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 Significant recent research has focused on the marriage of consumer preferences 
and engineering design in order to improve profitability.  However, in many markets, the 
profitability of new products for manufacturers is also a significant function of the retail 
channel structure through which the new products reach the ultimate customer. At the 
crux of the issue is the fact that channel dominating retailers, like Home Depot, Toys R’ 
Us, Wal-Mart have significant power arising from their hundreds of billions of dollars of 
sales revenue and have the ability to unilaterally control a manufacturer’s access to the 
customers.   
 A product design methodology is proposed that accounts for this new and 
important power asymmetry.  Manufacturer’s product success as defined by profit is 
affected by pricing at the retail and wholesale levels which in turn is dependent on the 
channel structure, i.e., retailer monopoly or duopoly.  These channel structures are 
explored in this dissertation under an econometric or game theoretic framework and the 
results are shown to have important implications for designers.  Additional non-
traditional considerations for engineering product design such as bundling and exclusive 
 
contracts which are typical for retail channels are also explored by integrating marketing 
models with a design optimization structure.  Lastly, some design methods for mitigating 
uncertainty in the strategic landscape of retailer dominated channels are developed.  
 The dissertation has three research thrusts. Research Thrust 1 is devoted to 
developing a product design optimization approach with retailer acceptance as a 
probabilistic constraint on candidate designs.  Slotting allowances are considered in 
concert with engineering design as complimentary approaches to achieving access to 
consumer markets.  The retailer’s decision framework and the design optimization 
approach of Thrust 1 are extended in Thrust 2 to include competitive pricing responses 
from both competing manufacturers and channel controlling retailers.    In Thrust 2 the 
implications for product design when manufacturers face monopolistic and duopolistic 
retail channels is explored as well as the design implications of an exclusive 
manufacturer/retailer relationship.  Finally, in Thrust 3 the prior thrusts are implemented 
for multiple product categories and product bundles in order to consider synergy and 
competition amongst multiple complementary designs.  Under this final Thrust 3, an 
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CHAPTER 1:      INTRODUCTION 
This dissertation presents new methods for integrating engineering design 
optimization with marketing and strategy models in the consideration of a major force in 
the modern retail market: the channel dominating retailer.  The methods proposed 
improve upon existing methods by incorporating the retailer’s ability to control and even 
possibly deny market access to manufacturer products by virtue of their consolidated 
position.  Including this externality (the retailer) provides a more realistic product design 
context.  Additionally, the product design optimization context is enriched through the 
proposed methods by allowing retailers and manufacturers to price products strategically 
in response to any introduction of a new design. 
The impact of tightly controlled channels (by retailers) is the overarching theme 
for this dissertation and several methodologies and analyses are developed to address new 
design and marketing practices relevant to this type of market.  The dissertation involves 
three research thrusts.  In research Thrust 1, a design methodology that accounts for the 
common practice of paying a retailer a fixed fee (slotting allowance) to guarantee shelf 
space is developed.  This analysis is performed under static competitor prices (i.e., retail 
and wholesale prices are assumed static).  In research Thrust 2, an approach is presented 
that accounts for the strategic pricing of competitor products in response to any design 
introduction which allows designers to consider strategic response in advance of 
introducing any design.  Using this approach, the impact of retailer characteristics 
(desirability to certain consumer segments) and the possibility of using one retailer 
exclusively as a channel partner are evaluated with respect to optimal designs.  Finally, in 
research Thrust 3 the simultaneous design of multiple products and product bundles 
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competing across categories for market share is considered.  In this final approach, the 
primary focus is on the strategic design of product bundles for greater profitability but 
additionally uncertainty in competitor strategy, cost models, and even design attributes is 
considered as a preliminary investigation into design for uncertainty in retail channels.    
1.1 MOTIVATION AND OBJECTIVE 
Engineering design is the foundation for product design.  Engineering design 
decisions are ultimately realized in products as attributes and features that are important 
to customers and the retailers who carry the products.  The realization that the decision 
for many of these attributes and features are made early in the design stage and are 
prohibitively costly to change in order to improve the marketability of the product, has 
led engineering design to focus on customer preferences in addition to the conventional 
engineering criteria. To that end, many approaches have been developed in recent years 
to collect and integrate customer preferences in the early stages of design in order to 
develop market-focused products.  However, a new force has emerged in the modern 
marketplace that requires additional consideration: the dominant retailer. Consolidation in 
the retail market has created some of the world’s largest corporations that control in 
excess of 70% of many markets (Cappo, 2003) thereby controlling the access 
manufacturers have to the consumer market.  In some cases, retailers have even become 
principal buyers for a supplier’s or manufacturer’s entire product line (Smith, 2002, 
Useem et al., 2003; Dukes et al., 2006).  In effect, the “Big-Box” retailers such as Wal-
Mart and Home Depot are gatekeepers to consumer markets and the manufacturer’s 
success depends on convincing retailers to carry their products (Bounds, 2006).  In fact 
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accounting for just 7 select retailer revenues revealed a total revenue in excess of $562 
Billion in 2006 (see Table 1.1.1) (Annual Reports, 2006).  
Retailer Revenue ($B) 
Wal Mart $313 
Home Depot $91  
Target $60  
Lowes $43 
Best Buy $31 
Circuit City $12  
Toys R' Us $12 
Total $562 
Table 1.1.1: Dominating Retailer Profits 
This revenue total is nearly 4% of the U.S. gross domestic product and higher 
than the 2007 U.S. Department of Defense Budget of $502 Billion (GPO, 2006). While 
these figures convey the consolidated nature and sheer size of modern retailers they do 
not express the drastic power shift from manufacturers to retailers.  As little as 30 years 
ago, the majority of retail products were sold through small local retailers frequently 
referred to as “Mom and Pop” stores (Boyd, 1997).  U.S. census data (U.S. Census, 2002) 
reveals that the number of retail establishments is continually dwindling and fell by 
800,000 establishments to 1.1 million establishments between 1972 and 2002.  
Considering a population increase of 50% during that same period the number of retailers 
per person has declined by 60% since 1972.  Not surprisingly, the revenue per 
establishment also supports this consolidation trend:  $650K/establishment in 1972, 
$1.1M/establishment in 1992 and $3M/establishment in 2002 (controlled for inflation).    
Further evidence of this power comes from the fact that multinational chains of stores 
have become commonplace as the rate of chain store openings continues to increase.  In 
the early 1960s the number of Wal-Mart stores numbered less than 15 while today they 
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amount to over 6,600 stores internationally.  Similarly, Circuit City and BestBuy now 
operate over 1,500 and 750 stores respectively (Annual Reports, 2006).  Lastly, this 
power shift is important because for most of the 20th century the manufacturers capable 
of developing and distributing products were the larger of the two parties involved in the 
retail channel (manufacturer and retailer) and could in effect “push” products on retailers.  
One need not search too hard to observe the reversal of this relationship.  Examples of 
retailers greatly overshadowing manufacturers include Home Depot’s $91 Billion in 
revenue vs. $6.5 Billion for its largest power tool supplier or Toys “R” Us $12 Billion vs. 
Mattel’s less than $5 Billion (Annual Reports, 2006).  Manufacturers are already forced 
to take this retailer power into account in the area of pricing and marketing. In this 
dissertation, the retailer focus is extended to an overall product design approach in the 
belief that manufacturers should be proactive in their engineering design considerations 
as they price and market their products. 
Retailers are primarily interested in vastly different metric than the manufacturers 
such as revenue per square foot versus the profit of a specific product offering.  
Logically, a retailer will only carry those products that maximize overall category profit.  
For example, Home Depot will only carry the five out of twenty available drills that 
generate the greatest revenue for the drill category.  This revenue depends on the 
competitive environment (e.g., prices at Lowes), preferences of customers toward the 
assortment of drills carried at Home Depot, and the accessories that are available for the 
drills. The retailer puts together these assortments and accessories in such a way to 
maximize the chances that customer will buy a product (and spend more) on any visit to 
the store.  Given that the retailer’s shelf space is limited, manufacturers have to carefully 
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consider (1) the attributes and features of their product vis-à-vis the assortment the 
retailer carries, (2) the strategic environment of the retailer (monopoly, duopoly, 
oligopoly, exclusive contract etc.), (3) the possible bundle of the product and the 
accessories, and (4) uncertainty in parameters supporting the design selection, all at the 
early design stage.    
In considering the gate-keeper role of retailers and the competitive products and 
their designs, a product designer cannot afford to take a “myopic” perspective in the 
design decisions by considering only his/her design and its impact on the market. 
Because engineering design decisions determine product cost and attribute positioning at 
the foundation of the development process it is logical to conclude that engineering 
decisions are transmitted to competitors and retailers as strategies to which they are 
forced to counteract. For example, just as a manufacturer considers retailers’ assortment, 
profit criteria, and competitors’ existing products in designing a new product, other 
competitors may anticipate this strategy and make their own move to influence the 
retailer. They might, for example, reduce their wholesale prices to the retailers to make 
the retailer margins more attractive. Or they may offer some additional features to their 
products to make them more appealing to retailers as well as consumers.  
Retailers, on the other hand, may also consider such strategic maneuvers in new 
product offerings and wholesale prices to make their own assortment decisions. Thus, 
these counteractions leading to a “game of moves and countermoves” in the marketplace 
call for the manufacturer to be “strategic” in their design decisions – that is, make design 
decisions by anticipating the moves of the competitors and retailers so that when the 
market is in equilibrium, none of the competitors or retailers have any incentive to 
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change the status-quo.  This dissertation seeks to integrate the strategic decision 
perspective with design engineering and marketing in a quantitative manner. The 
strategic design of the firm depends upon the projected market share of a new product 
offering as well as manufacturing costs estimated in the engineering phase considering 
the anticipated moves of competition and the retailers. Marketing relies upon engineering 
design to produce customer desired product attributes. Engineering design is charged 
with the complex task of developing products for uncertain customer preferences and 
competitive environments.   
Last but not least, uncertainty arises in many forms in product design. 
Traditionally, engineering design has focused on uncertainty in design parameters, 
customer usage and more recently customer preferences. Given the aforementioned lack 
of attention to strategic considerations and dominant retailers it should come as no 
surprise that uncertainty in competitor responses and channel controlling retailers have 
not been addressed. This uncertainty can arise from lack of knowledge about competitor 
or retailer assessments of: equilibrium pricing strategies, customer segment preferences, 
competitor costs (fixed and variable), competitor’s or retailer’s aversion to risk or 
existence of future competitor offerings.   Ultimately, the manufacturer would like to 
mitigate risk from uncertainty and exploit opportunities presented by the strategic 
environment.  Ideally a manufacturer’s decision making approach (See Figure 1.1.1) 
would simultaneously: 
• Maximize the chance of the product being selected by the dominant retailers 
• Maximize his/her own profit under strategic/competitive wholesale and retail 
price responses 
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• Reduce the uncertainty in the projected profit propagated from uncertainties in 
competitor strategies, customer preferences, demand fluctuations and cost 
projections.   
None of the current design methodologies reported in the literature account for the 
gate-keeper role of the retailer or the strategic interactions inherent in a channel 
environment while designing a product for success.  The focus of this dissertation is 
on addressing this gatekeeper role using the objectives listed above as overarching 



















Figure 1.1.1: Product Design for Dominant Retailers with Competition 
1.2 RESEARCH THRUSTS 
There are three main concerns (See Figure 1.2.1) that a manufacturer faces when 
developing products for retailer markets which will make up the thrusts of this 
dissertation.  First the manufacturer must ensure that the product makes it to market and 
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therefore must have a tractable approach for predicting the retailer’s acceptance decision 
(Research Thrust 1).  Second, responses of competitors will affect the profitability of the 
retailers and the focal manufacturer.  Realizing this, in Research Thrust 2 an econometric 
approach to accounting for competitive response at retail and wholesale levels will be 
integrated into the basic framework developed in Research Thrust 1.  Thrusts 1 and 2 
only consider strategic and design interactions within one product category.  In Thrust 3, 
the very common retail practice of bundling complimentary products (e.g., two different 
tools) from different product categories to compete in multiple product categories is 
explored.  Additionally, this thrust implements an initial investigation of the important 

















Figure 1.2.1: Design Considerations for Retail Channels 
1.2.1  RESEARCH THRUST 1:  ENGINEERING PRODUCT DESIGN 
OPTIMIZATION FOR RETAIL CHANNEL ACCEPTANCE 
An approach to modelling the importance of product acceptance by a dominant 
retailer will be investigated.  This foundational effort will assume that competing 
manufacturers do not have the capability to change their wholesale prices or product 
attributes in the near term, although the effects of competition will be addressed in 
subsequent chapters.   The purpose of the thrust will be to provide a manufacturer with a 
decision framework under which engineering design variables can be optimized for profit 
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while simultaneously ensuring that the dominant retailer remains as profitable or more 
profitable (indicating a high probability of accepting the new product by the retailer).  
The approach will endogenize the uncertainty in market segment’s preferences through a 
bottoms-up1 transformation of deterministic engineering design variables to customer 
relevant product attributes.  This is important because the value placed by each customer 
segment on each product attribute is uncertain and directly affects the decision 
framework of the risk-averse retailer.    
1.2.2 RESEARCH THRUST 2:  DESIGN FOR EQUILIBRIUM PRICING IN 
CHANNEL MARKETS 
In the short term, a price change is the only strategic move that is possible for a 
competitor (i.e., a design cannot change overnight for a competitor).  However, the prices 
are fixed for two quarters to several years.  Strategic moves are analyzed in the context 
that equilibrium is reached where none of the competitors (at the wholesale and retail 
level) can be made better off by changing their price.  This equilibrium pricing will 
ultimately affect the profitability of the retailers and manufacturers.  As such, a 
methodology is proposed that allows a manufacturer to predict both retail and wholesale 
price equilibria that result from engineering design decisions.   The manufacturer’s 
equilibrium profit is proposed as a substantially improved engineering optimization 
objective as it more accurately reflects reality.   Several cases are investigated that 
                                                 
1 Bottoms-up refers to the selection of specific engineering variables that when aggregated at the highest 
level result in quantifiable customer level product attributes.  This approach is distinct from the extant 
literature where attributes are selected at the highest level before engineering takes place (see e.g., Luo et 
al., 2007).   
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highlight the importance of: (1) monopolistic retailers, (2) duopolistic retailers , (3) 
customer preferences for different retailers, (4) and the possibility of exclusive contracts 
(which are prevalent for many retailers). 
1.2.3 RESEARCH THRUST 3: MULTI-CATEGORY DESIGN OF BUNDLED 
PRODUCTS FOR RETAIL CHANNELS CONSIDERING DEMAND 
DEPENDENCIES AND UNCERTAINTY IN COMPETITIVE RESPONSE  
One prevalent approach to increasing both retailer and manufacturer revenues is 
to improve the attractiveness of a product offering (to end customers) by bundling related 
items together for one price. To be most effective, bundled products should be developed 
with an integrated design approach that seeks to achieve synergies of value for the end 
customer as well as cost efficiencies through measures such as using common parts.  
Given these important interactions, a bundled product design approach is developed that 
takes into account strategic reactions (price changes) of retailers across the bundled and 
unbundled product categories and accounts for demand dependencies between bundled 
and unbundled goods. Additionally, there exists poorly defined uncertainty in terms of 
competing manufacturer product attributes, customer preferences, and even engineering 
design tolerances for many product categories.  To mitigate the risk of these 
multidisciplinary uncertainties a robust design approach is implemented in a novel 
manner to ensure acceptable product profitability and market share under a range of 
uncertain possibilities.  A bundled product design case study is presented for two 
complimentary power tools that offer a synergy in value.  Manufacturer profit and market 
share are optimized both deterministically and under intervals of uncertainty (robust 
optimization) surrounding competitor actions, cost models and engineering parameters.  
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1.3 ASSUMPTIONS 
In developing the design approaches in this dissertation, a few assumptions are 
made that are common to each of the research thrusts: 
• Firms have multiple competing objectives that are, to a large extent, functions 
of engineering design variables.  Foremost, a firm wishes to maximize profit 
but additionally a firm may wish to maximize market share or the profitability 
of its channel partners.   These objectives are usually competing and therefore 
candidates for multi-objective optimization.   
• During game theoretic or econometric price setting it is assumed that strategy 
sets of each competitor are known to all competitors and that players (retailer 
and manufacturers) are rational, strategic and exhibit foresight.  Rationality 
implies that decision makers attempt to maximize utility (Osbourne and 
Rubinstein, 1994).  Maximizing utility for game players (retailers and 
manufacturers) will generally mean maximizing profit. 
• Firms are risk averse and value the ability to choose less risky alternatives.  
Akin to some investors preferring high yield risky stocks and others preferring 
the 10 year treasury, it is assumed that firms are not merely risk neutral (i.e., 
wanting to maximize expected value).   Each firm can have a different risk 
tolerance or preference. As such, analyses are presented to show the tradeoff 
between predicted profit and a risk metric.  Frequently, in this dissertation, 
risk is quantified in terms of design rejection by the channel controlling 
retailer. 
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1.4 ORGANIZATION OF DISSERTATION 
The dissertation is organized in a sequential fashion as presented in Figure 1.4.1.  
Chapter 2 provides terminology and nomenclature common to the rest of dissertation as 
well as background information on tools such as Multiple Objective Genetic Algorithm 
(MOGA).  The initial analysis of the decision making by channel dominating retailers is 
made in Chapter 3.  This chapter provides an approach to design optimization assuming 
that retailers will only accept products that reliably improve profitability (Thrust 1).  It 
also assumes other retailers and manufacturers do not change their wholesale and retail 
prices.  In Chapter 4 additional layers of complexity are added to the modeling process by 
allowing manufacturers and retailers to alter prices in response to any new design offered 
by the focal manufacturer.  The goal of this effort is to understand how competitors will 
react to a presumably strong new design entrant.  A strategic or game theoretic 
framework is developed in Chapter 4 that allows these pricing reactions to take place 
(Thrust 2) and be accounted for during design optimization.  Chapters 3 and 4 analyze 
optimal design for the retail channel but for one product category only.  Chapter 5 
extends the effort to multiple product categories and includes an analysis and case study 
of product bundle design optimization for retail channels.  As shown in Figure 1.4.1 
uncertain modeling parameters are considered in Chapters 3 and 5 while Chapter 4 is 
deterministic.  Similarly, competitive pricing is only considered in Chapters 4 and 5 with 
the greatest emphasis on multilayered strategic pricing in Chapter 4.    In each chapter a 
multidisciplinary case study is presented that demonstrates the approach.  Finally, in 
Chapter 6 conclusions about the work are presented and comments about contributions of 
the dissertation are made along with options for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2:      DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY 
In this chapter, several definitions and terminologies are provided to facilitate 
understanding of the multidisciplinary environment that is the focus of this dissertation.   
Marketing and economics definitions that may not be well known in the engineering 
community are discussed in Section 2.2.  In Section 2.3, Multiple Objective Genetic 
Algorithms (MOGA) are describe to facilitate understand of Chapters 4 and 5 where a 
MOGA is used extensively. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past, engineering and marketing practitioners have been accused of each 
operating in a vacuum.  Although there have been several methods put forward to 
integrate engineering and marketing, none have specifically address the growing power 
of the retailer.  This issue is addressed in the present dissertation.  Due to the cross-
disciplinary nature of the problem we provide introductory definitions and terminologies 
in Section 2.2.  Additionally, less common definitions related to decision making and 
robust optimization are presented in Section 2.2. 
  An overview of MOGAs is also presented in this chapter as one of the preferred 
methods for solving non-convex problems with discrete design variable inputs.  
Additionally, MOGAs are capable of handling multiple objectives clearly very realistic 
given the sales and profit targets simultaneously pursued by most firms.  Solving such 
multi-objective problems generally yields and optimal set of solutions (Pareto frontier) 
which is discussed.  In this chapter we focus on the details of MOGA computations and 
demonstrate its usefulness in subsequent chapters for solving multidisciplinary problems.  
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2.2 MARKETING AND ECONOMICS DEFINITIONS AND 
TERMINOLOGIES 
A few terms from the marketing and economics literature are used throughout this 
dissertation that it may be useful to define:  
Assortment - For this work an assortment is defined as the products within a 
product family offered to consumers by the retailer (e.g., the 5 handheld angle grinders in 
the angle grinder product category at Home Depot) (Kotler, 2002). 
Bundle – The sale of two or more different products or services as a package.  
Bundling can occur with varying levels of independencies between products.  Product 
bundling has significant dependency while price bundling does not.  Product bundling 
requires significant foresight as the designs of the two or more products must perform 
well together to create any demand synergy.  In offering a bundle to a retailer the 
manufacturer should be mindful that the offering will likely cannibalize from two 
different product categories. 
Cannibalization – When a vendor introduces a new product that decreases 
demand for an existing product of the same vendor cannibalization of the existing 
product occurs (Kotler, 2002). 
Channel – A channel is a conduit by which goods or services are transferred from 
the producer to the customer (Coughlan, 2001).  For this dissertation, retail channels are 
explored where manufacturers use intermediaries (retailers) to transfer their goods to 
customers. 
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Choice (Demand) Model – Choice or demand models predict the demand for a 
product for a particular market or segment through the comparison of its utility to all 
other products available in the assortment (competing products) (Lourviere et al., 2004). 
Conjoint Analysis – A methodology for utility function estimation that relies on 
the comparison of hypothetical product profiles by potential customers.  The results of 
customer scoring, ranking or rating of the profiles are evaluated with a statistics package 
to estimate utility for individual attributes of a product which can in turn be used to 
obtain the overall utility for all attributes and based on choice model used to design or 
position a product (Green and Srinivasan, 1990). 
Duopoly – a special type of oligopoly where only two producers exist in one 
market. 
Exclusive (exclusive channel) – a strategy where a manufacturer uses only one 
reseller or retailer for his products (Moner-Coloques, 2006).  
Games or Game theory– refers to a broad array of microeconomic techniques 
used to analyze interactions amongst decision makers (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).   
In this dissertation competition for profitability of firms is modeled as game amongst 
non-cooperative players. That is, players do not form coalitions are collude to raise prices 
but rather compete to maximize their individual profitability.  Thus we are interested in 
non-cooperative games.  Additionally, the games are modeled under the assumption of 
“perfect information”.  Perfect information implies that that all players know the state of 
nature.  For example, all manufacturers and retailers know the preferences of customers 
with certainty.  Additionally, perfect information implies that all players know that the 
other players know the state of nature (consumer market in our case) and vice versa.     
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Monopsony – A single customer exists for a service or product.  This is similar to 
the situation where a single producer or manufacturer exists (e.g., monopoly).   
No Choice Option – The no-choice option is the option for customers to choose to 
not purchase any of the competing products.  It is included with a utility value for the no-
choice option in the demand model (Lourviere et al., 2004). 
Nominal Optimum – An optimal value for a deterministic (i.e., without 
uncertainty) optimization problem. 
Oligopoly – a market with only a few competitors (Vives, 1999).  
Price Equilibrium – A price equilibrium is reached when none of the players 
(competitors) has an incentive to change their product’s price: commonly referred to as a 
Nash equilibrium.  A Nash equilibrium is a widely accepted solution to competitive 
games that makes no claim about how the solution is reached only that it is a solution 
reached by rational decision makers taking into account the objectives of his/her 
opponent.  A Nash equilibrium exists under the competitive circumstances frequently 
encountered by manufacturers and retailers.  In games where the player’s profit functions 
are assumed to be continuous and twice differentiable in price it is sufficient to say that a 
Nash equilibrium exists if the profit functions for each player are quasi-concave in own-
price (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994).  Many profit functions exhibit quasi-concavity and 
for the basic cases of the logit choice model it has been proven that quasi-concavity exists 
(Anderson et al., 1992).    
Rational Decision Maker – A rational decision maker is one that is aware of his 
alternatives, forms expectations about unknowns (e.g., competitor pricing), has clear 
 19
preferences (e.g., prefers more profit to less) and chooses his action deliberately after 
some process of optimization. 
Robust Optimum – A robust optimum (for a maximization problem) for this 
dissertation will assume the definition that it is a design that with the  highest value that 
does not vary outside of an acceptable objective variation range when the uncontrollable 
(or uncertain) parameters are considered.  For this approach a decision maker must 
specify the acceptable variation range.  See Li et al. (2006) for full implementation 
details.   
Slotting Allowance - A slotting allowance is a fixed payment to a retailer by a 
manufacturer that entices the retailer to carry a product.  This payment offsets the 
retailers risk in committing shelf space to a product with uncertain demand (Lariviere and 
Padmanabhan, 1997), (Sudhir and Rao, 2006).     
Segments – Frequently consumers have heterogeneous preferences as an entire 
market yet can be grouped in to several groups or segments with significant internal 
homogeneity (Kamakura and Russell, 2003).   Segments have utility functions that are 
distinct from one another which provides an opportunity for increased accuracy in 
estimating demand.  For example, one segment of consumers may prefer heavy products 
for their perceived robustness while another segment might prefer light products for 
mobility.  If one just averages the two segment preferences the two extremes (heavy and 
light) could have equivalent utility which cannot provide insight as to which attribute to 
design toward (heavy or light).  In contrast, this is not a problem if distinct segment 
utility functions are used.  For example, when three products already exist in the heavy 
product segment the designer will be able to automatically identify the greater 
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profitability of the light segment which is underserved (fewer products with the light 
attribute exist).   
Utility – Utility is a measure of satisfaction that one derives from a good or 
service (Von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944).   
Value Proposition – The added benefit of a seller’s product relative to the next 
best alternative (Kotler, 2002 or Donaldson et al., 2006).   The value proposition made by 
a manufacturer to a retailer would be the improved profit for the retailer resulting from 
the improved product attributes.  From the retailer’s perspective an acceptable value 
proposition would result in a greater retailer profit by increasing the retailer’s overall 
market share or by reducing wholesale cost. 
2.3 MULTI-OBJECTIVE GENETIC ALGORITHM (MOGA) 
MOGA is an optimization technique capable of optimizing two or more 
objectives, f,  at one time.  It has the desirable property of being capable of globally 
optimizing non-convex problems with or without discrete design variables (Deb, 2001).  
MOGA will be used in chapters 4 and 5 to simultaneously optimize profit and market 
share objectives for the focal manufacturer.   Like all genetic algorithms, the MOGA is 
population based in that it starts with an initial set of designs (or a population) which are 
successively altered based on a strategy until the best population is found.  As shown in 
Figure 2.3.1 our MOGA implementation proceeds through a few simple steps.  First, 
design variables are generated as candidates to make up the first population.  These 
design variables are encoded and concatenated as binary strings for each instance of 
design variables or “individual” that is a member of the population.  Each individual is 
evaluated by an objective function call.  This is referred to as “simulation” in Figure 2.3.1.  
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Once the objective values are known for the population the individuals can be ranked in 
terms of performance.  This is known as fitness assignment or evaluation which is 
performed using a non-dominated sorting algorithm (NDSA) (Deb, 2001).  Consider 
Figure 2.3.2 which is the minimization of two objectives f1 and f2 .  Using NDSA, the 
purple dots are ranked lower (better) than all blue dots.  Essentially, the algorithm ranks 
lowest (best) the designs that no other design can claim to be better with respect to all 
objectives.   
The best ranked points are removed from the population and the NDSA is run 
repeatedly until all points are ranked.  Each time the NDSA loops through the population 
the rank index increases by one which means successive designs are ranked (worse) as 
they are selected by the NDSA.     
Once all points are ranked fitness assignment or evaluation is complete.  In the 
next two steps (Figure 2.3.1) after fitness assignment a new population is created.  One 
approach (as employed in this dissertation’s MOGA) is to partition the current population 
in to dominated and non-dominated designs.  The non-dominated designs and possibly 
more low ranked designs are copied to elite fractional space of the population to preserve 
the best members of the current population.  The remaining population members are 
generated using mutation or crossover functions with non-dominated and dominated 
designs as parents.  This mutation (flipping chromosome bits) and crossover procedure 
(swapping binary chromosome sections) guarantees that some offspring retain some of 
the non-dominated parent’s chromosome and can even improve upon the parent’s 
performance depending on the outcome of the mutation. Since the process is random it is 
also possible to have two dominated parents mate and create non-dominated offspring.     
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Once the new population is developed and sent back to the simulation stage for 
evaluation one generation has passed.  The process is repeated until a stopping criterion is 
met.  The stopping criteria can be a number of generations or a geometric evaluation of 
whether the Pareto Frontier (best ranked designs) is still getting better relative to a 
reference position in objective space.   The approach is implemented in Matlab’s genetic 
algorithm toolbox (Matlab, 2007) and uses the feasible over infeasible approach (Deb, 
2001) for constraint handling.  That is during fitness evaluation infeasible designs are 
ranked worse than all feasible designs regardless of their objective function performance.   
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Figure 2.3.2: Solutions to Multi-Objective Problem 
2.4 SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided an introduction to background economics and 
marketing material that may not be familiar to some engineers.  These definitions will be 
used throughout subsequent chapters in the development of our multidisciplinary 
approach.  Additionally, MOGAs were described briefly because they are used 
extensively in Chapters 4 and 5 to deal with multiple objectives simultaneously.  MOGAs 
are also ideal for solving discontinuous objective functions with discrete design variables 
such as those frequently encountered in product design.   
In the next chapter the channel design optimization problem will be tackled 
considering uncertainty in end customer preferences but will be limited non-strategic 
competition in terms of wholesale and retail product pricing.  That is prices are developed 
from a firm level analysis of margins rather than a game theoretic approach as presented 
in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 3:      ENGINEERING PRODUCT DESIGN 
OPTIMIZATION FOR RETAIL CHANNEL ACCEPTANCE 
Significant recent research has focused on the marriage of consumer preferences 
and engineering design in order to improve profitability.  The extant literature has 
neglected the effects of marketing channels which are becoming increasingly important. 
At the crux of the issue is the fact that channel dominating retailers, like Wal-Mart, have 
the ability to unilaterally control manufacturer’s design decisions as gatekeepers to the 
consumers or market.  In this chapter, we propose a new methodology that accounts for 
this power asymmetry and will be used by all subsequent chapters.  A chance constrained 
optimization framework is used in this chapter to model retailer acceptance of possible 
engineering designs and accounts for the important effect on the profitability of the 
retailer’s assortment through a latent class estimation of demand from conjoint surveys.  
The approach allows the manufacturer to optimize a product design for its own 
profitability while reliably ensuring that the product will make it to market by making the 
retailer more profitable with the addition of the new product to the assortment.  As a 
demonstrative example, we apply the proposed approach for product design selection in 
the case of an angle grinder. For this example, we analyze the market and are able to 
improve expected manufacturer profitability while simultaneously presenting the 
designer with tradeoffs between slotting allowances, market share, and risk of retailer 
acceptance.   
Section 3.1 provides the introduction and motivation for designing for retail 
channel acceptance along with a review of the extant research of integrated engineering 
and marketing design models.  An overview of the framework that is used to tackle the 
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problem multidisciplinary problem is provided in Section 3.2.   Sections 3.3 and 3.4 
model the decision criteria of the retailer and manufacturer respectively while Section 3.5 
provides a demonstration example that will be used throughout this dissertation.  Section 
3.6 provides analysis and discussion of the approach and conclusions are provided in 
Section 3.7.   
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Manufacturers have traditionally focused on consumers’ preferences as a strategic 
guiding light for designing successful products.  The recent development of the 
“superstore” and strong retail channels has rendered this consumer-centric paradigm 
somewhat inadequate.  In an expose (Frontline, 2004) of Wal-Mart business practices the 
question was asked “Is Wal-Mart good for America?”  To answer this question one must 
delve into the changes brought about by massive consolidation of retail storefronts by 
companies like Wal-Mart, Target and Home Depot.  The changes are sweeping to say the 
least.  One salient example exists in the lawnmower product category: 
Americans now buy more than 8.5 million push and riding lawn mowers a 
year – and they buy more than 70% of them at Wal-Mart, Home Depot, 
and Lowes.  Just twenty years ago 80 percent of lawn mowers were sold at 
independent retailers. 
     The Wal-Mart Effect (Fishman, 2006) 
The answer to the Frontline’s question largely depends upon whether or not you 
are a consumer, a producer (manufacturer) or competing retailer.  Consumers have 
benefited tremendously from reduced prices (8-27%, Singh, 2006), competing small 
retailers have obviously been negatively impacted or even driven out of business but the 
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less obvious affect is that manufacturers have less market power and must take into 
account strategic dominance of these retail players to gain access to consumers.   
This change in power over the last 20 years amounts to a shift from “push” to 
“pull” production (Frontline, 2004).   Traditionally manufacturers operated in a push 
mode where they designed products they determined consumers wanted and tried to 
convince or “push” retailers to carry the product.  This worked for a large part of the 20th 
century when manufacturers were relatively large compared to the small retail stores that 
carried their products.  The aptly named “pull” approach is a reversal of roles where the 
retailer partially dictates design requirements.  The retailer “pulls” in products based on 
their own objectives rather than entirely making the decision base on the desires of end 
customers.  The retailer still makes an assessment of what the consumer wants to stay 
competitive but, in a way, insidiously arranges assortments to maximize retailer profits 
rather than customer utility.  Thus the “pull” paradigm as discussed in this chapter 
amounts to a retailer profit focus vs. a focus totally on consumer utility.   
As mentioned in the Chapter 1, modern retailers have grown to such 
disproportionate size compared to their supporting manufacturers that one should expect 
a paradigm shift from the push to pull production to persist.   An obvious conclusion 
from massive retailer revenues present in Chapter 1 (Table 1.1.1) is that market power or 
control is derived from these revenues.  Given this position of power, the manufacturer 
must admit (perhaps grudgingly) that the retailer’s concerns ought to be taken into 
account in the manufacturer’s design decision process.  The retailer and manufacture both 
have the customer’s interests in mind but have conflicting objectives to maximize their 
own profits while serving the customers. These conflicting objectives put them on 
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adversarial positions. Thus if the manufacturer is hoping to maximize profits, he should 
realize this and try to co-opt the retailer by taking his considerations into account while 
serving the ultimate market (consumers).  This is our purpose in developing this chapter.   
It is generally agreed that retailers are profit maximizing entities who make 
decisions on which manufacturer products to carry based upon the availability of shelf 
space and the effect on their current assortment (Simpson et al., 2001).  Additionally, the 
channel controlling retailers can be influenced by human relational factors, and a myriad 
of manufacturer side incentives such as advertising or slotting allowances (Gilliland, 
2004).  Because as much as 90% of all new products fail (FTC, 2001), slotting 
allowances are offered by manufacturers as a risk mitigation feature for retailers.  Much 
of the business literature that has analyzed manufacturer/retailer relationships has 
concluded, with an almost obvious assertion, that while many of the factors are 
important, no single factor is as important as the short term profitability of the product 
selected to be carried by the retailer (Wagner et al., 1989, Shipley, 2001).  
In nearly all cases of retail environments and especially with retailer dominated 
channels, shelf space is finite (with the notable exception of online merchants).  It is 
therefore important for a manufacturer to evaluate his value proposition to the retailer 
(i.e., relative improvement for the retailer’s product line from a profitability viewpoint) 
within the context of the retailer’s assortment in order to assure channel acceptance 
(Simpson et al., 2001).  A product offering that completely cannibalizes (captures market 
share from) an equivalently profitable product will be poorly received.  In contrast, an 
unrepresented product (that has negligible cannibalization) with somewhat less demand 
or margin can be well received and added to the product category vice replacing an 
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existing model.  A retailer will add a product without replacing a competitor when shelf 
space is valued at less than the candidate product’s value proposition.  That is, the 
additional shelf space dedicated to the new product creates more profit than alternative 
products regardless of category.  Thus the manufacturer must ensure that his product 
makes the assortment more profitable than the existing assortment by supplanting a less 
profitable product or in fitting a niche.  This can be done by convincing some of the 
retailer’s customers, who currently are not buying any product in the category, to buy the 
new product (McIntrye, 1999).  We take the effect of the retailer’s assortment into 
account in our model of the retailer’s decision process using preferences of customer 
segments in the market, identified through a latent class preference (Section 3.3.4).    
The integration of marketing and engineering design is a burgeoning field, yet no 
model to date adequately addresses the role of the channel retailer as a gate keeper for the 
market (Luo, 2005).  Recent research has explored the interaction of collected marketing 
data and realistic engineering design constraints, e.g., (Li and Azarm, 2000, Wassenaar 
and Chen, 2003, Wassenaar et al., 2005, Michalek et al., 2005, Georgiopoulous et al., 
2005, Cooper et al., 2006, Besharati et al., 2006), to find an optimal solution for a 
financially oriented objective function.  For instance, Wassenaar and Chen (2003) and 
Wassenaar et al. (2005) use demand modeling or discrete choice analysis based on 
customer information (surveys) in the design of a universal motor.  Georgiopoulous et al. 
(2005) use a simple demand model for resource allocation and production capacity in the 
design of products.  They argue persuasively that “engineering decisions do not take 
place in a vacuum” and “economic, investment, and engineering design decisions affect 
each other implicitly or explicitly”.  While the reported approaches have been 
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improvements in the internal coordination of the manufacturer’s engineering design and 
marketing objectives they neglect to account for the retailer’s control of market access to 
end customers.  Our method is distinct in that we incorporate the concerns of an 
externality: the retailer.   
The objective of this chapter is to find product design solutions with maximum 
profit for a manufacturer consistent with previous work but also account for the growing 
importance and risk associated with the channel retailer.  We propose a manufacturer 
profit design optimization framework that treats customer segment preferences 
probabilistically in predicting retailer product acceptance.  A chance constraint that 
focuses on improving retailer profit in the face of uncertain customer preferences is 
employed to that end together with other engineering design constraints.   
3.2 BOTTUM-UP DESIGN FRAMEWORK 
The model we developed incorporates the channel power of a strong retailer 
through a bottom-up approach where a detailed engineering design module provides the 
foundation for marketing and cost estimating modules.  In actual industrial practice, 
marketing executives of the firm frequently select a target design for a product based on 
market research without regard to specific knowledge of the impact on engineering 
design.  We term this a naïve top-down approach because customer level product 
attributes are simply selected and passed down to the engineers to achieve with only 
occasional feedback.  It should be noted that there are top-down approaches (e.g., 
Waterfall in: Verner and Cerpa, 1997), Analytical Target Cascading (ATC), (Michalek et 
al., 2005), and others (Kumar, et al., 2006) that are not naïve in that they take into 
account multiple stages and feedback (waterfall) or multiple discipline objectives and 
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constraints with repeated feedback (i.e., ATC) or even multiple products in a family 
considering cost and manufacturing synergies (Kumar et al., 2006).   
While a naïve top-down approach is simple to understand and fits the hierarchical 
structure of many firms it has the deleterious effect of dictating high level attributes that 
may not be feasible (in terms of engineering design) or cost effective as cost is dependent 
principally on the engineering design.  Take for example, a firm executive that dictates 
that a new angle grinder must be extremely light and powerful and his conjoint studies 
suggest that a 1-lb angle grinder with an amp rating of 30 amps that costs less than all 
other products on the market would capture a large market share.  Such a target would 
not be feasible in the engineering design domain and also unachievable in the cost 
domain.  The only recourse in a naïve top-down approach is for the firm executive to 
guess which product attributes might be feasible and also a cost effective design.  Clearly, 
the naïve top-down approach can not approach optimality in terms of firm profit for these 
weaknesses.  ATC is an alternative top-down approach that with considerable additional 
complexity in sub-discipline coordination may be capable of performing such an 
information flow (top to bottom) with an optimal result. 
In contrast, our method begins at the engineering level or the lowest level 
decisions (e.g., selecting armature diameter instead of power output).  Unlike the naïve 
top-down approach the bottom-up approach (Figure 3.2.1) as used in our model is 
capable of incorporating the marketing models as a portion of the mapping that 
transforms engineering design variables, x, into product attributes, y, and to utility, u, and 
finally market share, m. Additionally, costs, C, are dependent upon the engineering 
design variables.  As such, the bottom-up approach allows the firm to develop a 
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generalized profit model which can be optimized and is completely dependent on 
engineering design yet incorporates the externalities of customer preferences and 
competitor offerings.  
Ultimately, the choice between a top-down and bottom-up approach may be most 
dependent upon the maturity of the product category in question and the commitment of 
the firm to innovation.  For fledgling product categories with a wide range of expansion 
and innovation possibilities the top-down approach may retain greater flexibility in 
simply setting performance goals at the top-level and allowing new sub-discipline models 
and options to be integrated as they become available.  For mature industries with well 
known costs, the bottom-up approach provides an efficient and logical method to quickly 
translate engineering design attributes into an estimated market share and profit.   
In the broadest sense, this is exactly what our model does but with the additional 
concern of satisfying the retailers profitability concerns (Figure 3.2.1).  It takes the inputs 
of engineering design variables x, conjoint surveys (customer utility estimates), and 
channel retailer shelf surveys (competitor product attributes) and outputs designs x that 
are acceptable to the retailer and provides optimal profits for the manufacturer.  The 
retailer’s decision is whether or not to carry a product which is of significant concern to 
the manufacturer as this determines market access in a highly consolidated retail market.   
This decision by the retailer is represented with a decision node near the top of Figure 
3.2.1.  The retailer decision is supported by the marketing module and takes into account 
the effect of a new product introduction on all products in the assortment.  The 
manufacturer’s decision of which product to produce or to what levels should design 
variables x be set is more complicated and influenced by feedback from the engineering 
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module, marketing module, and the cost estimating module.  The entire system is 
controlled by an optimization algorithm which in this case is single objective – 
manufacturer expected profit.  The latent class model (Kamakura and Russell, 1989) will 
compute the customer segment preferences prior to the optimization using conjoint 
surveys as an input and the number of segments defined by the user.  Thus the relative 
utility of a trial design will be readily known and as a consequence so will market share 
and profit.   
Engineering design (the selection of x) is the foundation of this approach although 
there are a number of intermediate steps as depicted in Figure 3.2.1.  Intermediate 
variables that are functions of design variables are denoted with an asterisk (*) in the 
nomenclature section of Chapter 1.  Each of the steps depicted in Figure 3.2.1 and the 
variables displayed will be explicated in detail in subsequent sections.  The overall 
objective of our formulation is to maximize manufacturer profit through the selection of 
engineering design variables x and a manufacturer’s suggested retail price MSRP.  The 
design space is bounded by a chance constraint that describes the probability of retailer 
acceptance as well as deterministic engineering constraints (e.g., heat flux, stress, etc.).  
We develop a model for the retailer’s product acceptance decision as a chance constraint 
in Section 3.3 and return to the manufacturer’s objective in Section 3.4.    
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Figure 3.2.1: The Bottom –Up Framework 
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3.3 THE RETAILER’S PRODUCT ACCEPTANCE DECISION 
We begin our modeling process of retailer acceptance of products, which will act 
as a constraint for the manufacturer’s problem, with several simplifications.  First, we are 
interested in a channel environment where a single or a few dominant retailers hold the 
majority of the channel power.  Singular dominance for many product categories in many 
regions of the United States is very much the case with Wal-Mart (frequently referred to 
as a monopsony).  Signs of slightly more dispersed channel power asymmetry also exist 
in the power tool industry (Home Depot and Lowes) and the consumer electronics 
industry (Best Buy and Circuit City).  The centralized power enjoyed by these retailers is 
a major concern for manufacturers and can result in a “produce/not produce” decision 
based solely on the acceptance of the dominant retailer.  As a result, we model using Eq. 
(3.1) the channel decision maker as a chance constraint (Birge and Louveaux, 1997) on 
the manufacturer’s design selection problem, where the left side of Eq. (3.1) computes 
the probability P of the value proposition ψ being greater than the switching cost 
threshold b.  To satisfy this constraint, the probability computed on the left side must be 
greater than the acceptance level α specified by the designer:  
           ( ) [ ]10,∈≥≥Ψ ααbP          (3.1) 
The probability of acceptance can be selected by the designer to determine what type of 
design will satisfy the retailer α% of the time since the retailers actions cannot be known 
with certainty.  Also, one can solve for α if a product design (including MSRP) is already 
known.  Such a constraint can be thought of as being similar to a traditional reliability 
constraint where, for example, a beam of design x1 will fail with a probability of (1- α)% 
given the uncertainty in loads and beam characteristics. 
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Frequently, in the literature, it is mentioned that retailers act on relational factors 
as mentioned previously.  The relationship with the various manufacturers’ sales people 
would be an example.  The switching cost threshold, b, can be used to take this into 
account along with the decision maker’s personal aversion to change (Simpson et al., 
2001).  A risk neutral retailer would require a probability of acceptance marginally above 
50% in order to justify switching to the new assortment.  For our analysis we will 
examine various levels of retailer acceptance probability α.  Manufacturers would 
obviously prefer that the dominant retailer will reliably accept their design and develop 
product designs to that end.    
3.3.1 COMPUTING THE RETAILER VALUE PROPOSITION 
The manufacturer’s value proposition is the means by which it can convince a 
retailer to carry its product. The value proposition ψ is defined as the amount by which 
the proposed product offering will improve the retailer’s profitability.  It is a critical 
component of the acceptance criteria established in Eq. (3.1) and the only means by 
which a manufacturer can overcome the indifference of the retailer or the switching cost 
threshold.  An assumption is made that the retailers evaluate all products within the 
context of the retail assortment.  The manufacturer takes the retail assortment into 
account in trying to convince a retailer to carry their product.  A model of the value 
proposition is shown in Eq. (3.2): 
ON ππ −=Ψ       (3.2) 
The profits of the new and previous assortments, πN and πO, can be decomposed 
into several components as we refine our model. 
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π                 (3.3) 
The contribution of each product, i=1,…,n, to the retailer’s profit is the product of market 
share, mi, market size N, and retail margin (Pi-Wi).  The demand variable m is estimated 
with the latent class model, see Section 3.3.4.  Summing the contribution of the n 








π          (3.4) 
Where for the prior assortment profit, πO, we sum the contribution for the p prior 
products just as we did for the original assortment.  Essentially, the manufacturer is 
attempting to convince the retailer that the new assortment n will be more profitable than 
the old assortment p through this value proposition. 
3.3.2 RETAIL MODELS WITH SLOTTING ALLOWANCES 
In general, a slotting allowance is a monetary incentive offered to a retailer when 
a manufacturer knows little about the demand for a new product (Lariviere and 
Padmanabhan, 1997), (Sudhir and Rao, 2006).    Essentially, the manufacturer guarantees 
an initial fixed payment (slotting allowance) to the retailer in order to obtain acceptance 
and therefore shelf space. Retailer acceptance models that consider slotting allowances 
are relatively sparse in the literature.  Lariviere and Padmanabhan (1997) and Desai 
(2000) develop deterministic models where manufacturers set prices and slotting 
allowances first and then the retailer’s decision is developed as a subsequent profit 
maximization model.  In contrast Shaffer (1991) and Chu (1992) (as noted by Sudhir and 
Rao, 2006) develop deterministic models where the retailer sets an optimal slotting 
allowance policy which is substituted into the manufactures profit maximization model.  
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Richards and Patterson (2004) develop a unique stochastic model where the value of a 
new product and slotting allowance as a real option with only product returns modeled as 
Brownian Motion/Poisson or a jump diffusion process. 
Our approach (like Sudhir and Rao, 2006; Lariviere and Padmanabhan, 1997 and 
Desai 2000) is to add the slotting allowances to the value proposition in the retailer’s 
decision model:  
( ) α≥≥+Ψ bAP                              (3.5) 
Eq. (3.5), is modeled as a chance constraint (i.e., stochastic constraint) and takes into 
account the multi-dimensional uncertainty in segmented customer preferences.  These 
uncertain customer preferences result in uncertain demand levels and are thus a critical 
portion of the value proposition in Eq. (3.5) (See Section 3.3.3 for implementation 
details).   
Slotting allowances are interesting in the context of a chance constraint as in Eq. 
(3.5) in that the slotting allowance itself is a deterministic quantity that can be used to 
offset increased uncertainty in the value proposition for the retailer.  Although empirical 
information about slotting allowances is scarce (Sudhir and Rao, 2006) our analytical 
interpretation of slotting allowances as a one time offset to retailer risk in accepting new 
products is consistent with the literature (Bloom et al., 2000; Sudhir and Rao, 2006; 
White et al., 2000).  A variety of slotting allowance and product offering combinations 
satisfy the same constraint which we discuss fully in Section. 3.6.2. Manufacturers can 




3.3.3 SOLUTION TO THE FULL RETAILER MODEL 
As mentioned previously (Section 3.3.2) our method is unique in its approach to 
modeling the retailer’s decision under uncertainty although probabilistic and reliability 
constraints are frequently used in engineering design (Du and Chen, 2004, Zou and 
Mahadevan 2006).  Specifically, we take into account in engineering design the uncertain 
utility that customer segments will assign to all preferences, not just rate of return as in 
Richards and Patterson (2004). We demonstrate the implementation of these uncertain 
preferences with the latent class model in this section and how the risk can be mitigated 
by a slotting allowance.  To understand the mechanics of evaluating slotting allowances 
in light of this risk, it is useful to combine the previous equations for an aggregate view 
of the retailer’s constraint: 


































                    (3.6) 
We can simplify the above equation prior to finding the deterministic equivalent 
of the chance constraint. For example, through the use of a representative retailer’s 
annual report a retailer’s margin can be assumed (e.g., Home Depot: 37%), which is 
equivalent to the quantity Pi-Wi written as GMRetailer×Pi.  Using the prior market’s known 
product offerings, we can compute the prior assortments profit πo using market shares for 














Reπ                             (3.7) 
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Initially we assume that the manufacturer is interested in only one channel 
retailer, has decided against slotting allowances, and assumes negligible switching cost so 
that the chance constraint can be further reduced to:  













Re          (3.8) 
At this point it is useful to apply the well known result (Charnes and Cooper, 
1963; Vajda, 1972; Birge and Louveaux, 1997) for developing the deterministic 
equivalent of a chance constraint which assumes that random variables are normally 
distributed.  (However, even if this normal distribution assumption does not hold, it is 
possible to find a transformation that makes the random process approximately normal 
(Albada and Robinson, 2007).) Consistent with the normal assumption, the market share 
mi is assumed to be stable and normally distributed random variable. The mean for each 
products market share is calculated as:  
     ( )ii mE=µ       (3.9) 
It is assumed there will be some covariance amongst the product market shares so 
a variance – covariance matrix is developed through Monte Carlo simulation of uncertain 
customer utility estimates as explained in Section 3.3.4.  This variance-covariance matrix 
is used to calculate the overall standard deviation of the jointly distributed random 
variables where: 























                              (3.10) 
                              )( iii mVarv =                                (3.11) 
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                                  ( )jiij mmCovv ,=                          (3.12)                         
[ ] [ ]nT PPPPPVP ,...,,,/ 2121 =⋅⋅=σ                            (3.13) 
i and j are the column and row indices of the variance-covariance matrix.  The variance 
makes up the diagonal elements and the covariance terms make up the off-diagonal 
elements of the variance-covariance matrix.  All variance and covariance terms are easily 
estimated using Excel’s built-in variance and covariance functions and the latent class 
model developed in Section 3.3.4.  Taking the norm-inverse (F-1) of the resulting 
standard deviation and the probability complement, the chance constraint takes the form 
(Charnes and Cooper, 1963):    
















itailerio αµπ    (3.14) 
We assume that the competing manufacturers maintain their current pricing 
levels.  In reality, some of the manufacturers will respond to the new product by adjusting 
their value proposition.  Generally, for directly competing products, the wholesale price 
will go down making the retailer’s profit margin much more attractive for the entire 
assortment. This reduction in competitor prices actually aids the attacking manufacturer 
in strengthening his value proposition by increasing the right side of the chance 
constraint, Eq. (3.14).   It is important to note that it has been observed that wholesale 
prices can increase under increased competition but this is not the norm (Berstein and 
Federgruen, 2003).  We do not adjust pricing for competing products in our model for 
tractability but are able to provide a conservative and appropriate estimate of retailer 
acceptance through the use of the chance constraint.  This is a significant improvement 
over deterministic models and is in keeping with the general perception that slotting 
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allowances are offered to mitigate the retailer’s risk.  Additionally, we consider risk 
related to uncertain customer preferences which have not been modeled stochastically 
with slotting allowances.    
3.3.4 ESTIMATION OF PRODUCT DEMAND 
The latent class approach (Kamakura and Russell, 1989) recognizes that there 
exists in the market distinct latent segments of consumers who use different choice 
criteria and that the accuracy of market share can be improved through this consideration 
of heterogeneity in preference modeling. The segments for the latent class approach are 
independent of demographics.  Customers are grouped based on the similarity of their 
preferences for the various features that make up the power tool rather than ethnicity, 
gender or socio-economic backgrounds.  For example a segment of consumers shopping 
for an angle grinder may prefer low weight models that by design are also usually lower 
in amperage.  This segment could be made up of hull technician demographic (typically 
grinding fiberglass hulls overhead) and the DIY (Do-It-Yourself) single female who may 
want, for instance, a light tool for furniture paint stripping.  The latent class model groups 
individuals based on similarity of their preferences (i.e., both demographics prefer a light 
tool) and estimates the overall size of the segments based on a least squares fit of the 
collected conjoint data.  Additionally, to minimize errors in estimating customer 
preferences and maximize the use of marketing resources, conjoint experiments can 
efficiently be developed to reduce the number of experiments necessary to achieve 
acceptable levels of error by as much as 50% (Huber and Zwerina, 1996).   
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In order to estimate a given product’s share of a segment using the latent class 
approach we sum up utilities u of the j attributes of product i within the segment 
(Kamakura and Russell, 1989): 







                  (3.15) 
A piecewise linear interpolation is assumed for all non-integer attributes in calculating 
utility. 
The same procedure is performed for each of the n competing products 
(assortment). We are able to estimate the segment share of product i in segment k while 
taking into account the utility of the no choice (or no purchase) option Unc: 













)exp(                 (3.16) 
This is one of the key steps in developing a model that adequately addresses 
assortment in the channel retailer situation.  It should be obvious now that as a new 
product is introduced that has different attribute levels than the existing assortment the 
probability of selection is altered for all products. It is worth noting that b in Eq. (3.5) can 
also be used to represent the value that the retailer places on an additional unit of shelf 
space.  In the case where a significant portion of the population is underserved (i.e., 
prefer the no choice or no purchase option) it may be advisable to design products that 
the retailer may add to the assortment instead of displacing an existing model.  We 
suggest the additional space can be analyzed by setting the value b equal to the estimated 
value of the shelf space.  This approach is necessary because the out-of-category product 
currently occupying the shelf space will not affect the in-category market share mik and 
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therefore the value of the shelf space must be accounted for outside of the market share 
computation. 
The process in Eq (3.16) is performed for each of the segments k for the given 
assortment of products.  The total market share (%) of a given product is computed from 
the segment size S (%), market share in each segment mik (%):           
                 ∑ ×=
k
ikki mSm      (3.17)                  
In order to take into account the stochastic nature of the utilities it is necessary to 
add a random element ε to the utility function. 







ε     (3.18) 
The final distribution of mi is used in the chance constraint and is estimated with 
Monte Carlo simulation of each attribute j, in each product i, in each segment k.  Each mik 
is the average of the simulations after completing Z iterations of Eq. (3.16) with point 
estimates from Eq. (3.18).  Thus the number of simulated attribute utilities necessary 
Sims is the product of Monte Carlo iterations Z, the quantity of products i, the number of 
segments k and the number of attributes j:  
         kjiZSims ×××=                             (3.19)       
3.4 THE MANUFACTURER’S DECSION 
The manufacturer develops products within a strategic context.  This is significant 
because designs that are only profitable in the short term may not produce lasting 
competitive advantage (Porter, 1985).  There are many methods for evaluating the 
strategy of a manufacturing firm in the strategic management literature (e.g., Drucker, 
1973, Mintzberg, 1987, Porter, 1996).  We propose a flexible profit maximizing function 
 44
that allows the manufacturer to pursue a number of strategies depending upon the 
decision making process of the retailer.  Under our model the manufacturer can pursue a 
cost leading (lowest cost), quality leading (highest quality), or differentiation2 marketing 
strategy. 
The manufacturer is concerned with a profit maximizing strategy for a given time 
horizon.  The time horizon for this profit maximization is of critical concern.  For 
example, in many industries it is acceptable to post losses on products to gain future sales 
in the form of predatory pricing (Lindsay and West, 2003).  In addition, it has become 
common for manufacturers to develop a bundling strategy where losses are posted on one 
item in order to tie-in sales on another.  The most frequently quoted example of this is the 
losses on inkjet printers for future profits in cartridges.  And more recently there exists 
examples where manufacturers suffer losses on video game consoles to promote game 
sales.  With some modifications our model should be capable of approaching these 
combined decisions through a generalized profitability model that accounts for the timing 
of revenue through Net Present Value (NPV) analysis as well as the bundling effect by 
using a combination of demand models in the objective function that include the prior 
profitability of unbundled assortments and the new profitability of bundled assortments.  
Bundling and the timing of cash flow are not explicitly modeled in the example problem 
of this work but are proposed as appropriate candidates for extending the approach. 
 As stated earlier we assume that the manufacturer has the intention of 
maximizing profit or shareholder value.  It is well accepted (Grinblatt and Tittman, 
                                                 
2  Differentiation strategy refers to a strategy where a manufacturer offers products that differ from 
competitors along one or more attribute in order to fill a niche that prefers the offered set of attributes. 
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1998), (Cantor and Lippman, 1983) that financial decisions take into account time and 
financial uncertainty.  Most simply put, our objective function is to maximize the NPV of 
profit: 
( ) FlowsCashNPV:MAX      (3.20) 
The development of the manufacturer model based on cash flows is somewhat 
more complex (with the addition of production costs C) but consistent with our analysis 






:                                (3.21) 
This representation of the variable cash flow incorporates the fact that the 
manufacturer has to evaluate its production decision within the context of its current M 
offerings or product line.  It would make very little sense for the manufacturer to expend 
the effort to develop a product that cannibalizes another product in his own line that is 
currently profitable.  This model endogenizes the possibility of this cannibalization by 
summing over all products in the product line, N.  We add the effect of time on our 
revenue where WACC is the weight adjusted cost of capital used to discount cash flows 









































3.4.1 PARAMETRIC PRODUCTION COST MODEL 
Numerous methods for estimating the cost of production exist in the literature.  
Related methods vary from detailed design estimates to novel neural network 
applications. Parametric methods, initially developed by the Department of Defense in 
WWII to estimate the cost of producing additional warplanes, have been the most widely 
used over the last half century and remain so today in government and industry (D.O.D., 
1999).   For example, the most popular software cost estimating technique of the 80’s and 
90’s is parametric and is still in use:  Constructive Cost Model or COCOMO (Boehm, 
1981).   
A detailed estimate is far too expensive and cumbersome for the early stages of 
design and can limit the design space (Scanlan, 2002) whereas parametric methods are 
quick, efficient, and accurate so long as sufficient historical information is available, 
production methods have not changed, and an extremely refined design resolution is not 
necessary.  The product of interest in this article exists in a mature industry where 
production techniques are well-established and significant historical and current market 
data exists.  Parametric methods are suitable in this instance as our product category is 
essentially a slightly differentiated commodity where all producers have similar cost 
structures.  Parametric estimation assumes that the commodity production techniques are 
well developed (nearly optimized already), that all producers are similarly competent, 
and that the economy of scale has already peaked due to large product volume (1 million 
units or more for our producer).  Costs are simply then a function of higher level product 
attributes.  This allows the designer/estimator to base cost relationships on engineering 
performance attributes such as: weight, speed, size, etc. (D.O.D., 1999).  These are 
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similar characteristics to the project level parameters in the widely validated COCOMO 
(Boehm, 1981).  That is not to say that the cost model and subsequent design 
considerations could not be made better with the inclusion of learning curves, and factors 
of scale but rather the parametric approach is sufficient for this application. 
Additionally, under a scenario where a manufacturer is first entering a new 
product category it is unlikely that s/he will have access to detailed production cost 
estimates or even be inclined to expend resources in developing cost estimates without 
first developing a strategy.  Parametric estimation is particularly well suited for this 
situation as performance characteristics and attributes for existing models in the product 
category are readily available.  Retail prices are the most readily available cost data for 
retail products (as opposed to wholesale prices which are confidential) and with a little 
effort: wholesale and production costs can be estimated using constant retail and 
wholesale margins.  For this chapter we begin with a dominant channel retailer’s 





=Re                      (3.23) 
We use this gross margin to discount the retail price of a potential product along 
with an analysis of a manufacturer’s annual report which has a similar structure yet Cost 




=                           (3.24) 
These margins determine the percentage of the retail price made up by the 
physical production costs, C: 
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     )1)(1( Re MFRtailer GMGMRC −−=           (3.25) 
This analysis yields a much generalized characterization of production costs 
relative to retail prices that is appropriate for the average product produced by the subject 
manufacturer and sold by the channel retailer.  In order to develop a cost model that 
accurately fits the market characterized by the specific margins of interest we use 
multiple regression analysis (Winston, 2004) to relate engineering performance 
parameters to production cost.  Further details and an example are provided in Section 
3.5.2. 
3.4.2 THE COMBINED MANUFACTURE/RETAILER MODEL 
The combined model for the manufacturer’s decision is then formulated to 
maximize future cash flows based on a latent class market share function and a 
parametric cost model subject to engineering constraints and retailer acceptance: 




































      




































           
 (3.26) 
The engineering constraints g(x) are endogenous to the model.   
The simplest scenario is one where the manufacturer offers only one product 
(NPD), and only one retailer exists to sell that product (a very strong channel 
relationship).  Additionally, we make the assumption that the retailer has fixed shelf 
space and that the manufacturer’s product must replace an existing product.  For this 
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dissertation, we assume that consumer preference does not change in time so we know 
that a decision that maximizes profit in the first period will maximize profit in all 
subsequent periods.   
3.5 CASE STUDY APPLICATION 
A demonstration example for our methodology was developed based upon a 
popular consumer product category:  right angle grinders.  These tools are used for in a 
variety of industrial and home settings and provide an excellent example of a product 
with multiple disparate customer segments.  The tool is used for applications ranging 
from cutting high modulus steel to shaping wood and fiberglass products.  We develop 
the latent class estimation of demand in Section 3.5.1, a parametric cost model in Section 
3.5.2, and a detailed engineering model to ensure feasibility in Section 3.5.3.  The 
problem demonstration is optimized using variations of Eq. (3.26) in Section 3.6.   
3.5.1 MARKETING MODEL EXAMPLE:  ANGLE GRINDER 
The latent class segmentation portion of the Sawtooth Software Market Research 
Tools (SMRT) (Sawtooth, 2001) was used to analyze 249 conjoint surveys of angle 
grinders (Figure 3.5.1) in the development of Table 3.5.1.   
 
Figure 3.5.1: 4.5” Angle Grinder Commonly Used for Masonry and Metal Work 
As shown in Table 3.5.1 each segment has an estimate of utility mean (µ) and 
standard deviation (σ) for several possible alternatives of product attributes.  The utilities 
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are normalized by Sawtooth (Sawtooth, 2001) and therefore add up to zero for an 
attribute category.   
 
Segment One Two Three Four 
Share 37.80% 24.80% 12.10% 25.30% 
 µ σ µ σ µ Σ µ σ 
Brand         
W -0.5 0.12 0.5 0.08 2.2 0.11 -0.2 0.05 
X 0.2 0.12 1.1 0.09 -2.4 0.12 -0.2 0.14 
Y 0.8 0.14 0.1 0.12 -1.5 0.15 1.2 0.16 
Z -0.5 0.13 -1.6 0.11 1.7 0.06 -0.8 0.16 
Price         
$79.0 -0.1 0.16 -0.1 0.01 0.0 0.07 0.0 0.12 
$99.0 -0.9 0.13 -1.2 0.04 1.9 0.08 -0.2 0.08 
$129.0 1.0 0.13 1.2 0.07 -1.9 0.09 0.3 0.08 
Amps         
6.0 1.3 0.08 0.5 0.12 -1.5 0.11 -0.5 0.13 
9.0 0.1 0.09 -1.4 0.13 -0.7 0.12 -2.4 0.12 
12.0 -1.4 0.10 1.0 0.15 2.1 0.12 2.8 0.22 
Life (hrs)       
80.0 -0.9 0.10 -0.1 0.12 -4.7 0.07 0.8 0.15 
110.0 1.3 0.11 -0.5 0.08 -5.8 0.03 0.7 0.18 
150.0 -0.5 0.12 0.6 0.11 10.5 0.01 -1.5 0.12 
Switch type       
Paddle 0.4 0.14 0.3 0.10 -3.3 0.04 -0.7 0.13 
TopSlider -1.0 0.19 -0.7 0.12 -3.0 0.04 0.4 0.15 
SideSlider 2.4 0.16 -0.1 0.07 2.5 0.04 0.6 0.05 
Trigger -1.8 0.16 0.4 0.15 3.9 0.03 -0.3 0.15 
Girth         
Small 2.5 0.10 0.7 0.15 1.5 0.02 2.4 0.11 
Large -2.5 0.08 -0.7 0.13 -1.5 0.05 -2.4 0.13 
Weight 
16lbs -2.3 0.06 -0.8 0.07 -0.5 0.03 1.5 0.13 
9 lbs 0.5 0.10 -1.2 0.08 2.0 0.03 0.5 0.03 
6 lbs 1.8 0.17 2.0 0.02 -3.5 0.02 -2.0 0.13 
No Choice -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  -0.2  
Table 3.5.1: Utility Estimates for Four Segments 
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An example of segment shares is shown in Table 3.5.2 for a sample set of 
attributes for 4 existing tools (A to D) and the new product development (NPD) of the 
focal manufacturer:  
 Tool A B C D NPD 
Brand W X Y Z X’
Price ($) $79.00 $99.00 $129.00 $79.00 $101.93
Amps 6.00 9.00 12.00 6.00 6.59 
Life (hrs) 80 110 150 110 110
Switch Paddle Trigger  Side Side  Side  
Girth Small Large Large Small  Small  
Weight (lbm) 5.00 9.00 16.00 5.00 7.2 
Segment % 21.3 0.04 18.9 22.8 36.9 
Table 3.5.2: Example Segment Share 
Customers in Segment One prefer high prices, low amp ratings, small girth, light 
weight, side slider switch etc.  Each of the designs in Table 3.5.2 partially satisfy these 
desires as the designs are truly intended for all segments at once.  Each of the segment 
shares in Table 3.5.2 are dependent upon how well the product fits the segment 
preferences as well as the competing product attributes as the total utility of all products 
forms the denominator in Eq. (3.16).  It is worth noting that negative attributes such as 
the heavy weight and large girth of Tool C can be overcome by positive segment 
attributes such as high price (a signal of quality to some consumers (Daughety and 
Reinganum, 2007, Fluet and Garella, 2002) and the side slider switch. 
3.5.2 COST MODEL EXAMPLE:  ANGLE GRINDER 
Twenty available grinder models were collected from two large retailers that can 
be characterized as channels in and of themselves.  C was computed for each model using 
the margins developed in the preceding paragraphs.  Many characteristics available for 
the twenty models were investigated as explanatory variables for cost, including: switch 
type, amp rating, mass, torque, RPM, body length, etc.  Production cost was set as the 
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dependent variable with each of the characteristics tested as independent variables.  
Conveniently multiple-regression is capable of obtaining β values (see Eq. (3.27)) for 
binary data through the coding of dummy variables.  An example of a dummy variable is 
a “1” for the presence of a slider switch and “0” for not present.  The switch types for the 
grinders were coded as dummy variables in order to determine if a significant cost 
relationship existed between the switch type and production cost.  The model was tested 
for its assumptions using usual diagnostics (i.e., normality test, test of homoskedasticity, 
and tests for independence of error terms and validation of linear assumption) and it was 
determined to be reliable and valid for the application. See Winston (2004), Milton and 
Arnold (2003) or Render et al., (2006) for a detailed review of multiple regression and 
selection of predictor variables.  All variables from Table 1.1.1 were tested with t-Stat, P 
values and R-Squared statistics.  The only two variables that had significance in terms of 
t-Stat, and the corresponding P value were the amps I of the tool and the power to weight 
P/W ratio.  Additionally, the t-Stats for Amps and Power to Weight ratio were 
significantly higher than required for the number of degrees of freedom applicable.  Thus 
the null hypothesis is rejected for Amps and Power to weight ratio yielding a 78.5% 
explanatory value.  The functional form of the regression model is shown below: 
eWPICi +++= )/(210 βββ               (3.27) 
where β1 and β2 are the multiple regression coefficients with values of 3.6160 and 0.1865 
respectively, and the estimate’s intercept β0 is found to be -29.294.  The error in the 
prediction is represented with e.  The ANOVA table for this multi-regression is presented 
in Appendix A. 
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3.5.3 ENGINEERING MODEL DEMONSTRATION: UNIVERSAL MOTOR 
AND BEVEL GEARS 
An engineering model is necessary to produce feasible designs that generate 
product attributes that can be evaluated within the context of the latent class model.  As 
mentioned previously, this chapter explores the design space of an angle grinder.  Several 
existing and validated design models exist for the major components of the angle grinder 
such as the universal motor (Simpson, 1998) and the American Gear Manufacturers 
Association standard for bevel gears (Hurricks, 1994).  We used these design models to 
develop optimal products in concert with the latent class segment model by transforming 
engineering attributes into consumer level product attributes.  The two components of 
greatest interest (motor and bevel gear set) are shown in Figure 3.5.2. 
 




Pinion pitch diameter Dp (m) 0.009≤ Dp ≤ 0.03 
Current I (amps) 6≤ I ≤ 12 
Gap thickness lgap (m) 0.0005 ≤ lgap≤  0.07 
Stack length L (m) 0.01≤ L ≤ 0.02 
Armature turns Nc (# of turns) 20 ≤ Nc ≤ 300, Nc ∈ Ζ 
Stator turns Ns  (# of turns) 10 ≤ Ns ≤ 200, Ns ∈ Ζ 
Gear ratio r 0.2 ≤ r ≤ 4 
Stator outer radius Ro (m) 0.01≤ Ro ≤ 0.01 
Stator thickness t (m) 0.0001≤ t ≤ 0.1 
Table 3.5.3: Engineering Design Variables 
The engineering design variables x make up the physical characteristics of the 
motor and bevel gear assembly (Table 3.5.3).  These design variables go through a series 
of engineering computations in the process of transforming them to measurable customer 
level attributes used in the latent class model (Table 3.5.4 and Table 3.5.5).  Table 3.5.4 
and Table 3.5.5 develop in a sequential fashion to facilitate the readers understanding of 
computation dependencies. For example, Ar in line two of Table 3.5.4 depends on lr in 
line one.  Those designs that meet the physical constraints (Table 3.5.6) are eventually 












Armature diameter lr (m) lr =2(Ro-t-lgap) 
Armature section Ar (m2) 4/)(A 2r rl⋅= π
Wrap length lrw (m) Llr 22A r +=
 ρ (ohm-m) 20 awg 0.036 ohms-m 
Wire area Aw (mm2) 20 0.504 mm2 
Arm. resistance Ra (ohms) wrwca AlNR /)(ρ=
Stator resistance Rs (ohms) wrwsa AlNR /)(2 ρ=
Resistance losses Pcopper  )(2 ascopper RRIP +=
Brush coefficient α (volts) α =2  
Brush losses Pbrush  (W) IPbrush ⋅= α
Voltage V (volts) V=120 v 
Power in  Pin (W) VIPin ⋅=
Motor output Pout (W) copperbrushinout PPPP −−=
Density  Steel ρ s (kg/ m3) ρ s = 8000(kg/ m3) 
 ρ copper (kg/ m3) ρ copper = 8900 (kg/ m3) 
Stator mass M s  (kg) soos LtRRM ρππ ⋅⋅−−= ))()(( 22  
Armature mass M a  (kg) sra LAM ρ⋅⋅=
Windings mass Mw  (kg) copperwscrww ANNlM ρ⋅+= )2(  
Motor mass Mm  (kg) wasm MMMM ++=
Motor constant K  π/cNK =
Magnetomotive force ℑ  INs=ℑ
Mean stator path  l c  (m) 2/)2( tRl oc += π
Stator cross section As tLAs ⋅=
Armature section Aa (m2) ra lLA ⋅=
Gap cross section Ag (m2) rg lLA ⋅=
Permeability of steel 
steelµ  steelµ =1000 
Permeability, free space 
oµ  
7104 −⋅= πµo
Stator reluctance sℜ  )(2/ sosteelcs Al ⋅⋅=ℜ µµ
Armature reluctance 
rℜ  )/( aosteelrr Al ⋅⋅=ℜ µµ
Air gap reluctance gℜ  )/( gogapg Al ⋅=ℜ µ
Total reluctance totℜ  gastot ℜ+ℜ+ℜ=ℜ 2
Flux φ  totℜℑ= /φ
Torque T (N-m) IKT /φ⋅=
Revolutions per minute N )(/)(549.9 mNTkwPN out −⋅=  
Table 3.5.4: Universal Motor Design Computations 
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The computations in Table 3.5.4 are dependent upon the input of the design 
variables and the inputs of several constants such as the resistivity and cross sectional 
area of 20 awg copper wire.  Looking forward to how our engineering design variables 
will affect the customer level attributes one can see that decisions such as stator diameter 
and stator thickness will invariably affect the overall weight of the tool and the girth, 
which are attributes analyzed in the conjoint study.    
Pinion torque (load RPM)  Tp (N-m) rpPT outp 65004599 /. ⋅=
Gear torque (load RPM)  Tg (N-m) rTT pg ⋅=  
Pressure angle φp °= 20pφ  
Cone distance C (m) ))(2/( pp SINDC φ⋅=  
Face width b (m) b=.008 m 
Gear pitch diameter Dg (m) rDD pg ⋅=  
Tooth loading intensity Fi (N) (/(2 CbDCTF ppi −⋅⋅⋅=
Elasticity factor (Carbon steel) Ze  189=eZ  
Zone factor ZH 2)2(/(4 pH SINZ φ⋅=  
Pinion pitch angle θg )/( CDASIN pp =θ  
Shaft angle γ °= 90γ  
Gear pitch angle θg pg θγθ −=  
Pinion cone depth dv (m) )( ppv SECDd θ⋅=  
Gear cone depth Dv (m) )( gpv SECDD θ⋅=  
Amplification (light/medium shock) 35.1=aK  
Load distribution (precision gears) 2.1=mK  
Geometry factor J J=.25 
Number of pinion teeth N t N t =11 
Module (pinion) m m=D p / N t 
Pinion mass Mp (kg) 4/)( 2 steelpp bDM ρπ ⋅⋅⋅=
Gear mass Mg (kg) 4/)( 2 steelgg bDM ρπ ⋅⋅⋅=
Bevel gears mass Mbg (kg) gpbg MMM +=  
Table 3.5.5: Bevel Gear Design Computations 
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Two design variables are necessary for modeling the bevel gears in addition to those 
already chosen for the motor.  The pinion pitch diameter Dp (m) and gear ratio are 
allowed to vary as design variables and allow for a wide range of gear designs (Table 
3.5.5).  
The engineering constraints g(x) (Table 3.5.6) help avoid the stereotypical 
problem of the marketing domain dictating solutions in the engineering domain that are 
infeasible.  We fuse the two domains in our objective function and the constraints of 
Table 3.5.6 to ensure that the optimal product in terms of manufacturer profit and market 
share is also feasible.  In addition to the constraints used in previous work (Simpson, 
1998, Wassenaar and Chen, 2003) we use several physical constraints to ensure sustained 
operability of the motor such as limiting the magnetic flux B and the heat flux Ks. 
Flux density armature Br (T) TAB ar 5.1/ ≤= φ
Flux density stator Bs (T) TAB ss 5.1)2/( ≤⋅= φ
Flux density air gap Bg (T) TAB gg 5.1/ ≤= φ




















Length to diameter ratio 5/ ≤GL
Integer turns int, =sc NN
Grinding wheel RPM Nout 10000/ ≤= rNNout
Bending stress σb (Pa) MPaJmFKK imab 145)/()( ≤⋅=σ  










Armature tip velocity va  )/(3658 smlNv ra ≤⋅⋅= π
Table 3.5.6: Grinder Constraints g(x) 
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Motors are also limited in terms of speed because a mechanical failure of the 
armature wire is possible due to centripetal force.  Also of concern are the grinding 
wheel’s material limitations which are frequently stamped on the wheel as not to exceed 
10,000 RPM.  Serious injury could result as the wheel shatters if the 10,000 RPM is 
exceeded.  The grinding wheel RPM and armature velocity need to be considered 
separately as we have gear ratio, r, as one of our design variables.  Lastly, we employ two 
constraints for the bevel gears to ensure that the contact stress, σf, and the bending stress, 
σb, of the gear tooth do not exceed the, σy, yield strength of the carbon steel.  Numerous 
other calculations were not included as they were never active during the optimization 
search.  Examples include constraints for shear stress in the bevel gear shaft, armature, 
and stator.   
Girth G (m) G=2(Ro+.004(m)) 
Amperage I (Amp) I 
Fixed mass Mf (kg) kgMMM commutarcordf 58.1......=++=
Total mass Mt (kg) Mt=Mbg+Mm+M f 
Table 3.5.7: Customer Level Product Attributes y 
As mentioned previously the girth of the tool and the total mass of the tool are 
important customer level attributes.  We assume a fixed mass for the grinder’s cord, 
commutator, gear shafts, plastic body and 5/8th inch (industry standard) arbor, and safety 
shield.  The weight of 1.58 kg was determined empirically and assumed fixed as 
preliminary calculations show that all of the fixed components were capable of handling 
12 Amp motors.  It is conceivable that one could develop a set of design variables x for 
each of these components and include them in the overall optimization problem.  In this 
section we have shown how the customer level attributes of weight, amperage, and girth 
are dictated by engineering level design variables.   
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3.6 CASE STUDY RESULTS 
The Power Tool Institute (Luo, 2005) estimates the size of the angle grinder 
market to be 9 million units with our channel retailer controlling at least 1/3rd of this 
market or 3 million units.  For comparison an original assortment that included a tool 
from brand W generated an objective function profit of $15.95 Million for the subject 
manufacturer.   Initially, we focus on the case that the market is mature (little incentive 
for advertising), the manufacturer does not consider slotting allowances and s/he has 
already sunk costs into plant property. This type of analysis is demonstrated in Section 
3.6.1.  In Section 3.6.2 we reinsert the slotting allowance A and demonstrate the effect of 
slotting allowances on retailer acceptance of the optimal design generated in Section 
3.6.1.  Comparing the two approaches to reliable acceptance shows that different 
combinations of engineering designs and slotting allowances can achieve the same 
reliability with varying success in terms of profitability. 
For this problem we used 1,000 Monte Carlo simulations Z.  We examine 5 
products with 7 attributes within 4 segments for a total of 140,000 random variables.  A 
deterministic optimization of the model takes approximately 5 seconds but when the 
chance constraint is added the additional computations of 1,000 market shares requires 
approximately 150 seconds.   The mi are computed as before and Table 3.6.1 is an 
example of estimated market shares for the 5 products in the assortment.  
Tool A B C D NPD 
Margin $29.23 $36.63 $47.73 $29.23 $44.03 
Market  19.49% 0.04% 18.67% 12.94% 52.49% 
Table 3.6.1: Example Market Share 
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As mentioned previously the latent class model simulations are used to estimate 
the variance-covariance matrix using Excel’s built in functions.  This matrix and the 
product margin complete the chance constraint.  The Standard Evolutionary Solver 
(Nenov and Flystra, 2003) (a genetic optimization algorithm from Frontline Systems 
Premium Solver) was used with the following genetic algorithm parameters: population 
(1,000), generations (1,000), mutation rate (0.075), precision3 (0.000001), convergence4 
(0.0001).  It is possible to use other optimization algorithms for problems such as this but 
we found the genetic algorithm most suitable because some of the engineering design 
variables are integers and discontinuities exist in the calculation of market share due to 
linear interpolation of utility between adjacent points.  After running the optimization 
problem through the genetic algorithm the manufacturer’s profit improved for the NPD 
(Table 3.6.2) substantially when requiring a 75% probability of satisfying the chance 
constraint. The new product of the profit per unit and the market share increased to 
$13.09 unit which yields a total profit of $39.29M or an increase in total profit of $23.34.   
Tool Brand Price AMP LIFE 
(hrs)
Switch Girth Weight 
Prev. W $89.00 10 80 Side  Small  9.00 
NPD Y $129.00 6 110 Side  Large  8.8 
Table 3.6.2: Previous and New Product Development (NPD) Comparison 
 
 
                                                 
3 Precision – amount of allowed constraint violation for both equality and inequality constraints. 
4 Convergence – a user specified parameter that terminates the problem when 99% of the members of the 
final population are different by less than the convergence parameter in terms of the objective function.  
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3.6.1 TRADEOFFS IN MANUFACTURER’S PROFIT VS. RETAILER’S 
ACCEPTANCE 
In a sense, for this example we have two objectives where the first objective is to 
maximize profit and the second is to ensure meeting our chance constraint with a high 
probability, e.g., the constraint epsilon approach to multi-objective design (Deb, 2001).  
Figure 3.6.1 shows that as we increase the requirement that the chance constraint be met 
with a higher probability the expected profit of the design falls.  This result is expected 
because a higher probability of acceptance constricts the design space more than a low 
probability of acceptance and thus some more profitable designs are pruned from the set.  
It is worth noting that the retailer acceptance constraint was not active at an α level of 
75% but was active for α=[80%, 95%] and no feasible solutions existed for α=99%.  That 
is, there were no designs that could create a 99% probability of retailer acceptance given 
the level of uncertainty in customer preferences.   
A Pareto set of designs (see Chankong and Haimes, 1983, Steur, 1986, Miettinen, 
1999, Deb, 2001) is presented in Table 3.6.3.  Interestingly, although somewhat 
expectedly, we see that designs that are highly profitable yet have lower probability of 
acceptance have similar characteristics.  These designs are characterized by heavy 
weight, large girth, low power, and high prices.  At the other extreme are designs that 
have a very high chance of satisfying retailer acceptance.  The right side of Table 3.6.3 
and Figure 3.6.1 show that very acceptable designs (to the retailer) are lower in price, 
lighter in weight, larger in girth, and are more powerful. A grouping of moderately 
acceptable designs with moderate profit has been identified in the center of Figure 3.6.1.  
This middle group of designs has some attributes that lie between the ranges of the 
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extreme design groups (weight, price, and power).  In apparent contradiction to general 
design trend the middle group is characterized by small girth.  A decidedly non-
quantitative approach was used to group the designs along the Pareto Frontier.  We 
simply looked at the inflection points or where the curvature changed along the Pareto 
Frontier and in conjunction with the high level design trends in Table 3.6.3 with the 
purpose of demonstrating the affect of retail channel constraint on engineering design.   







75.0% 80.0% 85.0% 90.0% 95.0% 100.0%





















Figure 3.6.1: Profit vs. Probability of Acceptance (%)  
The implications of results such as Figure 3.6.1 and Table 3.6.3 are discussed in 








Profit $M $39.29 $38.90 $35.27 $31.08 $25.80 $24.64 $23.73
Probability 
Acceptance (%) 75.0% 80.0% 85.0% 87.5% 90.0% 92.5% 95.0%
Design Variables 
Nc (turns) 150 150 150 150 149 149 149
Ns (turns) 25 18 12 13 23 22 22
Ro (m)  2.2 2.0 1.79 1.83 2.11 2.10 2.108
T(mm) 7.4 5.5 3.6 4.0 6.8 6.7 6.75
Lgap (mm) 3.3 2.0 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
I (amps) 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.44 6.82 7.74 7.88
L (m) 0.143 0.143 0.105 0.067 0.034 0.034 0.034
Gear Ratio (r) 2.00 2.00 2.78 4.00 4.00 4.00 4.00
Pinion Pitch Dp 
(cm) 1.35 1.35
1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35 1.35
Select Attributes 
Price $129.0 $129.0 $129.0 $129.0 $127.4 $118.5 $116.2
Weight (lbm) 8.80 8.11 6.50 5.70 4.99 5.01 5.00
Girth (Large/ 
Small) Large Large Small Small Large Large Large
Table 3.6.3: Pareto Frontier of Designs 
3.6.2 SLOTTING ALLOWANCE SENSITIVITY 
It is also possible to determine a slotting allowance necessary to ensure a specific 
probability of acceptance which precludes the need to change the design.  As an example 
we compute the slotting allowance required to improve our optimal product’s acceptance 
probability (Table 3.6.2 NPD solution) above the initial 75% threshold.  The NPD design 
in Table 3.6.2 is held fixed and the right side of the chance constraint is manipulated by 
adding the slotting allowance A.  The total slotting allowance for the assumed 3M units 
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Figure 3.6.2: Effect of Slotting Allowance 
These results will be compared to those of Section 3.6.1 in Section 3.7. 
3.7 DISCUSSION OF APPROACH AND CASE STUDY 
 Based on our case study and through the development of our approach we believe 
there are several important results that might be generalized to the overall issue of 
designing products for retail channel acceptance.  We feel that three primary areas 
provide the greatest insights for design and focus on them for our discussion.  These areas 
are: (1) the importance of customer preferences and the retail assortment on design, (2) 
the impact of retailer acceptance on design, and (3) the considerations of slotting 
allowances along with the firm’s strategic position in selecting a design. 
3.7.1 IMPLICATIONS OF CUSTOMER PREFERENCES AND 
ASSORTMENTS ON PRODUCT DESIGN 
In performing the process proposed in this chapter a multidisciplinary design team 
can present a Pareto frontier of designs to upper management for selection.  Clearly, a 
typical engineering approach of simply finding the Pareto set of designs with respect to 
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engineering constraints is not capable of finding these same solutions.  For example, a 
traditional engineering approach would attempt to find design variables that minimize 
cost and maximize performance such as amp rating, power, or power to weight ratio.  
This is all very logical to an engineer to perceive high power ratings, low cost and high 
power to weight ratio as desirable although the most difficult to achieve.  One only needs 
a cursory review of the consumer segment preferences (Table 3.5.1) to see that somewhat 
counter intuitively (to the engineer) many consumers prefer heavier products with lower 
power ratings which do not lie along the engineer’s personal Pareto frontier.  Some 
consumers even prefer a higher price which directly contradicts the downward sloping 
demand curves implemented in Georgiopoulous et al., (2005) and Michalek et al., (2005). 
Beyond the issue of consumer utility not corresponding to an engineer’s utility for 
designs there exists further complications with the assortment and market segments that 
exist. That is to say that, a designer cannot simply characterize an entire markets utility 
function and expect to design an optimal product without considering the assortment.  
Our approach aids manufacturing teams (marketers and engineers) in finding designs that 
take into account the positioning (product attributes) of competitive products and 
automatically obtains solutions that capitalizes on the most profitable segments.  In fact, 
the first solution in Table 3.6.3captures 54%, 0%, 0%, and nearly 97% of segments 1 to 4 
respectively while the last design captures 86%, 3%, 0%, and 42% of segments 1 to 4.  It 
would be nearly impossible for an engineer to identify that a heavy product, with low 
power, large girth and high price best satisfy these segments which are evidently most 
vulnerable in terms of competitor offerings.   
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The problem is further complicated by the fact that segments vary in size S to a 
great degree (see Table 3.5.1).  Integrating the latent class customer segment model or a 
model of equivalent resolution is an appropriate approach to dealing with this 
complexity.  Likewise, without engineering model integration it would be impossible for 
a marketing manager to predict engineering design feasibility as well as the profitability 
of the segment due to a lack of knowledge about cost.  A marketing manager can easily 
propose a set of product properties that are costly to achieve and erode profit yet appear 
to be desirable to many segments.  The equivalent error in the engineering domain would 
be to design for high level product attributes that are desirable to a segment yet without 
regard to the positioning of competitive products (i.e., the segment may be already 
saturated).  Our approach overcomes these problems by integrating the two domains with 
careful translation of engineering design variables to market share and finally to total 
profit. 
3.7.2 IMPORTANCE OF RETAILER ACCEPTANCE CRITERIA TO DESIGN 
Most importantly, our results indicate that one can actually design products with 
greater acceptability to retailers.  We can observe that the design changes significantly as 
greater reliability is enforced between the 75% and 95% range (e.g., the transition from 
heavier, less powerful products to lighter, more powerful products).  The change in 
design is observed for several reasons but they are all related to the enforcement of the 
chance constraint which we attempt to explain.  In positioning the products in Table 3.6.3 
the optimization algorithm will select products that only marginally satisfy retailer 
acceptance.  Two types of designs are acceptable to the retailer.  Those that increase 
profit without increasing uncertainty and those that increase profit enough to offset any 
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increase in uncertainty affecting the chance constraint.  If we remember that the customer 
has a “no purchase” option it should be apparent that uncertain utilities can (in some 
realizations) result in a reduction of the overall market size.   
As mentioned in previous sections, the algorithm presents new products to each of 
the segments for the computation of segment share.  These new products obviously have 
different attributes and it can be observed in Table 3.5.1 that each attribute has a different 
level of utility uncertainty surrounding it.  A design that has a high mean utility might 
also have a greater amount of uncertainty for a segment.  Ideally, new attributes would 
have higher utility and lower uncertainty.  New designs will replace segment shares of 
competitor designs that have higher or lower levels of uncertainty in the Monte Carlo 
simulation which, of course, yields varying levels of market share.  The designs on the 
left of Table 3.5.1 and Figure 3.6.1 represent the most uncertain designs to the retailer in 
terms of utility uncertainty and relative to the competitor designs yet have the greatest 
expected profit for the manufacturer.  The designs on the right of Table 3.5.1 have lower 
uncertainty in terms of utility and are less competitive (in terms of capturing market share 
for the manufacturer) with the more certain or profitable competitor designs in the 
existing assortment.   
It is not the intent of this chapter to suggest that in all firms the design team must 
generate a Pareto set for management that satisfies engineering constraints and the 
acceptance constraint.  Alternatively, management can set the reliability constraint level 
prior to optimization but for many the Pareto set will provide more information for upper 
level decision makers.  When presented with the Pareto set decision makers can perform 
tradeoff analysis with knowledge of the range of possibilities as well as knowledge that is 
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not explicitly modeled.  For example, a firm that has recently suffered common stock 
price erosion from negative press may select a higher level of acceptance probability to 
avoid the synergy of negative news.  A tradeoff can be performed between the designs for 
actual design selection. For example, the risk neutral manufacturer might consider the 
expected profit to be E[P]=α⋅Profit since a rejection results in zero profit.  In the case of 
the results tabulated in Table 3.6.3 the risk neutral manufacturer would actually select the 
design corresponding to α=82.5% as this has the highest expected profit (E[P]=αP 
=0.825⋅ $37.76=$31.15) including the 17.5% risk of rejection.  Other methods for 
including risk aversion of manufacturers can be employed in future work such as 
developing a utility function for the probability of success and profit (e.g., Clemen and 
Reilly, 2000). 
3.7.3 SLOTTING ALLOWANCES: CONSIDERATIONS FOR THE FIRM IN 
DESIGN SELECTION 
As mentioned previously, slotting allowances are commonly used in the retail 
sector to ensure retailer acceptance of a manufacturer’s products.  Providing the slotting 
allowance (Section 3.6.2) increases acceptability much the same way that altering the 
design can (Section 3.6.1). In comparing Figure 3.6.2 and Figure 3.6.1 the most obvious 
difference is that increasing the slotting allowance (Figure 3.6.2) is capable of achieving 
nearly 100% probability of retailer acceptance where adjusting the engineering design 
(Figure 3.6.1) was unable to do so.  Second, we observe that a profit of $32.8M with a 
95% probability is possible by increasing the slotting allowance to just over $6M where 
changing the design to improve acceptance reduces the profit to just under $23.9.  This 
demonstrates that the manufacturer has two possible methods for achieving reliable 
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acceptance of designs that might be used separately or in conjunction as we’ll try to 
demonstrate. 
Realizing that the manufacturer can delay the slotting allowance decision until 
negotiations with the retailer adds considerable flexibility to the design selection process.  
The design decision and slotting allowance selection can be tailored to the focal 
manufacturer’s unique cash flow and balance sheet position.  For example a firm that has 
significant cash reserves might select a financially riskier design (lower probability of 
retailer acceptance) from Figure 3.6.1 in the anticipation that the subsequent negotiation 
of a slotting allowance with the retailer will produce the greatest profits along the curve 
from Figure 3.6.2.  In contrast, a firm with lower cash reserves (i.e., unable to offer a 
$6M or higher slotting allowance) can select a design further along Figure 3.6.1 
accepting lower profitability for higher acceptance reliability based solely on engineering 
design.  A new slotting allowance tradeoff could be developed for this higher acceptance 
probability design in the same way that we did for Figure 3.6.2.  The manufacturer with 
lower cash reserves could then evaluate the design selection with respect to the range of 
acceptability for his/her more limited slotting allowance reserves.   
The Pareto frontier in Figure 3.6.2 is a valuable tool for the decision maker in 
evaluating the probability of channel acceptance in conjunction with a slotting allowance.  
It should be possible to perform engineering optimization using the slotting allowance as 
an additional design variable as a logical extension to our work.  This would (as 
suggested by Georgiopoulous et al., (2005)) even further integrate business decisions 
with engineering which is critical to the competitive advantage of the firm.  Additionally, 
even though competitors are considered static (i.e., not going through a product offering 
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refresh) in our analysis, the model is easily extendable to considering uncertainty in 
competitor offerings through a probabilistic treatment of assortment attributes in the 
market share and chance constraint formulation.  For example, if a manufacturer is 
concerned about a simultaneous new offering from a competitor, additional uncertain 
parameters can be added to the chance constraint and the risk can be mitigated with the 
use of focal product design, slotting allowance or both as in Figure 3.6.1and Figure 3.6.2.  
We feel that this tradeoff between product design, slotting allowances, and the modeling 
of the risk aversion of the firm would be most useful to practitioners and academia alike.   
3.8 SUMMARY 
The primary contribution of this approach has been to provide a decision 
framework for manufacturers in developing products for an emerging economic force 
which we have termed the channel dominating retailer.  Some previous work has been 
reported in integrating engineering with consumer preferences but those methodologies 
have not addressed the realities of modern retailer controlled channels.  The design 
decision process presented in this chapter also enables the manufacturer to more 
accurately predict the market share of his/her own product by estimating demand across 
consumer segments.  Lastly, this chapter provides a framework for the manufacturer to 
assess risk of channel acceptance through a chance constrained methodology and thereby 
make appropriate design decisions with regard to a slotting allowance.   This constraint 
on retailer acceptance for product design will be used extensively in Chapters 4 and 5 as 
additional considerations are added to the modeling process.  
The model is an improvement over extant methodologies but improvements and 
extensions are of course possible.  Thus far, the approach has neglected the competitive 
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response of manufacturers and retailers to the entrance of a new product.  Manufacturers 
can respond in the short term by changing prices and by designing new products in the 
long term.  Even more importantly, retailers will price products to maximize their 
products which can affect manufacturer market share and profit remarkably. For this 
reason, econometric models or game theory models will be employed in Chapters 4 and 5 
to account for such responses.  These results provide a first step toward these 
enhancements as the decision framework of the manufacturer and retailer have now been 
formed.   
In the next chapter this decision framework will be employed with a game 
theoretic modeling of prices at the retail and wholesale levels with the goal of more 
accurately determining design optimality under competition.  This chapter arrived at an 
estimate of wholesale prices from fixed margins and assumed retail prices stay constant 
as a new product is introduced.  The next chapter will address these limitations by 
allowing competitors to respond to new entrants with their best response which is taken 










CHAPTER 4:      STRATEGIC ENGINEERING PRODUCT DESIGN 
FOR MONOPOLISTIC AND DUOPOLISTIC RETAIL 
CHANNELS 
In this chapter, a method is presented for manufacturers to anticipate the reactions 
of retailers to new designs, in terms of their retail pricing, and consider them early in the 
engineering design process. A key consideration in the approach is that retailers carry 
multiple products and have to select and price them as an assortment while considering 
competitor retailer assortments. A multi-product price equilibrium is developed for retail 
markets with differentiated products and a demand function based on the multinomial 
logit (MNL) model.  This equilibrium result is used to extend the approach developed in 
Chapter 3 to develop optimal engineering designs considering equilibrium pricing.  The 
approach significantly improves the focal manufacturer’s projected profitability by 
probing the design space for new designs that better fit the requirements of end-customer 
segments while considering several common channel pricing structures.  The results 
show that the channel structure considered has a significant impact on optimality of 
product design. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  After the introduction in Section 
4.1, an overview of our proposed framework along with model assumptions and 
justifications is provided in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we provide the specifics of the 
methodology in translating a product design to its corresponding market share estimate. 
Section 4.4 highlights the specifics of modeling the strategic interactions along with the 
key theorems that drive our proposed empirical methodology.  In Section 4.5 we briefly 
discuss the application that provides an illustration of our methodology.  In 4.6 different 
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strategic cases are evaluated with the case study and results discussed. Section 4.7 
provides some concluding remarks.  
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The product development process has been defined as the transformation of a 
market opportunity into a product available for sale and involving disciplines of 
marketing, operations management, organizational management and engineering design 
each focusing on critical decisions (Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). These critical product 
design decisions are ultimately realized as product attributes and features that are 
important to the market and must compete against other products along multiple attribute 
dimensions, including price. The realization that the decision for many of these attributes 
and features are made early in the design stage and cannot be changed significantly to 
help the marketability of the product or its economic success, has led to cross-disciplinary 
approaches in many of these related fields (Ulrich and Eppinger, 2004). To that end, 
many approaches have been developed in recent years to collect and integrate customer 
preferences in the early stages of design to provide the manufacturer flexibility in 
designing products that are market-focused.  Some of them focus on the information 
sharing and coordination aspects across disciplines (see e.g., Terwiesch et al., 2002); 
others propose specific design methodologies that consider cross-disciplinary impact and 
synergies (Morgan et al., 2001).  As mentioned in Chapter 3 with respect to the 
engineering design literature, the cross disciplinary methodologies developed have been 
improvements in engineering design aspects but assume that the manufacturer or 
producer interacts directly with the consumer in the marketplace.  These recent 
approaches rely on the estimation of customer utility for high level product attributes that 
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are the result of engineering design decisions.  High level product attributes are translated 
into market share and profit with implications focusing on competitive draw or market 
expansion using a discrete choice model and generally a cost model (see, for example, 
Ramdas and Sawhney, 2001).  
While the above methodologies are suitable for contexts where manufacturers sell 
products directly to consumers, their efficacy is seriously compromised in indirect 
channels where manufacturers have to go through retailers to reach their customers.  With 
the emerging clout of these retailers in their channel relationships, manufacturers are 
already forced to take this retailer power into account in the area of pricing and marketing 
(Luo et al., 2007). In this chapter, we extend our analysis to consider strategic pricing in 
the overall product design approach.  An integrated approach is proposed that considers 
not only customer preferences in the early stages of the engineering design process but 
also the retailer pricing decisions and assortment compatibility (i.e., is the product good 
for the assortment) so as to account for the gatekeeper role these powerful retailers play 
in the market.  
Retailers are primarily interested in vastly different metric than the customers in 
evaluating a new product to carry.  While strong overall customer preference for the 
product is expected, it is the revenue per square foot that will determine whether a retailer 
will carry the product – it has to maximize overall category profit.  For example, Home 
Depot will only carry the five out of twenty available drills that generate the greatest 
revenue for the drill category.  This revenue, in turn, depends on the assortment of drills 
that is available at the store for customer to buy. The retailer puts together these 
assortments in such a way to maximize the chance that customers will buy a product (and 
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spend more) on any visit to the store.  Given that the retailer’s shelf space is limited, 
manufacturers, therefore, have to carefully consider the attributes and features of their 
product vis-à-vis the assortment the retailer carries, and competitors product features and 
attributes, all at the early design stage so as to maximize the chances of the product being 
carried by the powerful retailers and being successful in the market.  
In considering the gate-keeper role of retailers and the competitive products and 
their designs, the manufacturer cannot afford to take a “myopic” perspective in the design 
decisions by considering only their design and its impact on the market. Because 
engineering design decisions determine product cost and attribute positioning at the 
foundation of the development process it is logical to conclude that engineering design 
decisions are transmitted to competitors and retailers as strategies to which they are 
forced to counteract. For example, just as a manufacturer considers retailers’ assortment, 
profit criteria, and competitors’ existing products in designing a new product, other 
competitors may anticipate this strategy and make their own move to influence the 
retailer. They might, for example, reduce their wholesale prices to the retailers to make 
the retailer margins more attractive. Or they may offer some additional features to their 
products to make them more appealing to retailers as well as consumers.  Retailers, on 
the other hand, may also consider such strategic maneuvers in new product offerings and 
wholesale prices in making their own assortment decisions.  Thus, these counteractions 
leading to a “game of moves and countermoves” in the marketplace call for the 
manufacturer to be “strategic” in their design decisions – that is, make design decisions 
by anticipating the moves of the competitors and retailers so that in equilibrium, none of 
the competitors or retailers have any incentive to change the status-quo.   
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This chapter seeks to integrate the strategic decision perspective with engineering 
design, manufacturing cost and marketing in a quantitative manner. The strategic design 
of the firm depends upon the projected market share of a new product offering as well as 
manufacturing costs estimated in the engineering design phase considering the 
anticipated moves of competition and the retailers. Marketing relies upon engineering 
design to produce customer desired product attributes. Engineering design and 
manufacturing are charged with the complex task of developing cost-efficient products 
for uncertain customer preferences and competitive environments. Using a strategic 
approach the designer will be able to develop a scenario that if a product is designed with 
engineering design variables x, that result in product attributes y, an equilibrium price P 
will result in the retail environment as a result of strategic interactions by competing 
retailers and manufacturers.  The retail price P determines market share m and 
manufacturer profitability П of the design which is the overall objective of the 
manufacturer.  The extant approaches in the integrated design-manufacturing-marketing 
literature have not endogenized the important pricing process in engineering design.      
With respect to the extant literature in the product development area, our 
approach focuses on the impact of downstream channel strategies on product design 
decisions, an area of limited focus thus far (see Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). Additionally, 
this chapter proposes a framework for marketing and product strategy within retail 
channels which is an area identified as requiring additional research (Krishnan and Loch, 
2005). From a pure analytical viewpoint, a number of game theoretic frameworks have 
been developed to understand strategic interactions with monopolies (Dewan et al., 
2003), duopolies (Savin and Terwiesch, 2005, Balsubramanian, 2004, Klastorin and Tsai, 
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2004) and oligopolies (Naik et al., 2005) which are commonly observed in modern 
manufacturing and retail environments.   The issue of multi-tiered strategic interactions 
(e.g., manufacturer duopoly, retailer duopoly) which is critical for modeling channel 
player behavior has been studied for simple and pre-existing product wholesale and retail 
pricing decisions (e.g., pricing of detergents) (Basuroy et al., 2001).  The multi-tier 
structure has been rarely extended to competing along multiple dimensions.  For 
example, Tsay and Agrawal study a single manufacturer/product with duopolistic 
retailers competing along two dimensions: service and price (Tsay and Agrawal, 2000).  
However, none of the previous approaches focus on the design of products. The one 
exception is the work of Luo et al. (2007) who empirically determine the high level 
product attributes for a manufacturer in an oligopolistic setting interacting with a 
monopolistic retailer.   Luo et al. (2007) have analyzed the econometric and marketing 
portion of the product pricing and attribute decisions without delving into the feasibility 
of any engineering design which is the focus of our approach along with a generalization 
of the approach to a retail duopoly.   
This chapter presents a multidisciplinary approach to product design that includes 
multiple player interactions (retailers and manufacturers), heterogeneous consumer 
marketing models, and integrated engineering design models and cost models. The 
strategic interaction considered is broad (retailer duopoly or oligopoly), which has not 
been explored in conjunction with engineering design and manufacturing costs  in the 
extant research. We prove  that a multi-product price equilibrium exists in the retail space 
for differentiated products under the multinomial logit (MNL) model and use this result 
to develop a methodology for optimal engineering designs for both monopoly and 
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duopoly retail channels structures.  This proof allows the manufacturer to anticipate the 
potential price reactions to any change in design and therefore to evaluate the profit 
potential of any candidate design under the MNL demand model.  Not only do we take 
into account price reactions by retailers to design introductions but also the reactions of 
competing manufacturers. 
4.2 MARKET STRUCTURE AND PROPOSED FRAMEWORK 
The product-market that we consider in this chapter is one characterized by 
manufacturers reaching out to customers indirectly through retail channel consisting of 
powerful retailers (monopoly or duopoly).  The manufacturers differentiate themselves 
with strong brands in a mature market and compete with other manufacturers for retail 
shelf-space. When they introduce new products, they set wholesale prices for the 
retailers, who choose to either carry the product or not carry the product. Retailers set 
their own retail prices, which along with the wholesale price is taken into account for the 
carry-not carry decision. This product-market is characteristic of many consumer 
durables that are engineered and marketed to customers through retailers (e.g., power 
tools, household appliances, electronics, etc.).  The multi-level strategic design 
framework is shown in Figure 4.2.1. From the bottom to the top, the framework includes 
the consideration of engineering design criteria for the focal manufacturer (bottom level), 
consideration of strategic criteria with respect to the manufacturer’s competitors and 
dominant retailers (middle level), and the consideration of customer segments and 
preferences (top level).  This problem will be analyzed from the perspective of the 
manufacturer firm (i.e., the perspective of a product designer in the firm) who is 
interested in maximizing profit. The general framework is shown in Figure 4.2.1 for a 
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retailer duopoly with four manufacturers and four consumer segments. This model can be 






















Figure 4.2.1: Strategic Design Framework 
The product design problem can be described as follows (see Figure 4.2.1). In a 
competitive market of i products, Manufacturer A (the focal manufacturer) designs a 
candidate product with engineering design variables x where in it must take into account 
the strategic response of other manufacturers.  We assume that the other manufacturers B, 
C and D have only the strategic move of altering their wholesale prices WB, WC and WD, 
respectively. This is a standard assumption (Luo et al., 2007) as other responses in 
attributes are difficult to achieve in the short-term (Hauser, 1988, Horsky and Nelson, 
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1992). In order for manufacturers to set wholesale prices they must know the effect on 
market share which can only be determined after retailers set their retail prices (e.g., Pri 
=P1i , P2i,…,PRi  where i is index for the retailer’s assortment and r is the index for the 
retailer).  We assume that both retailers and manufacturers are fully informed about 
customer preferences (top level), which is a valid assumption in mature markets (e.g., 
Villas-Boas and Zhao, 2005).  The market provides feedback to the retailers’ actions in 
the form of product market shares mi.  The retailers choose their retail prices to maximize 
profits in the monopoly case or to reach price equilibrium in duopoly/oligopoly case.  
Once retail prices are fixed at the retail level, manufacturers can determine equilibrium 
wholesale prices.  Given price equilibrium at the two levels (manufacturing and retail 
levels) the manufacturer is able to determine the efficacy of any candidate design x.  The 
focal manufacturer can, thus, perform a strategic scenario analysis with retail profits and 
manufacturer profits as outcomes given any design candidate. Thus the framework 
provides a much richer and realistic environment for evaluating engineering design 
decisions since it accounts for the power of retailers and the strategic responses available 
to competitors. We expand on the links between engineering design, strategy and 
marketing in the next few sections. 
 
4.3 FROM PRODUCT DESIGN TO MARKET SHARE  
Before discussing the strategic interactions in any design evaluation, we present 
the mapping process for turning engineering designs x into product attributes y which are 
then used to determine market share mi while highlighting where the pricing process 
affects market share.  This process is depicted in Figure 4.3.1 for a hand-held power tool 
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– a right angle drill.  We assume that market information – competition and their 
offerings – is already available, through shelf surveys of assortments at the channel 
dominating retailers.  In the short term, we assume that the physical attributes of 
competitor products, y , are fixed The three right angle drills at the right of Figure 4.3.1 
are an example of existing assortment in the focal retailers in the application we consider.  
Each power tool’s attributes in the assortment are recorded as the existing competitor’s 
attributes which are critical to the positioning of any new design.  Customer preference 
data can be in the form of survey data or choice-based conjoint data or point-of-sale data.  
For our application, we collect preference data through conjoint analysis where customers 
are presented with product prototypes for direct comparison.  The customer preference 
data is analyzed using finite mixture estimation techniques to identify distinct latent class 
segments to capture the heterogeneity in customer preferences (Kamakura and Russell, 
1989) 5 .  This latent class approach along with the shelf survey allows our design 
approach to search for gaps in the competitive landscape that are weak in terms of 
competitive offerings as well as find customer segments whose preferences are currently 
underserved.  The integration of this information with a bottom-up cross disciplinary 
translation of engineering designs into customer relevant product attributes is presented 
in Figure 4.3.1. 
                                                 
5 Alternatively, heterogeneity can also be captured using Hierarchical Bayesian estimation methods.  
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Stator outer radius Ro (m)
Current I (amps)
Armature turns Nc (# of turns)
Stator turns Ns  (# of turns)
Stator thickness t (m)
Stator Gap thickness lgap (m)
Motor Stack Length L (m)
Pinion Pitch Diameter Dp (m)
Gear Ratio r






Power=f (I, L , t, R0 , DP)
Torque=f (I, L, t, R0 , DP)
Mass=f (Dp , Ro , t , L, Ns , Nc)
RPM=f ( r, Dp)
Gear Bending Stress≤ 145 MPa etc.
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mi=f (uijk,Pi) *discrete choice model
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Figure 4.3.1: Product Design to Market Share 
The design process starts with an instance of design variables x, which are then 
transformed to intermediate variables y through appropriate engineering computations 
(See bottom two blocks in Figure 4.3.1).  For example, the weight of product is 
calculated from the density and volume of its constituent components.  Similarly, power 
and torque of a product will be functions of gear ratios, current and voltage.  Engineering 
constraints such as gear stresses, heat flux, armature velocity and others are calculated at 
this point to determine if the candidate design is feasible before proceeding to market 
share estimate determination.  Design variables and engineering functions (constraints or 
attribute functions) need not be continuous as we will employ a genetic algorithm to find 
optimal designs (Deb, 2001) It is worth noting that the marketing and engineering should 
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collaborate (e.g., Morgan et al., 2001) to determine which product attributes are most 
relevant in investigating for optimization (i.e., they must matter to customers or affect the 
production cost).  For example, the marketing communicates to engineering that weight is 
one of the important evaluation criteria to customers and should be an output of the 
design model.   
Similarly, if engineering and manufacturing have determined that revolutions-per-
minute RPM is an important driver of cost in the past due to higher stresses and heat 
dissipation requirements it should be communicated to marketing for inclusion in the 
conjoint study in an appropriate way.  Even if customers place little value on RPM, this 
knowledge will be important to the overall design optimization as designers can therefore 
relax preconceived notions for minimum RPM values (a constraint) and possibly reduce 
production costs without affecting overall product performance and utility.  Thus, an 
early concurrent consideration of all the relevant criteria (engineering design and 
customer preference) by the product development team gives a significant advantage in 
avoiding the costly mistake of performing customer studies that do not contain all of the 
relevant attributes that are cost or performance drivers in the engineering model (see 
Loch and Terwiesch, 1998). 
Once product attribute variables y are determined from intermediate engineering 
design computations, one can estimate the utility of each attribute y (with a piecewise 
interpolation of utility values assigned to attribute levels, if needed) based on the conjoint 
analysis estimates for each segment by summing the utilities ujk, in segment k, of all 
attributes j that appear in product i.  This effort allows one to estimate market share as 
demonstrated in Section 3.3.4 using Eq. (3.15) to Eq. (3.17) with the one distinction that 
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pricing no longer remains constant and is continually adjusted at the top of Figure 4.3.1 
in response to any new design entering at the bottom of Figure 4.3.1.  
Given that retailers have increasingly consolidated power and control of the retail 
channel (i.e., access to consumers), evaluating the manufacturer’s design in the context of 
the effect it has on retailer profit is an important consideration although our primary 
objective is to maximize the manufacturer profit.  Clearly, if the manufacturer is 
concerned with possibility of being denied shelf space by the retailer he/she would prefer 
to select a design that is much more profitable for the retailer than the existing assortment 
it carries.  At the same time the manufacturer’s profits and the retailer’s profits are 
competing objectives so a manufacturer would benefit from being able to choose from an 
optimal set of designs with respect to each of these objectives.  The formulation 
presented in this chapter is such an approach to setting the manufacturer’s design strategy 
given a specific channel structure.  As such in addition to maximizing manufacturer profit 
we add a constraint to our formulation where the manufacturer also wishes to increase 
retailer profitability so as to ensure market access. Thus, the manufacturer’s objective 




























     
(4.1) 
In section 4.5.1 we extend this formulation to multi-objectives for several other cases of 
channel markets (e.g., duopololistic retailers).  Initially we present a single objective 
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(maximize manufacturer profit) to facilitate understanding of the pricing framework that 
will be presented in the subsequent section. 
The manufacturers profit Пi  is maximized by altering engineering design variables x 
to satisfy engineering constraints g(x) ≤ b, realizing that market share mi is largely a 
function of y and therefore x.  In addition to focusing on optimizing retailer profit we 












ππ ) just as we did in Chapter 3.  This channel profit constraint is 
deterministic unlike the stochastic or “chance constrained” approach present in Chapter 3.  
Production costs Ci  can be modeled as a function of the engineering design variables x or 
can be estimated from product attributes, y , like those shown in Figure 4.3.1 (D.O.D., 
1999, Boehm, 1981, Scanlan, 2002).   We again use the latter approach in our 
application, which is based on historical prices of products in a category.  The 
formulation presented above may appear simple until one considers that market share is 
also significantly dependent on retail price Pi (as shown in Figure 4.3.1) which is also 
dependent upon the wholesale price Wi  which is not entirely under the manufacturer’s 
control.  Predicting the equilibrium retail and wholesale price of the products will be 
discussed in the next section along with the engineering optimization interface.   
4.4 APPROACH TO STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS 
A pricing framework that analytically captures the strategic interactions of Figure 
4.2.1 is presented in Figure 4.4.1 for both monopoly (1 retailer) and duopoly (2 retailers) 
channels with an oligopoly of manufacturers competing with the focal manufacturer.  The 
framework incorporates the layers of strategic pricing moves available to competitors and 
will be referred to repeatedly in the remainder of this section.  It should also be noted that 
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we approach strategic interactions under the classical game theory assumptions 
(Osbourne and Rubinstein, 1994) that players are rational and fully informed of each 
others possible strategic moves (i.e., perfect information).   
4.4.1 PRICING FRAMEWORK 
The focal manufacturer (Manufacturer A) develops a new product A in the 
assortment i=1,2,…,n  that has engineering design variables x (bottom layer of Figure 
4.4.1) with an objective to maximize profit.  In the short term (one quarter to one year) 
the competing manufacturers will be unable to change product designs because of the 
manufacturing line and supply contract modifications that would be necessary.  However, 
they can alter their wholesale prices and do so under the assumption that their 
competitors will attempt to make a “best response” to any Wi decision (manufacturer 
layer, Figure 4.4.1).  The retailers also select retail prices Pri that will maximize their 
profit under a “best” response assumption from their competitive retailer (in the case of a 
duopoly retail channel) or simply maximize profit (in the case of the monopoly channel).  
The retail prices and product designs affect each consumer segment depending on its 
specific preference structure, which the finite mixture latent class model estimates based 
on the conjoint analysis.  These determine the segment sizes and the market shares (top 
layer of Figure 4.4.1).    
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Monopoly Channel 
Retail Pricing Level: RPL1
Wholesale Pricing Level: WPL1
Duopoly Channel
Engineering Design Level: EDL2
Wholesale Pricing Level: WPL2
Retail Pricing Level: RPL2
Market Share Analysis: MSA2
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Figure 4.4.1: Pricing Framework 
The game theoretic aspects of retailers and manufacturers selecting retail and 
wholesale prices based on Nash equilibria or “best response” functions makes the 
problem of optimizing product design computationally intensive.  We solve the layered 
equilibrium situation as a nested algorithm where the retail pricing level (RPL) 
optimization is the selection of retail prices P using the Nash equilibrium of profit for 
retailers.  The first order condition for a Nash Equilibrium must be met for each 
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retailer/product profit combination riπ which is essentially requires solving a system of 
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In practice, to solve Eq. 4.2 and Eq. 4.3 we use an optimization routine to minimize the 
square of the sum of the first derivatives of retailer profit with respect to each of the retail 
prices. 







max π:         (4.4) 
The existence and (preferably) uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium for retail prices for the 
multinomial logit (MNL) demand function is necessary to guarantee an equilibrium at the 
retailer where each of the retailers offer multiple products.    Unlike the Nash equilibrium 
existence theorem (Caplin and Nalebuff, 1991) for a single product (competitors carry 
one product), to date a multi-product price equilibrium existence proof does not exist 
(Anderson et al., 1992).  The multi-product environment is far more common in the retail 
environment as each retailer generally carries an assortment of products and thus 
deserves consideration.      
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THEOREM 1 – Retailers’ multi-product Nash equilibrium:  A unique Nash equilibrium in 
prices exists for a retailer carrying an assortment of n products in a category of N 
products carried by all retailers. 
 Proof is given in Appendix B. 
The next layer for consideration in the pricing framework is setting of wholesale 
prices which are also based on the concept of Nash equilibrium.  Similar to retail prices, 
we minimize the sum of the squares of the first derivatives of manufacturer profit 
functions with respect to wholesale prices Wi  to solve Eq. 4.5 for each of the 






















Π ,...,,     (4.5) 
THEOREM 2 – Manufacturer’s single product Nash equilibrium:  A unique Nash 
equilibrium in wholesale prices exists for a manufacturer selling products through a 
differentiated-retail-duopoly. 
 Proof is given in Appendix B. 
 This structure creates a vertical Nash Equilibrium for the manufacturers and 
retailers in setting prices, which is an assumption that has ample support in actual 
practice (see Choi, 1991 and Kadiyal et al., 2001).  A review of each of the proofs 
presented in the Appendix shows that the existence of global maximizing strategies for 
both the retailers and manufacturers requires that each of them to consider prices set by 
the other.  While we cannot guarantee convergence of wholesale and retail prices 
considered simultaneously for all situations, we have observed convergence empirically 
without difficulty for all the cases we have considered in the application.  The last layer 
of the optimization is the setting of engineering design variables by the focal 
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manufacturer.   The engineering design problem is clearly not convex with many 
discontinuous and discrete variables.  As such we use a genetic algorithm (Deb, 2004) to 
optimize the design.   
The sequence for the pricing framework for monopoly and duopoly (shown in 
Figure 4.4.1) can be thought of as proceeding through the following steps for each design 
considered during the optimization: 
1. Start with a population of engineering design alternatives at the Engineering 
Design Level (EDL).  
2. Set initial wholesale prices Wi at the Wholesale Pricing Level (WPL) for each 
design alternative: 
a. Monopoly (WPL1): One set of wholesale prices is initialized  
b. Duopoly (WPL2): Two sets of wholesale prices are initialized at 
WPL2 
3. Set initial retail price at the retail price level (RPL) for each design: 
a. Monopoly: One set of retail prices is initialized at RPL1  
b. Duopoly: Two sets of retail prices are initialized at RPL2  
4. Calculate market shares (mi and mri) based on utility of the engineering 
designs and retail prices and returned to the RPL. 
a. Monopoly (MSA1): Return markets shares mi for the monopolist 
b. Duopoly (MSA2): Return market share mri for each retailer. 
5. Adjust retail prices in the RPL until: 
 91
a. Monopoly (RPL1):  monopolist profit is maximized in RPL1.  Due to 
the no-choice option in the latent class model and a downward sloping 
demand function the problem is quasiconcave.   
b. Duopoly (RPL2):  a Nash equilibrium is reached for logit models by 
minimizing the first partial derivatives of retail firm profit. 
6. Pass equilibrium retail prices (RPL) back to step two.  Wholesale prices are 
adjusted (as a short term strategic response) until Nash equilibrium is reached 
(i.e., no manufacturer can alter the wholesale price and capture more profit).   
Once a Nash equilibrium (Eq. 4.5) is reached proceed to step 7.   
7. Estimate profit from engineering design variables (cost), market share (step 
four), and equilibrium wholesale price (step six). 
8. Stop if optimal profit is found.  (Note: it is possible to implement additional 
objectives in this step for a multi-objective problem). 
4.4.2 STRATEGIC CASES 
We present four cases of varying channel structure to show the effect of taking 
into account the channel’s competitive landscape on optimal engineering design based on 
an actual product-market.  We consider 4 manufacturers (A to D) and 2 retailers (1, 2). 
Case 1:  Retailer Monopoly/Manufacturer Oligopoly 
This is the simplest case of the four as there is no strategic interaction between 
retailers.  The retail optimization layer is simply a profit maximization problem that 
depends upon the wholesale inputs of the manufacturers and of course the consumer 
characteristics.  Strategic interactions occur at the manufacturer level in setting wholesale 
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prices which impact the engineering optimization. This is the baseline case that extends 
the prior work (Luo et al., 2007) to include engineering design optimization. 
Case 2:  Retailer Duopoly/Manufacturer Oligopoly: Identical Retailers 
Here a retailer duopoly exists but consumers are indifferent across all segments as 
to which retailer to buy from so the retailer’s only compete on price.  This case is more 
complex than Case 1 due to the nature of the strategic interactions at the retailer level, 
though both cases require an inner optimization at the retailer layer.  The formulation for 
the setting retailer prices takes into account wholesale prices as before but now is 
formulated as an equilibrium optimization where retail prices are adjusted to minimize 
the square of the first derivatives of the duopoly retailers’ profits with respect to price.  
We assume that consumers are indifferent toward the retailers and that each retailer 
carries the same assortment.  While somewhat unrealistic, such a case should demonstrate 
downward pressure on retail prices and therefore wholesale prices relative to the 
monopoly case. This will also serve as a baseline to examine Case 3 and Case 4 results. 
Case 3:  Retailer Duopoly/Manufacturer Oligopoly: Differentiated Retailers 
A more realistic approach would account for the preference of consumers for the 
retailers themselves.  It is well documented that specific retailers target specific consumer 
segments and therefore logical to assume that they have achieved differentiation in that 
regard.  For example, Lowes targets female customers with wider, brighter isles and a 
greater emphasis on decorating (Pittman, 2005).  A conjoint study can easily include 
samples where product i is offered at retailer r and then assess the value that consumers 
place on the “retailer attribute”.  Because the value of the product will vary with each 
retailer, the equilibrium prices at the retail level should be at least marginally different.  If 
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manufacturers can predict outcomes for this scenario with our methodology they should 
be able to develop more profitable designs and wholesale price negotiations at the other 
optimization levels.  In Table 3.5.1 of the previous chapter we show that 3 out of four 
customer segments prefer one retailer over the other. 
Case 4: Retailer Duopoly/Manufacturer Oligopoly: Exclusive retailer strategy  
Numerous examples exist in a variety of markets where manufacturers and 
retailers seek exclusive reseller relationships (Moner-Coloques, 2006).   This is done as a 
means to secure access to market (manufacturer’s perspective) and as a means 
differentiate an assortment for greater profits (retailer’s perspective).   We model this 
arrangement in a manner similar to Case 2 except that the focal manufacturer decides to 
go to the market through only one of the two identical retailers as an exclusive retailer 
strategy.  This approach where one retailer is allowed to fulfill all demand “Referral to 
Reseller” has been shown to theoretically improve profits 6  for both parties in the 
exclusive channel (Tsay and Agrawal, 2004).  Our method is similar to previous analyses 
(Trivedi, 1998) where the manufacturer is integrated with only one retailer except that we 
allow the retailer to carry additional differentiated products from the original assortment 
which reflects market reality of our shelf surveys.  The retailer chosen for the exclusive 
relationship will carry the new product offered by the manufacturer as long as its profits 
improve relative to the original assortment just as in the previous cases.  The competing 
retailer not chosen for exclusivity with our manufacturer simply offers the original 
assortment.  
                                                 
6 For example, Apple and AT&T sold 270,000 iPhones in under 30 hours in an exclusive channel relationship which 
boosted both firms profitability (Hartley, 2007).     
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4.5 CASE STUDY 
We chose to apply Cases 1-4 to the engineering problem problem developed in 
Chapter 3, Section 3.5.  This detailed engineering design structure and marketing data 
(conjoint analysis) (Luo et al., 2007) were available for common small angle grinders and 
an ideal candidate application for the case studies as they are typically sold in a strong 
retailer channel environment as presented in Chapter 3.   A brief shelf survey of the 
channel controlling retailers Lowes and Home Depot would reveal an assortment similar 
to that shown in Table 4.5.1. 
 
 
Tool A B C D
Brand W X Y Z
Price ($) $79.00 $99.00 $129.00 $79.00
Amps 6.00 9.00 12.00 6.00
Life (hrs) 80 110 150 110
Switch Paddle Trigger Side Side
Girth (in) 2 3 3 2.25
Weight (lbm) 5.00 9.00 16.00 5.00 
Table 4.5.1: Example Assortment at a Retailer 
For the first four strategic cases from Section 4.4.2 our model replaces Tool A 
with a new product whenever the channel constraint is met in Eq. (4.1).  The assortment 
is the same for the retailers under the monopolist and duopolist cases in that they carry 
the new product and products C-D.  For the fourth (exclusive retailer channel) we assume 
that retailer one carries the new product and that the competing retailer carries the 





4.5.1 OPTIMIZATION APPROACH 
We used Matlab’s Genetic Algorithm and Direct Search Toolbox (GADS) 
(Matlab User Manual, 2007) to develop a multi-objective genetic algorithm (MOGA) to 
simultaneously optimize focal manufacturer profit (Manufacturer A) and retailer profit.  
While our focus is to maximize the focal  manufacturer’s profit while ensuring that 
retailer makes at least as much profit as he was making with the existing assortment, 
determining the Pareto solutions for manufacturer and retailer profits would help us 
understand the trade-off better, as we show subsequently.  Additionally, one might think 
of increasing the retailer’s profitability above the prior assortment profit as strengthening 
the manufacturers case to obtain shelf space.  We formulate the manufacturer’s decision 
as two objectives: (1) maximizing his own profit, and (2) maximizing the channel 
partner’s profit (monopolist, duopolist, or exclusive retailer).  This can be described 
mathematically by adding the second objective to the optimization formulations as shown 





























































































































Figure 4.5.1: Optimization Formulations 
 A non-dominated sorting algorithm (Deb, 2001) is employed to find a Pareto 
frontier for each strategic situation (Monopoly, Duopoly with identical retailers, and 
Duopoly with differing retailers, and the Exclusive retailer).  The 9 design variables were 
encoded in a binary format with lower and upper bounds specified in accordance with 
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Table 3.5.3.  The wholesale prices were allowed to increase up to $100, which is higher 
than the maximum wholesale prices encountered in practice.  The design variables were 
encoded as 200 bit binary strings and run with a population size of 100 for 200 
generations.  Additionally, the MOGA was set to terminate if objective function values 
change less than 1×10-6 over 50 generations or change less than 1×10-6  for a time period 
of 10,000 seconds.  Constraints were handled using the “Feasible Over Infeasible 
Approach” (Deb, 2001) where violated designs are set equal to the worst function call 
plus a penalty.  Additionally, a crossover fraction of 0.6, a mutation rate of 0.1 and an 
elite fraction of 1/3rd were used.  The inner optimizations for retail price setting and 
wholesale price setting are strictly quasi-concave for monopoly and duopoly price setting 
(See proofs in Appendix B) and as such are amenable to gradient based optimizers such 
as Matlab’s fmincon (Matlab User Manual, 2007). The computational issues involved in 
our methodology are discussed at length in Appendix B.   
4.6 DISCUSSION OF APPROACH AND CASE STUDY 
4.6.1 INTERPRETATION OF MANUFACTURER VS. RETAIL PROFITS 
The results focus on Manufacturer A’s design strategy in developing a new design 
to replace the existing Product A design in the market under different channel structures, 
with the assumption that the competitor products remain in the market with their existing 
attributes, which is taken into account in developing the new design scenarios. The 
competitors can however change their wholesale prices of their products in the short-
term.  As expected the strategic cases present varying levels of profitability for the 
manufacturers and retailers highlighting the impact of the varying market power of the 
two types of players under different channel structures (monopoly and duopoly).    
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In Figure 4.6.1 we present an optimal set of designs for four strategic cases where 
the focal manufacturer is able to manipulate a design (Tool A) to achieve maximum 
profit for himself and the retailer (monopoly) or retailers (duopoly).  All the design 
solutions satisfy a constraint that the retailers’ profits exceed those with preexisting 
assortment and thus achieve channel acceptance under the proposed decision framework.  
The profit level of the existing assortment for each of the strategic cases is shown as a 
dashed horizontal line in Figure 4.6.1.  The great variety of optimal designs are shown in 
Figure 4.6.1 to highlight the importance of the strategic case and how designs can change 
as one transitions between manufacturer profitability and retailer profitability along the 
Pareto set of designs.  Initially we focus on explaining equilibrium prices for the strategic 
cases and will return to the variety of designs present in the next section. 
Consider the retailer monopoly case in Figure 4.6.1.  Design A3 is the optimal 
design from the focal manufacturer’s (Mfr A) viewpoint which maximizes A’s profit 
while ensuring that retailer makes more profit than what he makes with the existing 
assortment. The other design solutions along the Pareto frontier from Design A1 to 
Design A3 increase retailer profit at the expense of the manufacturer profit.  If 
Manufacturer A is greatly concerned about being rejected by the retailer due to the 
uncertainty in the retailers own decision framework he might select a design between 
Design A3 and Design A1 along the Monopoly Pareto frontier.  Any design between 
these two points clearly increases the manufacturer’s value proposition to the retailer 







































Figure 4.6.1: Strategic Environment Comparison 
4.6.2 COMPARISON OF STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENTS:  CASES 1-3 
The solution set of each of the strategic cases presented Figure 4.6.1 are unique 
and depend on the specific channel structure.  The monopoly Pareto frontier is the least 
profitable situation for manufacturers as both duopoly cases have acceptable solutions 
that have higher profits than the monopoly solution with the greatest manufacturer profit.  
In addition, monopoly retailer profits exceed any of the duopoly cases which consistent 
the extant literature (Gibbons, 1992), (Anderson et al., 1992) given that the monopolist 
does not have competition to shift prices lower.  The increased price competition in the 
two duopoly retailer situations (identical and differentiated) allow for the possibility of 
greater manufacturer profits as prices in the retail space a lower resulting in fewer 
customers preferring the no-choice option. The reasons for this are clear when we look 
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closer at the retail prices that are the outcomes under the various situations (See Table 
4.6.1 to Table 4.6.3). In each of the tables, we present the optimal new design for 
Manufacturer A as the third row which is preceded by other Pareto designs that increase 
retailer profits at the expense of manufacturer profits.    The last row in each of the tables 
presents the wholesale prices and retailer prices for the pre-existing assortment (Table 
4.5.1).   
Overall, the results are consistent with the general economic model predictions for 
monopoly and duopoly structures.  For example, in the optimal solutions (Designs A3, 
A6, and A9) the retail margins are much higher for the monopoly retailer ($72 to $84) as 
compared to the margins in the duopoly situations ($26 to $50).  This is to be expected 
when one player in the channel controls access to consumers.   Additionally, 
manufacturers receive lower wholesale prices at strategic equilibrium under the 
monopoly situation ($25 to $50) versus the duopoly ($39 to $70).  The retailer obviously 
enjoys much higher profits as a monopoly (note that duopoly profits are sum of the two 
retailer’s profits in Figure 4.6.1).  


























A1 $43.23  37.46 $25.01  $25.33  $118.89  $113.12  $100.65  101.53 $167.00 $523.40 
A2 $46.21  $38.27  $38.45  $25.67  $118.40  $110.46  $110.64  $97.86  $218.00 $468..34 










































Table 4.6.1: Designs for Monopoly Retailer 
In Table 4.6.1, we observe that the wholesale price of the optimal new design 
(A3) for manufacturer A is much higher than the existing design in the market due to the 
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greater utility of the new design. In this scenario, Manufacturer B and D also lower their 
wholesale prices as a reaction to the new design A3 which improves the retailer’s profit. 
However, Manufacturer C raises the wholesale price. This is consistent with predictions 
in extant literature (Hauser and Shugan, 1983) who show that incumbent manufacturers 
may find raising wholesale prices as a defensive strategy to be optimal for them 
depending on the distribution of consumer tastes and which segment the tool is targeted. 
In the monopoly case, the retailer does pass on the decrease in wholesale prices to 
consumers in the form of lower retail prices except for Tool C (compare the existing 
retail prices in the last row with the equilibrium retail prices for Pareto optimal design A1 
in the first row). Another interesting result is that if Manufacturer A chooses to introduce 
Design A1, with a much lower wholesale price, it leads to pricing by other manufacturers 
which are also very low, even though the other attributes of their design remain the same.  
At some of these wholesale prices, these manufacturers may actually be selling below 
costs; however this reaction is to be expected as they would try to stem the loss of market 
share to Manufacturer A (similar to airlines matching cut-rate prices of competitors even 
though it might result in losses for everyone). However, the optimal design A3 (from 
MFR A’s perspective) does not suggest any such possibilities. 
Another interesting result in the monopoly case is how much market share the 
monopolist retailer gives up to the “no choice” option.  Summing the market shares for 
the four tools for each case A1, A2, and A3 yields total market shares of 72%-75% 
implying that 25% to 28% of consumers will opt to purchase none of the tools based on 
the high price.  This is readily observed in the retail prices for the monopolist being $20 
to $50 higher than the in the duopoly cases.  In contrast, the customers purchasing a tool 
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under duopolistic competition are in the 95% to 98% range which is consistent with the 
notion that competition is better for consumers.    The differentiated duopoly has a slight 
edge in penetration relative to the identical duopoly (i.e., closer to 98% for many of the 
Pareto designs) as each retailer can focus on preferred segments. 
 
Table 4.6.2: Designs for Duopoly Identical Retailers 
Interesting results can also be found when comparing the two duopoly cases.  As 
was expected, when the retailers are differentiated the results lead to different retail 
margins and identical retailers lead to identical retail margins.   The pricing model that 
we employ offers each retailer the same wholesale price and retail prices are 
subsequently selected. When retailers are identical it appears that price competition is 
particularly fierce with the lowest retail margins observed for all cases.  Differentiation 
by retailers in terms of which segments they appeal to the most allows both retailers to 
retain higher margins than the identical case (Table 4.6.2 and Table 4.6.3).   
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Table 4.6.3: Designs for Duopoly Differentiated Retailers 
4.6.3 ANALYSIS OF EXCLUSIVE STRATEGY 
In addition we have developed strategic case for the exclusive retail channel 
arrangement that is growing increasingly frequent.   This is especially appropriate for our 
case study as exclusivity is common in the tool industry where, for example, Home Depot 
exclusively sells Husky hand tools and Ryobi power tools (Han Shih, 2005). To set up 
the exclusive retail channel we selected one of the two retailers as a “channel partner” 
who has exclusive rights to carry the new tool (Tool A) along with Tools B to D.  The 
remaining retailer or “competing retailer” in the subsequent figures carries the original 
assortment (Tools B-E).  Tool E is the design in place prior to optimization.  We selected 
retailer one as a fixed choice for the exclusive relationship although in principal the 
selection of the retailer could easily be made a design variable with the use of binary 
variable.   
The exclusive channel (Case 4) is compared to the most relevant example from 
the previous cases, duopoly with identical retailers (Case 2), which included optimal 
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designs A4 to A6.  For this comparison all retailers are considered equal in attractiveness 
to each segment.  They only differ by the content of their assortment.    The previously 
termed Duopoly (identical) case will now just be referred to as the “Non-exclusive Case”.     
 
Table 4.6.4: Designs for Exclusive Case (Identical Duopoly) 
In comparing the two cases we see that the under the exclusive channel the 
channel partner (retailer selected to carry the optimized tool) benefits greatly as the 
profits for the entire Pareto Set dominate those of the non-exclusive case. In contrast the 
manufacturer loses the possibility of achieving the highest profit (Figure 4.6.2).  If we 
compare the manufacturer’s optimal design under the non-exclusive case (A6) to the 
optimal design under exclusivity (A12) we see potential profits erode by $80M.  In 
contrast the channel partner’s profits rise from $111.4M (recall Table 4.6.2 is the sum of 
2 identical retailers) to $218.1M or increase by $106.7M.    Thus $26.7M in net value has 
been added to the channel which anecdotally explains the existence of exclusive retail 
relationships.  Given that the retailer’s still have strategic dominance in this situation due 
to their control of market access, one can consider the exclusive offering as an incentive 
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to a retailer to achieve shelf space similar to a slotting allowance.  For a cash-strapped or 
risk-averse manufacturer the exclusive offering may be much more attractive than a 
slotting allowance.  This risk is due to the high outflow of cash for a slotting allowance in 
the present period with no guarantee of sales volume. The profits of the model are still a 
prediction whereas a slotting allowance is an immediate deterministic outflow of cash.   
In addition the exclusive contract can provide greater manufacturer profit than some of 
the non-exclusive Pareto designs.  For example, A12 is preferred by the manufacturer to 
A5 and A4.  A12 is also preferred by the channel partner, which in effect coordinates the 






















Non-Exclusive Duopoly (Sum of Retailers' Profits)
Non-Exclusive Duopoly (Channel Partner only)
Exclusive Duopoly (Sum of Retailers' Profits)






*note retailers are identical except for assortment 
 
Figure 4.6.2: Exclusive Channel Comparison 
 
4.6.4 OPTIMAL ENGINEERING DESIGNS 
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There are some trends that can be observed in the designs themselves in 
comparing the channel structures and location along the Pareto frontier.  First, the most 
profitable designs for the focal manufacturer (A3, A6, A9, A12) are in general less 
powerful than their less profitable counterparts.  It is costly for the manufacturer to 
produce a tool with greater power to weight ratio yet the consumers value this attribute.  
Regardless of the strategic case analyzed this appears to be the case.  In comparing the 
strategic environments we see that along the entire Pareto frontier the manufacturer 
develops lighter tools for the monopoly (5.15 to 5.33lbm) with a smaller girth (1.79 to 
1.82 in).  As global observation we see that the designs under a monopoly channel are 
also far less diverse than the other channel structures.  For example, weight under the 
differentiated duopoly case varies by nearly 5 lbm and only varies by a few ounces under 
the monopoly.  We believe this is a facet of the monopoly being able to dictate which 
attributes will best fit the current assortment as defined by the segment utilities.  The 
lighter tool is more costly to produce based on our cost predictions which significantly 
erodes the manufacturer profit as shown in Figure 4.6.1.  Still the amperages for the 
monopoly tools are in the lower quality range.    This has important implications for 
manufacturers as it may not be possible to design high quality tools, (as perceived by 
customers with regard to amperage) for the monopolist, that have positive wholesale 
margins.   
The differentiated duopoly appears to offer the highest wholesale prices and 
allows the manufacturer to design the highest amperage tools.  Because the retailers are 
not competing entirely on price in the differentiated case, retail prices can be adjusted 
higher for segments that prefer a particular retailer.  These higher retail prices provide the 
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manufacturer with the opportunity to search a larger design space and provide a more 
diverse set of designs (including higher performance models) that still generate the 
greatest profits (Figure 4.6.1).  Thus the manufacturers would prefer the differentiated 
case to persist in reality.  Finally, in the exclusive case we see the manufacturer again 
isolates his strategy to a relatively narrow set of product attributes in terms of weight and 
amperage.  This is similar to the monopoly case where it appears that the retailer is better 
able to dictate acceptable model design for the assortment.  Of course a fifth tool is 
present under this case so it may be that this is also the best position to compete against 
the original assortment (now including Tool E.) 
 








 New Design ID A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7 A8 A9 A10 A11 A12 
Design Variables Units             
Armature wire turns  Nc (# of turns) 196 205 205 204 205.6 208 216 171 172 259 259 263 
Stator wire turns     Ns  (# of turns) 110 139 110 160 177.7 154 144 179 176 143 149 132 
Stator outer radius  Ro (m) 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.022 0.018 0.024 0.016 0.017 0.017 0.019 0.017 0.020
Stator thickness  t (m) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.026 0.007 0.028 0.002 0.002 0.003
Gap thickness  lgap (m·10-4) 4.6 1.8 4.6 3.9 5.0 14.8 26.4 20.5 8.0 29.2 20.1 23.7 
Current  I (amps) 5.01 6.15 5.06 6.69 6.73 5.62 8.72 6.67 5.20 5.92 6.01 5.41 
Stack Length  L (m) 0.072 0.081 0.09 0.146 0.198 0.155 0.162 0.169 0.139 0.147 0.141 0.197
Gear Ratio  r 2.87 2.17 2.87 4.98 3.36 3.47 3.09 4.54 2.96 2.88 3.07 3.12 
Pinion Pitch Diameter  Dp (cm) 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.012 0.023 0.047 0.049 0.019 0.019 0.019
Girth  (cm) 4.62 4.55 4.55 6.96 6.12 7.39 5.66 5.84 5.84 6.50 6.17 6.55 
           (in) 1.82 1.79 1.79 2.74 2.41 2.91 2.23 2.30 2.30 2.56 2.43 2.58 
Weight  (kg) 2.34 2.38 2.42 4.60 4.32 5.03 3.56 5.66 4.36 4.36 4.09 4.48 
             (lbm) 5.15 5.24 5.33 10.14 9.53 11.08 7.84 12.48 9.62 9.62 9.02 9.87 
  
Table 4.6.5: Pareto Designs 
 The important take-away from the above table is that the optimal designs are quite 
different for the different channel structures considered.  Virtually none of the Pareto 
Designs predicted by this model would have been developed by a traditional engineering 
model which would search for different objectives: lowest cost, highest amperage and 
lightest tool for example.  The fatal flaw for such an approach is that some consumers 
prefer heavier tools (Table 3.5.1) which would allow the manufacturer to design less 
costly, Eq. (8), yet optimal tools in some cases (e.g., 7.8 to 12.48 lbm for the Duopoly 
 107
cases).  Additionally, ignoring pricing changes by competitors within segments might 
result in negative revenue if profitable wholesale prices are unachievable because of the 
strategic landscape. 
Additionally, there are significant variations in the design variable values for the 
manufacturer’s optimal designs A3, A6 A9 and A12 most importantly with respect to 
stack length, stator radius, current, gear ratio and pinion pitch.  These variables in turn 
impact the performance and cost (price) of the tool, which the market is concerned with.  
While, from a qualitative perspective this difference is to be expected given the intuitive 
pricing pressures from different channel structures, our methodology provides a 
systematic manner to incorporate the impact of channel structures and strategy into the 
product design process.  Overall we observe a tendency for the manufacturer to fill a 
niche in the lower cost, low to medium amperage and heavier (except for the monopoly 
situation) category which is currently underserved by the assortment (Table 4.5.1).  The 
manufacturer appears able to capture a significant market share (30% to 40%) with all 
Pareto designs due to the weakness of the competing products.  This, of course, is a 
function of the attributes of the competitive offerings that we have considered in the case 
study. However, it is clear from the results our methodology provides a very efficient 
way to consider the competitive positions in the market, their potential reactions and the 
retailer reactions. 
4.7 SUMMARY 
Considerable effort in the design community has produced methodologies that 
significantly improve customer satisfaction and quality.  These methods frequently ignore 
the reality that customers interact principally with dominant retailers for many product 
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categories and have no access to the manufacturer.  The approach presented in this 
chapter takes into account these channel dominating retailers through a game theoretic 
price setting model at the wholesale and retail level.  Several cases of channel structures 
are presented and we observe that the optimality of designs vary markedly as the 
structure changes and as the threat of shelf space denial goes up.  Under a heightened 
threat of shelf space denial our approach provides a Pareto set of designs to choose from 
that can mitigate this risk.    In addition to the variance in designs, channel structures 
appear to affect retail and wholesale margins to a great deal.  The monopolist retailer is 
able to drive wholesale prices to the lowest level while differentiated retailers and 
exclusive arrangements are able to improve profitability for both members of the channel.  
Additionally, our approach shows that manufacturers may be able to make their offer 
significantly more attractive with an exclusive contract.  Our results provide anecdotal 
evidence that while the manufacturer is limited to lower profits under an exclusive 
relationship the exclusive relationship provides significant motivation for channel 
acceptance and may be preferable to choosing a higher retailer profit under the non-
exclusive arrangement.    The strategic dominance of retailers presented here may provide 
some insight as to the recent large migration of manufacturing operations to less 
expensive and arguably lower quality workforces such as those in China.  Facing a 
monopolist retailer a manufacturer would have little choice but move off shore if a 
competitor does so as well.  The downward pressure on wholesale prices demands it.   
In the next chapter, design of product bundles is modeled with its impact on 
multiple product categories.  That is, several products are designed simultaneously with 
the possibility of selling two or more for a single price.  Additionally, a preliminary 
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probing of the assumptions of pricing equilibrium (Nash Equilibrium) is investigated 
along with other sources of uncertainty to determine their affect on optimal (robust) 

















CHAPTER 5:      MULTI-CATEGORY DESIGN OF BUNDLED 
PRODUCTS FOR RETAIL CHANNELS CONSIDERING 
DEMAND DEPENDENCIES AND UNCERTAINTY IN 
COMPETITIVE RESPONSE 
In this chapter, multi-category and bundled product design is explored as well as 
an approach to designing for uncertainty in the channel structure.  A prevalent approach 
to increasing both retailer and manufacturer revenues is to improve the attractiveness of a 
product offering by bundling related items together for one price. To be most effective, 
bundled products should be developed with an integrated design approach that seeks to 
achieve utility for the end customer as well as cost efficiencies through measures such as 
using common parts.  We propose a bundled product design approach that endogenizes 
the profit maximizing prices set by the channel controlling (monopolist) retailer similar to 
the monopolist framework of Chapter 4.  The approach extends the previous chapter to 
account for demand dependencies between the product categories and thus the impact of 
the bundle and cross-category competition on proposed engineering designs is known.  
Additionally, an approach that simultaneously considers uncertainty in 
engineering design tolerances, competing manufacturer product attributes, customer 
preferences, to ensure acceptable product profitability and market share under interval 
uncertainty is presented in this chapter.  A bundled product design case study is presented 
for two complimentary power tools which rely on the case study developed in Chapter 3 
along with the modifications necessary to make the tools cordless.  Manufacturer profit 
and market share are optimized both deterministically and under uncertain intervals.  We 
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find that considering demand dependencies can create optimal bundle and individual 
product designs that increase profits for both retailers and manufacturers.    
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows.  After the introduction in Section 
5.1, an overview of the proposed framework along with model assumptions and 
justifications is provided in Section 5.2. In Section 5.3, we provide the specific case study 
modifications necessary for the bundled product design relative to that presented in 
Chapter 3. Section 5.4 details the optimization approach used with the results presented 
in Section 5.5 and a summary in Section 5.6. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, we narrow the focus to the increasingly pervasive practice of 
product bundling in the retail sector which has been studied by economists and marketing 
researchers (Salinger, 1995), (Mulherne and Leone, 1991), (Pierce and Winter, 1996), 
(McAfee et al., 1989).  Bundling is a practice where value is added to the product 
offering by combining multiple complimentary products for a single price which directly 
impacts any demand model used to design the product.  Two sub-categories of bundling 
exist: (1) price bundling and (2) product bundling (Stremersch and Tellis, 2002). Price 
bundling is simply the offering of two or more separate and possibly independent 
products for one price.  Product bundling, on the other hand, requires some level of 
product integration and dependency.  Price bundling can be easily achieved by retailers 
while product bundling requires action on the part of manufacturers to integrate the 
products at the design stage.  Researchers generally agree that product bundling provides 
the greatest opportunity for increased profits (Mulhearne and Leone, 1991), (Stremersche 
and Tellis, 2002) and is therefore a prime candidate for design consideration.  
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Extant literature has addressed coupling engineering design for a single product 
category with discrete choice models such as the multi-nomial logit (Besharati et al., 
2006), (Luo et al., 2007).   Because bundled products present a new category in and of 
themselves we extend these approaches to investigate competing product category 
designs within a Nested Multi-Nomial Logit (NMNL) formulation (Anderson et al., 
1992), (Kannan and Wright, 1991).  The NMNL formulation for large choice sets (e.g., 
multiple categories) helps avoid violations of the irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption 
(Ben-Akiva, 1973) (McFadden, 1978).  This assumption essentially requires that original 
pair wise decisions remain in tact as additional alternative choices are added (Lourviere 
et al., 2004).   Bundle choice models (BCM) fall under the larger genre of multi-category 
models (Seetharman et al., 2003) and thus the evaluation of high level bundle attributes 
with choice models is not without precedent (Chung and Rao, 2003).  Kopalle et al., 
(1999) have shown that pure bundling (offering a bundle only) is never the equilibrium 
strategy (profit maximizing for multiple players) under the NMNL formulation.  As such,  
we investigate a mixed bundling strategy within NMNL formulation as a significant 
improvement in accuracy is possible over previous approaches where cross category 
effects are ignored (Williams et al., 2006) or when bundles are simply evaluated within 
existing product categories (Williams et al., 2007).   
Although examples abound in the retail marketplace, the extant literature has not 
considered the role of bundling early in the product design process.  Ideally, a design 
process would take into account the possibility of bundling by incorporating efficiencies 
of quantity and scope (i.e., costs) from the bundle as well as any market share gained 
from the added value to customers.  Less obviously, the design approach should also take 
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into account the effects of design integration on the individual products design, the 
cannibalization of sales between products, and the effect of the bundle on the retailer’s 
profit.  Finally, regardless of the bundling strategy a retailer chooses to use, if products 
are made more complementary in the design stage itself both manufacturers and retailers 
can benefit from higher sales, which may make it easier for the manufacturer to convince 
the retailer to carry its products.  
Additionally of concern, retailers now exert significant pressure on manufacturer 
wholesale prices as the largest retailers (e.g., Wal Mart) strive to continuously provide 
value to customers through price reductions (Fishman, 2006).    Realizing that 
manufacturers do not interact directly with end customers but rather propose product 
offerings to retailers who price the product and might accept or reject the design based on 
their own objectives, a new methodology is needed.  Retailers wish to maximize profit 
(see e.g., Simpson et al., 2001, Wagner et al., 1989, and Shipley, 2001)   which is an 
objective that does not necessarily align with the manufacturers profit maximization 
objective  (i.e., the retailer and manufacturer do not necessarily cooperate).  Some recent 
and relevant work in the engineering literature has sought to analyze non-cooperative 
behaviour (objectives are not aligned) between engineering disciplines within a 
manufacturing firm (Chanron and Lewis, 2005), (Xiao et al., 2005) (Marlar and Arora, 
2004).  The new approach proposed here will consider a non-cooperative externality: the 
retailer.  In that vain, the profit maximizing objective of the manufacturer has been 
modelled simultaneously with the retailer’s objective of maximizing category profits 
(Luo et al., 2007) (Williams et al., 2006) but in this work we extend approach to the 
multi-category assortment that includes the possibility of product bundles.  In our 
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approach the retailer is essentially an important stakeholder (Donaldson et al., 2004) who 
makes decisions on prices and shelf space while the manufacturer makes decisions on the 
rest of the product attributes. We limit our scope to a monopolist pricing model, from the 
retailer’s point of view, for multi-category profitability. 
While the manufacturer-monopolist retailer relationship can be readily modeled 
as a non-cooperative game, the relationship between the focal manufacturer and 
competing manufacturers is much more complicated. Game theoretic approaches to 
modeling simultaneous competitor reactions require strict-quasiconcavity of all 
competitor profit functions with respect to their own strategies in the case of 
deterministic games (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1998) and the super-rationality of players 
in the case of Bayesian games (Harsanyi, 1967).  These are rather strict criteria and 
difficult to prove for a multidisciplinary engineering design problem with discrete 
variables, and non-convex objective functions.  Additionally, players have repeatedly 
proven to be irrational (i.e., make responses that are not best responses to a competitors 
action, see e.g., Binmore et al., 2001) and incapable of identifying the Nash Equilibrium 
(Nash, 1951), (Haruvy and Stahl, 2005).  These aspects make it difficult to incorporate 
manufacturing competitor actions in a game theoretic framework.  Rather than focusing 
on the question of “which designs are optimal for our focal manufacturer given all 
manufacturers converging to a competitive equilibrium?” we reframe the question as 
“which designs are optimal for a bundle given that all competitor strategies and uncertain 
events (within an interval of uncertainty) conspire against him?”  Therefore, the one of 
the objectives of this paper is to develop a flexible design methodology that allows 
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manufacturers to manage uncertainty in the design, pricing and marketing of multiple 
products.     
5.2 APPROACH TO MULTI-CATEGORY DESIGN WITH BUNDLES 
 We approach this problem from the perspective of the manufacturer who is 
considering the design of multiple individual products and their possible bundle.  Each 
individual product and the bundle of all products are modeled as product categories.  The 
approach is formulated to evaluate demand for an engineering design in light of the 
possibility of substitution between product categories.  Our approach is formulated with 
four key goals in mind: (1) the effect of bundled product designs should be accounted for 
in calculating all product category market shares and profits (e.g., cross category effects), 
(2) the approach should be capable of optimizing product designs for multiple 
manufacturer firm objectives (e.g., profit and market share), (3) the design should take 
into account retail prices dictated by the monopolist retailer, and (4) designs should  be 
robust or have acceptable objective variation under uncertainty (e.g., uncertainty in 
competitor product attributes, uncertainty in  wholesale price, or uncertainty in an 
engineering parameter like material’s property).   
 Our framework is aimed at addressing these goals and is built up in a multilayered 
fashion where design decisions, retailer reactions, and consumer choices are sequenced in 






































Figure 5.2.1: Multi Layered Design Framework 
 As shown Figure 5.2.1, the innermost layer, Layer 1, is for the determination of 
the market shares for each product as designed (see the darkest block).  Market shares can 
only be determined once the retail price for the assortment in each category is set since 
price is a major component of customer utility.  The demand model (Layer 1) we employ 
will be presented in Section 5.2.1.  The next layer, retailer pricing layer (Layer 2), will be 
explicated in Section 5.2.2.  This layer of the model is depicted as the medium grey toned 
region allows the retailer to set prices that maximizes profits across all product 
categories.  Finally, engineering design (Layer 3) is the outermost layer (light grey tone) 
and must ensure the feasibility of the designs while simultaneously predicting monopolist 
price setting at the retail level (see Section 5.2.3).   This basic model provides the basis 





5.2.1 LAYER 1:  DISCRETE CHOICE MARKETING MODEL  
 Manufacturers are concerned with profit which is a function of production costs, 
wholesale price, and market share.  In the context of a bundled product the manufacturer 
is concerned with the profit generated by the original unbundled products as well as that 
of the bundle which can be addressed with the NMNL formulation.  In our 
implementation of the NMNL formulation we use a nest for each product category.  For 
example for two products there would be a nest for product 1, a nest for product 2 and 
then a nest for a bundle of the two products.   
 The NMNL approach is very flexible and capable of analyzing multiple 
categories along with the no-choice option which is presented in Figure 5.2.2. 
I1 IBundle
U11, U21 …U 1
Il IL
U1l, U2l … U1L,U2L… U1B,U2B  ...
…
1N
U 2l2N U LLN U BBN
…
 
Figure 5.2.2: Discrete Choice Design for Product Bundling 
 Each of the l=[1,2,…,L,B] nests or categories has an attraction or inclusive utility, 
Il that determines the overall market share of the product category. B represents the 
bundle nest while individual product competition is represented with (1,2,…,L).  This 
representation in Figure 5.2.2 assumes that any bundle B must be made up of all 
individual products [1,2,…,L] for a manufacturer offering a bundle.  That is one product 
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from each individual nest must make up the bundle.  To analyze the situation where n of 
L individual products are offered as bundles requires an additional bundle nest for each 
combination of categories.        
The inclusive utility Il of nest l is essentially a function of the utilities Uil for each 














∑             (5.1) 
where µ2 is a scaling parameter within the nest which is estimated using conjoint analysis 
of consumer surveys.  The probability of a consumer selecting the category nest Gl is 




























µ      (5.2) 
 In the second stage conditional probability of selecting the ith product given the 


































|     (5.3) 
Thus the probability at the outset of selecting any one product competing within such a 
cross category environment is a function of product utilities in all of the categories.  The 
market share m of product i in category Gl is then: 
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|                           (5.4) 
This NMNL market share calculation forms the cornerstone for rest of the bundle design 
approach as the innermost layer but relies on some preparatory work including shelf 
surveys (i.e., what are the competitor attributes?) and consumer surveys for each category 
(i.e., what do consumers want in terms of product attributes?).   
 To perform this task, we assume that first, manufacturers will collect customer 
preference data from likely users using a conjoint analysis (Green and Srinivasan, 1990) 
based on the alternatives in each of the two categories and the bundles (e.g., 1, 2, and the 
bundle). Customers are provided choice sets, each with an alternative from product 
category 1, an alternative from product category 2, and an alternative from the bundle 
category. Each choice set also has a no-choice option. Based on the choice data from 
customers across the many choice sets, customer value or utility that customer places on 
the various attributed of the products and the bundle are estimated. Recent estimation 
techniques allow estimation of utilities at the individual level using Bayesian techniques 
(Rossi and Allenby, 2003, or at the segment level using finite-mixture model techniques 
(Kamakura and Russell, 1989). Based on the conjoint data, customer’s probability 
estimates for choosing one or the other category or the bundle can be estimated at the 
segment level.  Commercially available marketing software (e.g., Sawtooth Software 
Market Research Tools) (Sawtooth, 2001) can be used to perform these conjoint utility 
estimates for each market segment and is a suggested methodology to support this 
framework.  The customer choices from the conjoint survey are decomposed into j 
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attribute utilities using maximum likelihood estimation and ultimately used to calculate 
market share.  Attribute utilities u=[u1,u2,…,uj] are functions of high level customer 
relevant product attributes y=[y1,y2,…,yj].  To estimate the total utility Uil for a product i 
within a category Gl, we sum the attribute utilities uijl: 
∑=
j
ijlil uU              (5.5) 
The market share calculations presented in this section culminate in a monopolist retailer 
setting retail prices so as to maximize profit of all categories. When products in a 
category within the NMNL formulation have market shares of less than an arbitrarily 
small number, 0.5%, due to low utility we can interpret such a situation as the product 
being denied shelf space.  The setting of retail prices is presented in the next subsection. 
5.2.2 LAYER 2:  RETAIL PRICING MODEL  
At this point we expand the original framework to demonstrate the internal 
workings of the retailer pricing model to calculate retailer profit π as he/she sets profit 



























































U12,U22 …UN2 U1L,U2L…UNL U1B,U2B  ...UNB
…
 
Figure 5.2.3: Retailer Pricing Layer 
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In the expanded section of Figure 5.2.3 the retailer pricing model is presented.  
The retailer observes the attributes of his own assortment and has a conjoint model of 














=     (5.6) 
P11 signifies the retail price of the first product in the first nest/category. Each nest has Nl 
products and thus the retail price matrix may not necessarily be square or symmetric.  
These retail prices will be iteratively set to maximize the profit of the retailer.  Each 
iteration consists of setting a retail price, calculating market share and retailer pricing, 
and then determining if retail profit is optimal as shown in Figure 5.2.3.   If profit is 
optimal the retail price is then known and the algorithm can proceed to the engineering 
layer.  To implement this we must first fully characterize the retailer’s profit function 
within the context of multiple categories, bundles and NMNL.  Given that there are a 
corresponding set of wholesale prices Wil assumed in the model for every retail price Pil 
and the possibility consumers may prefer not to select any product (i.e., no choice) Unc, 


















































































π   (5.7) 
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It is important to note that Il  and Uil are functions of retail price which is a customer level 
product attribute (i.e., y∈ilP ).  Utility for a product is downward sloping in price which 
means that customers (given two identical products) prefer the less expensive alternative. 
As such the utility for the retail price attribute takes the form: εββ ++−== oRilRj Pu / , 
where the price elasticity (i.e., customer response to price increases) is estimated in terms 
of a negative slope -1/βR, an intercept βo and an error term ε.  In turn Uil is a function of 
this uj=R as well as ultimately the attractiveness of the nest Il.  Thus the retailer (regardless 
of monopoly power) cannot freely increase retail prices.  As retail prices approach 
infinity the market share of all products drops to zero and customers turn to the no 
purchase or no choice option Unc.  Thus even a monopolist must strategically select prices 
for customer evaluation. 
Under certain conditions (i.e., strictly quasiconcave profit functions in a 
manufacturers own wholesale prices) Wil can be estimated using a game theoretic 
framework (see, e.g., Luo et al., 2007) but a reasonable approximation can also be found 
by observing actual retail prices and reducing the price by the retailer’s gross margin 
estimated from annual reports.  The latter interpretation is used in this work as the strict 
quasi-concavity of profits cannot be guaranteed for multiple manufacturers whose profit 
functions we discuss in the next section.    
Ultimately, this pricing model allows the retailer to maximize profits across 
related categories and to take into account the cross category effects of cutting prices on 
one manufacturer’s product to see the relative inclusive utility altered for all products and 
categories.  We believe such an approach more accurately models the decision 
framework of modern channel controlling retailers as department managers will 
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inherently seek to maximize departmental profit (multiple related categories) rather than 
each individual category.     
5.2.3 LAYER 3:  MANUFACTURING ENGINEERING AND PRICING MODEL  
We limit our decision model to a single focal manufacturer and as mentioned 
previously estimate wholesale prices at competing manufacturers from annual reports and 
shelf surveys.  We make no assumption on wholesale prices for the focal manufacturer 
and rather allow wholesale price to be a design optimization variable.  The manufacturer 
assumes the static wholesale prices of his competitors from retail prices discounted by a 
margin approximated from annual reports and then tries to maximize profit by setting 
optimal wholesale prices.  If he sets wholesale prices too high the monopolist retailer 
reacts by raising prices to the point of negligible market share for the focal 
manufacturer’s products.  The optimization algorithm ensures that the manufacturer sets 
prices with foresight of the retailer’s reactions.   
  Even after bounding our pricing framework in this manner a sizeable problem 
remains due to the nature of the multidisciplinary decisions that must take place for the 
manufacturer to optimize profit.  The complexity of product category dependencies in 
bundles along with the strategic response from the monopolist retailer requires that 
manufacturers develop their product line very carefully.  In our approach, the 
manufacturer begins by developing engineering models with inputs x.  These models 
serve two purposes: (1) high level product characteristics (e.g., weight, power) valued by 
customers are estimated through engineering design computations, and (2) product design 
feasibility in terms of design constraints such as maximum temperatures and stresses in a 
gear box are estimated.   In the extant methods that consider demand models only one 
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product’s design variables need to be generated since only one category exists.  In our 
approach we are tackling multiple categories/products at once with design dependencies 
amongst the products due to bundling.  As such, more design variables are required.  We 
concatenate the design variables for the different products which are then passed in to the 
intermediate computations as shown in the lower left of Manufacturer’s Bundle Design 



























































Figure 5.2.4: Manufacturer's Bundle Design Framework 
When L individual product categories are incorporated into the engineering design 
simulation, each product category set Gl will have a set of design variables lGx and 
wholesale prices W for the focal manufacturer.  The manufacturer also develops a set of 
bundle design variables 
BG
x  if the bundle is to differ from the individual product designs.  
Finally, the manufacturer can specify which design variables must be common or shared 
amongst the individual products and/or the bundle with the vector xShared.  This is key to 
achieving a product bundle as opposed to simply offering two products for one price 
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since some level of product integration is imposed by the shared variables. For each 
category that the manufacturer wishes to consider in the design optimization wholesale 
prices W=[W1, W2,…,WL,WB]  should be selected as well.  When x and W are sent to the 
next stage we refer to these vectors together as a candidate design.    
 The next step is performed in the “Intermediate Engineering Computations” block 
of Figure 5.2.4.  Here engineering design model takes inputs from the lowest level design 
variables x and simulate higher level (customer relevant) product attributes y.  The 
functions that take place in this stage can be anything from simple mathematical 
functions that predict an attribute like horsepower to highly detailed finite element 
simulations that predict stiffness of a power tool’s housing.  Additionally, the engineering 
simulations are responsible to check the limitations of the design.  That is a function g(x) 
is calculated and measured relative to a maximum value b. If g(x)>b then the candidate 
design is rejected and a new design selected.    
 If the design is feasible, the customer level product attributes y and wholesale 
prices W are passed to the retail pricing layer and demand model after which ultimately 
emerges the market share mil of each product which is a critical component of the 
manufacturer’s profit objective and obviously any market penetration objective.   Thus 
the manufacturer is able to influence market share in a couple of different ways.  Design 
variables can be tuned (through optimization) to better address customer preferences in 
light of the assortment or the manufacturer can reduce wholesale prices to encourage the 
retailer to reduce retail prices on the focal manufacturer’s product.   
 The last key to the manufacturer’s design selection is computing production costs 
which are of course a critical component of the profit function and takes place in 
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“Compute Production Costs” block of Figure 5.2.4.  Competitor wholesale prices and 
production costs for all manufacturers are estimated using the parametric approach 
detailed in Chapter 3.  That is wholesale prices and production costs are estimated from 
wholesale and retail margins found in annual reports and a multi-regression of product 
attributes currently found in the dominating retailers’ assortments.  
 The estimation of market share, production costs, and proposed wholesale price 
culminates for the manufacturer at the decision node in Figure 5.2.4 “Optimal 
Manufacturer Profit?”  We can write the manufacturers profit function as the sum of 
profits derived from each of the product categories (including the bundle category). For 
the first objective, first we sum the profit in each nest Gl but of course only those i 
products belonging to the focal manufacturer’s (FM) offering FMlGi∈ .  As before (see 
retailer profit Eq. 5.7) we sum the profit across all nests (See Eq. 5.8.1). Several 
researchers (see, Stremersch and Tellis, 2002, for a comprehensive summary) have 
pointed out that in addition to profit, market share (or market penetration) may be equally 
important in new product introductions.  Therefore, we sum the market shares of the 
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(5.8.1) 











































































        (5.8.2) 
 Subject to: (1)         ( ) bg ≤x                   (5.8.3) 
                 (2)         newold ππ ≤                     (5.8.4)     
      Initially it is not obvious that the two objectives are competing because their 
forms are similar.  The greatest difference between the two lies in the fact that if 
wholesale prices are set below production costs profit (Objective 1) will be negative and 
market share (Objective 2) may be extremely high as the retailer senses an opportunity to 
increase profit by directing consumers to the low wholesale price product through 
incentives such as low retail price.  While counterintuitive, these negative margins have 
been observed for several product introductions (see, e.g., Hesseldahi, 2005, who 
examines the X-box video game console) where maximum market share was the primary 
consideration.  This so called “loss leader” approach is implemented in anticipation of 
future profits on accessory sales (e.g., software/games).  The optimal design for this loss-
leader strategy can be found using our multi-objective approach.  These profit and 
penetration formulas Eq. (5.8.1-5.8.2) are flexible in that a manufacturer can offer 
multiple products within a nest/category as we sum over FMlGi∈  and also the cross 
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category effects are taken into account with the NMNL calculation.  Thus the 
manufacturer has the ability to assess changes in design variables as they impact the 
entire product line.  Moreover, as discussed previously, the manufacturer faces physical 
constraints Eq. (5.8.3) and highly consolidated retailer power Eq. (5.8.4) that requires that 
the retailers new profit πnew be greater than the old πold in order to achieve access to 
consumers.  So, in essence, the previous methods (e.g., Williams et al., 2006) have been 
extended to multiple categories and bundles through an initial calculation of Eq. (5.7) that 






















Figure 5.2.5: Nested Optimization 
 Any proposed set of new products (individual products and bundles) must 
increase the retailers profit or the manufacturer faces rejection.  Thus we provide an 
additional constraint for the multi-category model that constrains the new retailer profit to 
being higher than the retailer’s prior profit, see Eq. (5.8.4).  If the model were extended to 
consider multiple retailers one would simply add additional constraints for those retailers 
but the pricing layer becomes much more complicated as multiple retailers must reach a 
competitive equilibrium in pricing rather than a simple maximization.    
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 In total, Figure 5.2.5 makes up the mathematical formulation of the engineering 
layer shown in Figure 5.2.4 as well as the retail pricing layer. Given that many design 
variables are discrete and the desire to find a global optimum for objectives that may not 
be convex we recommend a genetic algorithm and specifically a multi-objective genetic 
algorithm (see, e.g., Deb, 2001) to optimize the engineering layer.  The retailer profit can 
be found through a gradient based algorithm because of the quasi-concavity of the 
NMNL formulation.           
5.2.4 MULTIDISCIPLINARY UNCERTAINTY 
 We propose robust optimization as a method to solve for a focal manufacturer’s 
strategy under uncertainty.  Robust optimization, pioneered by Taguchi (1978), seeks to 
find designs with minimal variation in design’s (objective) performance due to variation 
in uncertain parameters. Although robust optimization has principally been applied to 
models with variation in engineering parameters (e.g., dimensional tolerances) we believe 
it is equally amenable to multi-disciplinary sources of uncertainty (e.g., consumer 
preferences, wire thickness etc.) as demonstrated in (Besherati et al., 2006).  We extend 
the scope of uncertainty to included strategic sources such as competitor reactions in 
choosing product attributes that might not be strictly quasi-concave (in own profit) 
decisions. 
 Uncertain intervals can be constructed from defined probability distributions 
based on confidence intervals (Besharati et al., 2006) or the decision maker can specify 
an interval range of uncertainty for parameters before optimization.  This can be used to 
model strategic options of a competitor as an uncertain interval whereby we believe that a 
competitor might select a product attribute between some lower and upper limits of the 
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attribute.  In the context of bundling one can specify a range that the bundle product 
attributes might deviate from the existing individual product attributes since the cost 
function for retooling the bundled product is unknown.  These strategic options are 
essentially modeled as uncertain parameters which can be accounted for in robust 
optimization as will be discussed subsequently.  
 While not computationally trivial, the Multi-Objective Robust Optimization 
(MORO) technique developed by Li et al. (2006) has many properties that are amenable 
to finding solutions that are optimal given an acceptable level of objective variation.  This 
approach is capable of finding designs that are multi-objectively robust (i.e., the 
uncertainty considered does not cause variation outside of a range specified for each 
objective).  This range is called the Acceptable Objective Variation Range (AOVR) and 
is defined by the decision maker. The MORO approach has convenient properties in that 
objective functions need not be convex in parameter uncertainty since a genetic algorithm 
is used to probe the candidate design for robustness.   
 MORO is most easily described graphically but first a few definitions are in order.  
Uncertain input parameters p=[p1, p2,…,pG] are assumed to vary by an amount 
±∆p=[±∆p1, ±∆p2,…,±∆pG] around a nominal parameter value of p0 =[p0,1, p0,2,…,p0,G] 

























Figure 5.2.6: MORO: Robust Optimization 
 If the parameter tolerance region were exhaustively mapped to objective space we 
would see regions of uncertainty surrounding each design which is called the objective 
sensitivity region (OSR) (grey areas on the right side).  In this case we present a set of 
designs that are multi-objectively optimal with respect to profit and market share on the 
right side of Figure 5.2.6.  In order to define robustness we must first define a range of 
objectives that the decision maker would find acceptable.  The approach has the decision 
maker define ranges ±∆f=[±∆f1, ±∆f2,…,±∆fM] for each of the objective functions f=[f1, 
f2,…,fM]  which are first normalized.  These ranges make up a hypercube termed the 
AOVR.  The simplest definition for robustness is to say that if AOVR encloses OSR then 
the design is robust as is the one in the exploded view shown in Figure 5.2.6.  
Equivalently if we find the Euclidian distance to the worst case of the OSR Rfnew is less 
than the normalized distance to the tangency of the AOVR (RI)  then the design is also 
robust.  For completeness a design that is multi-objectively optimal in a nominal sense 
yet is not robust per this definition is shown at the top of Figure 5.2.6.  This design would 
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be rejected for excessive uncertainty.  A simplified inner-outer optimization approach is 
shown in Figure 5.2.7 to accomplish the task of robust optimization.  In cases where 
robust optimization is unable to find a feasible solution (including the robustness 
constraint) the decision maker can expand the AOVR incrementally.  The reader is 


















































Figure 5.2.7: Robust Optimization Topology 
  In Section 5.3 this approach will be applied to a case study with multi 
disciplinary sources of uncertainty that are of consequence to the design of bundled 
products.   
5.3 CASE STUDY:  CORDLESS ANGLE GRINDER AND RIGHT ANGLE 
DRILL 
5.3.1 NESTED LOGIT DEMAND MODEL 
 A bundled product engineering design for notional customer segments was 
developed based on historical data as a case study for our approach.   A product bundle of 
a cordless angle grinder and a cordless right angle drill is proposed as a bundle that is 
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likely of interest to customers. The customer preferences for these products and the 
bundle are estimated using the NMNL model (see Table 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.2).  The 
grinder and drill are each treated as categories (Table 1) that compete with the bundle 
category (grinder plus drill in Table 5.3.2) within the NMNL model.  Each product comes 
with a battery pack and charger when sold separately and share a battery/charger when 
sold together in a drill/grinder bundle.  Segment specific product attribute utilities uijl are 
given in tables one and two along with the nest scaling parameter µ1. 
Segment Two Three Four Segment Two Three Four
Share 24.8% 12.1% 25.3% Share 21.2% 34.4% 22.0%
µ 1 0.82 1.02 0.85 1.10 µ 1 0.92 0.94 1.06 0.89
Price
$99.00 3 2 2 2 3 2 3
$199.00 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
$299.00 -3 -2 -2 -2.1 -3.1 -2.1 -3.1
Volts
10 -0.45 -1.5 -0.5 -2.25 -1.45 -2.5 -2.5
25 0.1 -0.65 -0.38 -0.13 -0.1 -0.65 -0.38
40 1 2.13 2.82 2.38 1.55 3.15 2.88
4 -1.4 -1.71 -0.8 -0.8 -0.5 -0.7 -1.2
10 0.5 -0.82 0.74 -0.3 -0.5 0.2 0.3
16 0.9 2.53 1.54 1.1 1 0.5 0.9
Girth
Small -2.5 1.5 -0.6 1.5 1.4 0.5 -0.8
Large 2.5 -1.5 0.6 -1.5 -1.4 -0.5 0.8
Weight
16lbs -0.3 -0.5 -1.5 -2.3 -1.8 -2.5 -1.5
9 lbs -0.5 -0.1 0.5 -0.5 -1.2 -1.5 -0.5
6 lbs 0.8 0.6 1 2.8 3 4 2





















Grinder Category Utility Estimates Drill Category Utility Estimates
One One
 
Table 5.3.1: Grinder and Drill Category Utilities 
 For motivation it is worth explaining that, an angle grinder is a tool commonly 
used in many trades for removal of material or cutting while a right angle drill is 
frequently used for drilling in cramped spaces due to its reduced horizontal clearance.  A 
bundle of these tools would be especially attractive to plumbers, electricians, or even the 
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weekend hobbyist and requires design integration of the common battery and voltage 
specifications. The user can expect to receive a reduced price by using the same 
supporting components (battery pack and charger in Figure 5.3.1).   
 This complicates the design optimization as the battery pack design must consider 
the preferences of the shoppers of all three categories (drill, grinder, and drill+grinder)  
Cordless angle grinders are operated for long periods (minutes at a time) at high RPM 
(10,000 RPM) while drills are operated for much shorter periods at higher torque (up to 
600 in-lbs) and lower RPM (less than 1,750).   Due to the nature of these two operating 
environments one can expect the voltage requirements (directly impacts torque) for each 
tool and battery capacity (amp-hrs) to be somewhat different for each tool.  For example, 
buyers of angle grinders want longer battery life due to the high RPM and longer tasks 
while the users of drills are particularly interested in light weight designs.   
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Segment Two Three Four Segment Two Three Four
Share 21.5% 35.5% 18.3% Share 21.5% 35.5% 18.3%
µ 1 1.26 1.04 1.09 1.01 -2 -2 -2 -2
Combined Attributes
1 2 1 2 -0.3 -1.2 -0.5 -0.5
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 -0.5 0.4 -0.1 -0.5
-1 -2 -1 -2 0.8 0.8 0.6 1
-1.75 -1.45 -1.48 -2.00
0.00 -0.10 -0.28 -0.52
1.75 1.55 2.08 2.51
Pure Attributes (bundle context)
-0.80 -0.46 -0.67 -1.18 4 -1.37 1.17 -1.66 -0.76
-0.25 -0.48 0.22 0.35 10 0.55 0.48 -0.77 0.76
1.05 0.94 0.45 0.83 16 0.82 -1.65 2.43 0.00
Drill Girth Grinder Girth
1.52 1.42 0.52 -0.77 Small 1.25 0.98 0.75 -0.61
-1.52 -1.42 -0.52 0.77 Large -1.25 -0.98 -0.75 0.61
-2.27 -1.80 -2.46 -1.46 16lbs -0.29 1.21 -0.48 -1.48
-0.46 -1.19 -1.47 -0.49 9 lbs -0.47 -0.36 -0.07 0.51
2.74 2.98 3.93 1.95 6 lbs 0.76 -0.85 0.55 0.97
No Choice



























Bundle Category Utility Estimates
One
 
Table 5.3.2: Bundle Category Utilities 
  We assume that all three categories make up a market size of 20 million 
units although the exact size of each category is unknown until the shares of the nests are 
calculated in the NMNL model.  The focal manufacturer updating his offering of 1 of 3 
drills in the monopolist retailer’s  assortment as well as 1 of 3 grinders and 1 of 3 bundles 
in the retailer’s assortment. The new offering must be more profitable than the assumed 
assortment pre-existing on the retailer’s shelf.  The conjoint analysis of bundle attributes 
contains more product attributes because each of the tools in the bundle will be evaluated 
in the context of the nest or category.  In addition, the bundled tools have combined 
attributes such as voltage, price,  and combined weight because the bundle has one less 
battery and will be evaluated as a whole when one considers the contractor who must 
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carry the tools to and from the jobsite as a set.  The grinder and drill individual product 
weight will each be evaluated with the battery attached.   
 The differing values placed by the product category segments on product 
attributes will be important in selecting an optimal design since the nests do not value 
attributes equally.  For example a tension exists between the grinder category that wants 
long battery life and the tool category that prefers light weight.   The engineering design 
must take this into account in providing all three category designs since the battery design 
will affect all three categories differently.  Product attributes from the left side of Table 
5.3.1 and Table 5.3.2 will be computed in the next section.   
5.3.2 ENGINEERING PERFORMANCE MODEL 
 The general universal motor and bevel gear design methodology from Chapter 3 
was adapted for the cordless right angle drill and angle grinder.  In designing the two 
individual tools and the bundle the proposed approach was restricted offering the 
individual tools as a bundle a logical cost savings approach through commonality of 
components.   In the design of electric power tools we have identified 9 design variables 
that impact higher level attributes that are then translated into utility.   Because we are 
designing two different motors (one for each the grinder and the drill) we have 18 design 
variables related to motor and bevel gear (Figure 5.3.1).  There are also two shared design 
variables that affect all category offerings from the manufacturer: voltage (volts) and 
battery size (amp-hrs). Finally, three wholesale prices were also set as design variables, 
one for the grinder, drill and bundle.   
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Note:  motor variables *, bevel gear variables ** 
Stator outer radius Ro (in)* 
Current I (amps)* 
Armature wire turns Nc (# of turns)* 
Stator wire turns Ns  (# of turns)* 
Stator thickness t (in)* 
Stator Gap thickness lgap (in)* 
Motor Stack Length L (in)* 
Pinion Pitch Diameter Dp (in)** 
Gear Ratio r** 
Stator outer radius Ro (in)* 
Current I (amps)* 
Armature wire turns Nc (# of turns)* 
Stator wire turns Ns  (# of turns)* 
Stator thickness t (in)* 
Stator Gap thickness lgap (in)* 
Motor Stack Length L (in)* 
Pinion Pitch Diameter Dp (in)** 
Gear Ratio r** 
Battery/Charger Design Variables (2) 
Voltage V (volts) 
Battery Size Cap (amp-hrs) 
Wholesale Price Design Variables (3)
Grinder/Drill Bundle Price ($) 
Grinder Price ($) 
Drill Price ($) 
Grinder Design Variables (9)Drill Design Variables (9)
**Bevel Gear 
*Universal Motor  
 
Figure 5.3.1: Design Variables 
 The engineering design variables were transformed to intermediate customer 
relevant variables that are then transformed to utility using linear interpolation of the 
customer level attributes utilities in Table 5.3.1 and Table 5.3.2 just as we did for one tool 
in Chapter 3.  One of the simplest examples of this transformation is the operating time or 
battery life of the tool: 
I
CapLife ×= 7.0(min)      (5.9) 
where I is the design variable for motor current and Cap is the Battery size and an 
efficiency factor of 0.7 is applied (Hurricks, 1994).   Similarly the girth attribute G of the 
design is : 
)5.(2)( +×= oRinG   (5.10) 
where Ro is the outer radius of the stator in inches and ½ inch is added to the radius to 
account for the plastic body of the tool and an air gap for cooling the motor.  The weight 
of the tool is a somewhat more complicated approximation from the design variables and 
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is presented in Table 5.3.3.  This intermediate attribute also has a complicated affect on 
market share as it affects each category’s overall utility differently.   
Density  Steel ρ s (lbm/ in3) ρ s =0 .283(lbm/ in3)
Density of Copper ρ copper (lbm/ ρ copper = 0.297(lbm/ in3) 
Face Width b (in) b=0.3 in
Gear Pitch Diameter Dg (in) rDD pg ⋅=
Armature Diameter lr (in) lr =2(Ro-t-lgap) 
Wrap length lrw (in) Lll rrw 22 +=
Stator Mass M s  (lbm) steeloos LtRRM ρππ ⋅⋅−−= ))()(( 22  
Armature Mass M a  (lbm) sra LAM ρ⋅⋅=
Windings Mass Mw  (lbm) copperwscrww ANNlM ρ⋅+= )2(  
Motor Mass Mm  (lbm) wasm MMMM ++=
Pinion Mass Mp (lbm) 4/)( 2 steelpp bDM ρπ ⋅⋅⋅=
Gear Mass Mg (lbm) 4/)( 2 steelgg bDM ρπ ⋅⋅⋅=
Bevel Gears Mass Mbg (lbm) gpbg MMM +=
Battery Mass Mbat (lbm) 5.0+= CapM bat
Fixed Mass Mf (kg) )(2.1.... lbmMMM Arborcommutarf =+=  
Total Mass Mt  (kg) Mt=Mbg+Mm+Mf+Mbat 
Table 5.3.3: Cordless Tool Mass Computations 
 The mass of the battery Mbat is an approximation based upon a survey of 
commercially available replacement batteries for power tools.  It is important to note that 
the battery capacity impacts two performance attributes in the design (weight and battery 
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Length to Diameter Ratio 5/ ≤GL
Flux Density armature Br (Tesla) TeslalB rr 5.1)4/)/(( 2 ≤⋅= πφ  
Flux Density Stator Bs (Tesla) TeslalLB rs 5.1)2/( ≤⋅⋅= φ  
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Bending Stress σb (Pa) MPaJmFKK imab 145)/()( ≤⋅=σ
Armature Tip Velocity va )/(10000 sftlNv rmotora ≤⋅⋅= π  
Table 5.3.4: Common Constraints 
 A set of constraints is implemented for each class of power tool though the 
universal motor and bevel gear overall design is general in nature.  This is because the 
usage scenario of each motor is far different (e.g., high torque necessary for drill, high 
RPM necessary for grinding).  The common constraints (Table 5.3.4) are implemented 
for each design while Table 5.3.5 constraints are individual product specific. In total there 
are 24 constraints for the overall engineering design 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 2422102 =++⋅ grinderdrillcommon .  If the bundle products were not forced to follow 
the individual product category designs an additional set of engineering constraints would 
be necessary.  Due to space constraints it was not possible to demonstrate all intermediate 
computations.  For details on calculating the following intermediate design variables 
(flux φ , module (pinion) m, motor RPM Nmotor, torque T, gear cone depth Dv, pinion cone 
depth dv,   tooth loading intensity Fi , zone factor ZH) and selection of design constants 
(Ze,Ka, Km, J) see Chapter 3.   
 For the grinder, two unique constraints were implemented to ensure safe operating 
speeds and adequate grinding RPM.  The range of output RPM was limited from 8000 to 
10000.  10000 RPM is the upper limited allowed by the manufacturers of the grinding 
disks that are commonly sold for the angle grinder while 8000 RPM under no-load 
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conditions ensures adequate operation for material removal.  Right angle drills are used to 
bore large holes through wall studs for routing plumbing and electrical services.  The 
large drill bits require significant torque so the output was constrained to greater than 500 
lbf-in which is appropriate for high quality consumer grade power tools.  In addition, the 
no-load output RPM was limited to 1750 to ensure a reasonable operating range for 
drilling in wood.    
Motor RPM Nmotor 40000≤motorN
Grinding Wheel RPM Nout-grinder 10000)/(8000 ≤=≤ − rNN motorgrinderout  
Drill Torque T (lbf-in)  )(500 inlbfT −≥
Drill Output RPM Nout-drill 1750/ ≤=− rNN drillout
Table 5.3.5: Grinder and Drill Performance Constraints 
 Finally, a battery cost model was added to the motor-bevel gear cost model 
(Section 3.5) based upon a market survey of battery costs and a simple multi-regression 
of two coefficients: voltage and battery size.   
 )(3.10)(51.1($) hrsAmpeBatterySizVoltsVtBatteryCos −⋅+⋅=     (5.11) 
The battery design (cost) is then very important and affects three attributes as the 
customer segments are sensitive to the performance (i.e., voltage and battery life) as well 
as have significant utility for lower prices. The tension between these performances 
attributes, engineering design constraints, and strategic interplay makes for an interesting 







5.3.3 CASE STUDY SOURCES OF UNCERTAINTY 
 For this case study, it is assumed that the manufacturer wishes that his profit, and 
market penetration be maximal but also wants the projected profit and penetration results 
to be insensitive to uncertainty.  Using the MORO approach discussed previously we set 
the AOVR of the objectives ±∆fM  to ±10%.  That is, if the projected profit or market 
share of the candidate design varies by more than 10% the design is rejected.  Some may 
argue that simply maximizing the expected value of profits and market share is sufficient 
but firms can be placed at a serious disadvantage if they under-perform earnings forecasts 
significantly.  Our use of robust optimization helps ensure that forecasts are closer to 
targets under the uncertain parameter intervals considered.  Additionally, one might 
question why an upper limit on profit or market share variation need be enforced.  
Consider the case of extremely strong demand where a manufacturer cannot fulfil orders 
due to capacity limitations.  In such a case the powerful retailer may penalize the 
manufacturer by a degraded evaluation of ability-to-deliver for future product 
transactions or even through a contract instrument that financially penalizes non-
performance.  Thus both underestimating and overestimating performance have negative 
implications regardless of the expected value.  The MORO is one approach to reducing 
the inaccuracy of objective estimates through engineering design.  
 As discussed in Section 5.2 we can use MORO to mitigate the affect of the 
multiple sources of uncertainty in a product design optimization.   Sources of uncertainty 
in the case study come from 3 disciplines: strategic uncertainty (competitor attributes), 
manufacturing tolerances, and cost model projections.  Since it is not possible to consider 
all sources of uncertainty we limit our focus to a few candidates from each discipline.  
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The first three parameters considered will endogenize the possibility that a competing 
manufacturer may cut his/her wholesale prices to suboptimal levels with respect to the 
firm’s own profit.  Thus the wholesale prices of the grinder, drill and bundle for a 
competitor (WPgrinder, WPdrill, and WPBundle) are allowed to vary during robust 
optimization by ±30% from their nominal value.  The nominal value of the wholesale 
price is estimated using multi-regression and annual reports as formulated in Section 3.5.  
The competitor might also change other important product attributes such as voltage and 
battery size.  As such, we also allow these values to vary by ±30% during robust 
optimization from the value observed for the competitor in the shelf survey.  If the ±10% 
variation in objective functions cannot be met the decision maker can reduce uncertainty 
in the model inputs or expand the scope of the acceptable variation and then rerun the 
robust optimization. 
 Next, we include considerations for manufacturing tolerance uncertainty.   The 
stator outer radius Ro and the stack length L were allowed to vary for the focal 
manufacturer by ±1% which is a considerable tolerance region.  This uncertainty impacts 
strategic positioning by affecting the mass of the tools but also the ability of the tool to 
carry voltage and current or to stay within pre-defined operating limits (i.e., motor RPM 
in Table 5.3.4).  Thus the method insures that constraints are met under uncertainty and 
that changes in attributes do not cause too great of variation in profit or market share.  
Additionally, these attributes impact the production cost function as weight impacts the 
cost function significantly.  Lastly, we address uncertainty in the cost function estimate 
itself by assuming that the power/weight ratio cost coefficient in (Williams et al., 2006) is 
allowed to vary within its 95% confidence interval estimated during the multi-regression.      
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 These uncertain intervals (5 strategic, 2 manufacturing, and 1 cost = 8 total) that 
make up the parameter tolerance region can be expanded or contracted along with the 
AOVR in accordance with the risk aversion of the decision maker for the focal firm.  In 
addition, the number of sources of uncertainty considered can be expanded as the risk 
aversion of the firm increases.  Ultimately though, a balance must be struck between the 
size of the AOVR and the uncertainty intervals as no feasible results can be found with an 
extremely small AOVR and large uncertainty intervals.   
5.4 OPTIMIZATION APPROACH 
We used Matlab’s Genetic Algorithm and Direct Search (GADS) Toolbox to 
develop a MOGA to simultaneously optimize market share and profit for the subject 
manufacturer using a non-dominated sorting algorithm for design ranking (Deb, 2004).  
The 23 design variables were encoded in a binary format with lower and upper bounds 
specified.  The wholesale prices were allowed to increase to $2,000 each as a method to 
eliminate any unprofitable product from the manufacturer’s product line.  Such a price 
would result in a miniscule market share that would be truncated from consideration by a 
decision maker.  The design variables were encoded as 12 bit binary strings and run with 
a population size of 200 for 200 generations.  Additionally, the MOGA was set to 
terminate if objective function values change less than 10-6 over 50 generations or change 
less than 10-6 or a time period of 600 seconds.  Constraints were handled using the 
“Feasible Over Infeasible Approach” (Deb, 2001) where violated designs are set equal to 
the worst function call plus a penalty.  Additionally, a crossover fraction of 0.6, a 
mutation rate of 0.1 and an elite fraction of 1/3rd were used.  The inner optimization in 
Figure 5.2.5 for retail price setting is strictly quasi-concave (Anderson et al., 1992) for 
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monopolies.  As such, we implemented this in Matlab’s minimization routine “fmincon” 
where retail prices were constrained to being greater than wholesale prices.  As 
mentioned previously, the robust optimization approach used was MORO and 
implemented as described in Li et al., (2006) which has an inner optimization that uses a 
genetic algorithm to find the expected global solution.  
5.5 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
One case was run for both the nominal or non-robust monopoly case and the 
robust-monopoly case for bundled product design.  Figure 5.5.1 shows Nominal Pareto 
Design frontier (non-dominated solutions) with squares and the Robust Pareto Design 
frontier as diamonds.  Robust solutions are plotted at the uncertain parameter’s nominal 
value so one can think of the position on the graph as being unable to move greater than 
10% in any direction under the tolerance region considered. Both results show that a wide 
range of optimal market penetration and profit results are possible along the Pareto 
frontier although a much larger range of possibilities exists for the robust design 
approach.  These plots confirm that a tension exists between market share and profit as 
objectives as suspected.   Market share can be gained at the expense of profit and vice 
versa.  We also see that market share and profit can only be traded against one another to 
a limited extent by varying the product design.   
 Interestingly, the practice of offering products at a loss to achieve market 
penetration (e.g., X-box, inkjet printers) is confirmed in the negative profit regions of the 
Robust Pareto Designs on Figure 5.5.1 where the market share realized nearly reaches 
60% or 12M units at a $272M loss  This result is possible because the customers are 
sufficiently elastic (sensitive) to price and the wholesale pricing was allowed to reach 
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values far below marginal cost which encouraged the retailer to lower prices and direct 
market share to the focal manufacturer.  This result can also be achieved by designing 
extremely high quality goods (i.e., greater utility) and offering these goods at below cost.  
It need not be a situation where a mediocre good is offered at an extremely low price.  
Both types of solutions exist along the Robust Pareto Designs.  This is a business model 
akin to that employed for the X-box and inkjet printers where manufacturers accept 
losses to achieve future revenue streams on software and ink.   
 Finally, we are able to see the impact that the decision making structure has on the 
profitability of designs along the Pareto Frontier by overlaying the Pareto curves on 
Figure 5.5.1.  By virtue of the fact that robust design optimization requires an additional 
robustness constraint relative to the original problem it is observed that the robust 



























Figure 5.5.1: Robust/Nominal Pareto Comparison 
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  To demonstrate how designs along the Pareto curve can be achieved we 
present 6 designs (as indicated on Figure 5.5.1) in Table 5.5.1.  Design 1 is highly 
unprofitable yet captures high levels of market share by offering better attributes at 
higher production costs yet with low wholesale prices or a negative margin.  The 
profitable designs (2, 3, 4, 5 and 6) have much lower voltages and lower battery 
capacities in general which results in a lower production cost.  It appears that given 
consumer price elasticity from the conjoint estimates that low cost/lower performance 
strategies are better for the focal manufacturer given the assumed strategic framework 
(monopoly) and competitor assortment.   
Grinder Drill Grinder Drill Grinder Drill Grinder Drill Grinder Drill Grinder Drill
N c  (turns) 130.73 118.43 130.00 121.24 118.96 133.99 101.01 92.08 110.19 96.30 98.90 114.58
N s (turns) 42.33 15.30 38.86 15.77 39.04 15.06 28.23 16.71 26.48 16.82 43.24 16.72
R o (in) 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.62 0.59 0.61 0.64 0.44 0.53 0.45 0.47 0.44
T (in) 0.22 0.28 0.22 0.28 0.28 0.32 0.14 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.13 0.14
l gap  (mil) 3.78 2.28 3.27 2.76 1.69 2.87 0.12 3.19 0.24 3.19 0.35 3.15
L (in) 2.68 2.57 2.67 1.89 2.60 2.06 2.79 2.73 2.78 1.66 2.80 2.73
r (ratio) 1.99 2.56 2.65 2.62 2.66 2.07 2.01 4.37 2.01 3.39 2.01 4.37
D p (in) 1.25 0.69 1.25 0.68 1.24 0.66 1.51 0.65 1.39 0.83 1.51 0.64
V  (Volts)
Cap  (amp-hrs)
Girth (in) 2.17 2.23 2.17 2.22 2.18 2.22 2.27 1.88 2.27 1.90 2.18 1.88
Mass (lbm) 5.87 5.54 6.41 5.37 6.21 5.27 6.84 5.76 6.11 5.40 6.22 5.79
Duration (min) 2.21 2.28 2.92 2.23 2.36 1.83 2.46 1.51 3.26 1.51 2.46 1.93
Prices
Pure Price $76.16 $98.18 $76.35 $92.13 $76.54 $90.81 $82.14 $96.91 $98.18 $90.91 $79.04 $96.88
Bundle Price
Market Share
Pure Share 5.92% 19.12% 5.30% 32.58% 8.10% 17.24% 38.03% 12.05% 24.94% 10.16% 22.17% 8.40%
Bundle Share
21.58 15.44
1.43 1.23 1.26 1.10 1.10 1.11
41.79 31.13 17.07 23.75
Robust Monopoly Nominal Monopoly
Design 1 Design 2 Design 3 Design 4 Design 5 Design 6
10.82% 11.57% 7.21% 5.50%
$115.44 $116.95 $129.10 $122.72 $110.22 $122.62
20.75% 16.40%  
Table 5.5.1: Sample of Optimal Designs 
 It is worth noting that retailer profits benefit from the design optimization of the 
product bundle.  Otherwise the designs would be rejected by the retailer who can reject a 
design by raising the price to high levels and therefore eliminate market share.  Further 
evidence of the improvements offered by bundle design optimization can be seen in the 
market shares estimated by the approach.  The bundle products share significant market 
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share with the individual product categories for many of the optimal designs.  Overall the 
robust offerings from the focal manufacturer tend to have more attractive bundles as 
evidenced by the higher market shares for the bundle versus the non-robust designs.  This 
observation is an additional motivation for pursuing bundle design for manufacturers.  
Lastly, we see a slight shift from the manufacturer emphasizing the grinder design to the 
drill design as he/she attempts to make the designs more robust.   The emphasis is shifted 
by reducing the wholesale price of the drill, reducing the weight of the Drill through 
engineering design changes, and most importantly by increasing the voltage which is 
highly valued by drill shoppers.  This somewhat unexpected trend demonstrates the 
importance of considering the categories simultaneously in the NMNL formulation.  
Making these engineering design decisions without such a model would lead to 
suboptimal cross category profit cannibalization for the manufacturer which is of great 
concern considering the number of manufacturers offering bundles and products in 
multiple categories. 
5.6 SUMMARY 
 This chapter has presented a new approach to developing bundled product designs 
within a retail channel setting.  The NMNL approach considers demand dependencies 
amongst the product bundle and individual product categories while our nested 
optimization of retail prices accounts for the increasing clout of retailers in the market 
place.   The case study demonstrates the effectiveness of this new methodology on a 
bundle-relevant product category in optimizing profitability and market share.   
Considering the bundle and individual products simultaneously has important design 
implications as shown in the power tool case study where each individual tool and bundle 
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relies upon the same battery pack and voltage that would likely be suboptimal for either 
tool in isolation.   Additionally we have shown that robust optimization can account for 
multiple sources of uncertainty including the competitor strategies and that hedging 
against such strategies requires design consideration (i.e., optimal robust designs are 
different than nominally optimal designs). Our approach is distinct as a design 
methodology in that we take into account monopolist pricing as developed in Chapter 4 
as well as a retailer acceptance criterion established in Chapter 3 which we demonstrate 
are important factors in calculating profit and market share.  
 This concludes the main body of this dissertation.  In the next chapter, concluding 
remarks about all three research thrusts will be made.  Additionally the primary 
contributions of this work will be discussed along with possible future areas of research 












CHAPTER 6:      CONCLUSIONS 
This dissertation has focused on engineering design optimization of products for 
retail channels.  The powerful downstream position of retailers from manufacturers 
allows them to unilaterally make two decisions that greatly impact manufacturer profit.  
The two retailer decisions are: (1) whether to commit or deny shelf space to a product and 
(2) what prices should be set for the assortment.  These are the fundamental issues of this 
dissertation as ultimately these decisions affect the success of any engineering design. 
  After introductory material and terminologies in Chapters 1 and 2, Chapter 3 
(Research Thrust 1) is focused on developing a framework for answering the 
manufacturer’s first decision: “will this design make it to market?” under myopic or non-
strategic conditions which in reality means “does the profit improve the retailer’s 
profitability?”  If so, it the product is likely to make it to market.  Additionally, marketing 
considerations such as slotting allowances and a switching cost threshold are considered 
in concert with engineering design.  Chapter 4 (Research Thrust 2) extends the design 
methodology from Chapter 3 to consider retailer and manufacturer price setting to answer 
the manufacturer’s second question: “what design will perform well assuming prices 
reach equilibrium at the wholesale and retail level?” under strategic considerations.  This 
means that the focal manufacturer expects all other players (manufacturers and retailers) 
to play their best response to all other best response functions and his design should be 
optimal under that scenario.  Chapter 5 (Research Thrust 3) addresses the first question 
but reframes the second question to “what design is optimal if uncertain strategies and 
outcomes go against me?”  This means he wishes to consider in advance how other 
player’s strategies and even events might make his design suboptimal.  Additionally the 
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approach in Chapter 5, extends the prior approaches to multiple products sold separately 
and in a bundle.  Robust optimization is applied as an approach to consider multi-
disciplinary sources of uncertainty.   
In this chapter, conclusions and highlights about each of the Research Thrusts are 
provided in Section 6.1.  The main contributions of the dissertation are discussed in 
Section 6.2 and possible future research directions are presented in Section 6.3. 
6.1 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 A subsection is devoted below to concluding remarks for each of the Research 
Thrusts. 
6.1.1 ENGINEERING PRODUCT DESIGN OPTIMIZATION FOR RETAIL 
CHANNEL ACCEPTANCE 
In this first research thrust the dominance of the channel dominating retailer was 
established with significant evidence from news reports (Frontline, 2004), academic 
journals (Singh, 2006), annual reports (Annual Reports, 2006) and even books devoted to 
channel dominating retailers (Fishman, 2006).  Although modern design methodologies 
do take into account the preferences of the end consumer the extant approaches have 
neglected the preferences of the retailer and in particular neglected the engineering design 
considerations.  The strong evidence of channel control which dictates a need to develop 
designs that have a high probability of acceptance to the retailer was the impetus for this 
research thrust.   
While typical design methodologies attempt to maximize customer utility they do 
not address the metric by which retailers measure a product:  assortment profitability 
(Simpson et al., 2001).  The impact of a new product design on retailer’s assortment 
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determines its likelihood of acceptance.  If the design provides significant profit 
improvements for the retailer one would expect that the design would readily have access 
to shelf space.  This concept of requiring that designs improve retailer profitability or 
provide an improved value proposition is the basis of research thrust one.   
The manufacturer can improve retailer profitability and gain access to the market 
in one of three ways:  (1) providing low wholesale prices for improved retailer margin, (2) 
designing products with increased customer utility to allow increased retail prices or an 
alternative for those customers not currently purchasing a product, or (3) providing a 
slotting allowance to the retailer.  The first method is obvious and directly reduces the 
profitability of the manufacturer’s product which is our focus along with attaining 
channel acceptance.  The second and third approaches are used simultaneously in this 
research thrust to increase profitability of the retailer while simultaneously ensuring 
channel acceptance.   
To model retailer acceptance and increase profitability, a discrete choice model 
consisting of latent class segments is employed.  This approach allows one to consider 
the preferences of like customers separately to determine how a potential design fits the 
market.  This is key to assessing the impact on the retailer’s assortment with regard to 
profitability and thus acceptability.  Through a careful translation of engineering design 
variables into higher level customer relevant product attributes one can estimate the 
segment share attained by any given engineering design.  This estimation of segment 
share leads to an estimate of market share which directly contributes to the 
manufacturer’s profitability and along with retail margins determine retailer acceptance.   
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To model the retailer acceptance criteria a chance constraint is employed.  This 
chance constraint takes into account the uncertainty in customer preferences along with 
the effect of slotting allowances which is added as a deterministic quantity.  The chance 
constraint provides a convenient framework to assess the probability of acceptance of the 
design given uncertain segment preferences and allows the manufacturer to 
simultaneously tailor his slotting allowance to achieve a probability of retailer acceptance.  
 In this research thrust, it is demonstrated that both improved design and slotting 
allowances can increase manufacturer profitability and the probability of retail channel 
acceptance.  Additionally, it is demonstrated that a wide variety of designs are optimal (in 
a multi-objective sense) depending upon the level of profit and probability of acceptance 
required by the manufacturer.  Finally, this research thrust provided the groundwork for 
profit estimation, channel acceptance criteria, and the case study that were used heavily 
in the subsequent thrusts.       
6.1.2 STRATEGIC ENGINEERING PRODUCT DESIGN FOR 
MONOPOLISTIC AND DUOPOLISTIC RETAIL CHANNELS 
This research thrust extends the effort to considering pricing reactions at the 
retailer and manufacturer levels.  Given that retailers attempt to maximize the profit of 
their assortment, one would expect them not to passively accept the manufacturers’ 
suggested retail price and rather act strategically to optimize profits.  This is, of course, 
another departure from the extant literature that assumes that the manufacturer interacts 
directly with the end customer. 
To implement such an extension a strategic pricing framework is developed that 
allows manufacturers and retailers to anticipate the strategic moves of their competitors 
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and downstream channel partners under a variety of channel structures.  The framework 
allows the focal manufacturer to generate and evaluate designs in the context of the 
channel structure and therefore optimize designs taking into account the strategic pricing 
of wholesale competitors as well as the ensuing price competition that takes place at the 
retail level.  An existence proof for a unique Nash equilibrium is provided in Appendix B 
for the retailers and manufacturers.  A unique equilibrium is necessary for the 
manufacturer to accurately assess the optimality of any of his/her engineering designs. 
Several channel structures are investigated and compared in this research thrust.  
They include: manufacturer oligopoly – retailer monopoly, manufacturer oligopoly – 
non-differentiated retailer duopoly, manufacturer oligopoly – differentiated retailer 
duopoly, and manufacturer oligopoly -  retailer duopoly with exclusive contracts.  In all 
of the cases, a multi-objective genetic algorithm is used to simultaneously optimize 
manufacturer and retailer profit.  This provides an alternative approach to ensuring 
channel acceptance.  Designs on the Pareto frontier with high retailer profits would very 
likely achieve greater retailer acceptance than those only marginally better than the 
current assortment.   
In comparing the various channel cases one can conclude that different designs 
are optimal dependent upon the channel case and the manufacturer’s commitment to 
improving retailer profitability.  Consistent with economic theory (Osborne and 
Rubinstein, 1994) the monopolist achieves the greatest profits for the retailer and the least 
profitability for the focal manufacturer.  The manufacturer appears to be able to take 
advantage of the differentiated duopoly to specifically tailor products that better fit the 
two retailer’s assortments than when the retailers are identical.   The exclusive contract 
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between manufacturer and retailer is becoming more common in industrial practice and 
for good reason.  It appears that by creating a design specifically for his channel partner 
the manufacturer is able to raise that retailer’s profits substantially.  The downside is that 
the manufacturer loses access to the other retailer and forgoes significant profits through 
reduced market share. 
Ultimately, this research thrust has demonstrated the need for manufacturers to 
not only take into account pricing reactions of competitors but also the channel structure 
itself.  It also provides manufacturers with a framework to pursue exclusive contracts as 
an alternative to slotting allowances as they substantially improve the retail partner’s 
profits.    
6.1.3 MULTI-CATEGORY DESIGN OF BUNDLED PRODUCTS FOR RETAIL 
CHANNELS CONSIDERING DEMAND DEPENDENCIES AND 
UNCERTAINTY IN COMPETITIVE RESPONSE 
This research thrust extends the analysis of retail channels to consider multiple 
product categories and the bundle of products from those categories.  Because, to some 
extent, products from different categories can act as substitutions for products in other 
categories demand dependencies exist between the categories.  Additionally, a product 
bundle acts as a substitution for any of the individual products.  This is of concern to the 
retailer and manufacturer alike as cross category substation will affect category profit 
which is the metric that retailers use to accept or deny manufacturer product offerings. 
Realizing these demand dependencies exist, a design optimization formulation has 
been demonstrated that allows a manufacturer to consider the impact of offering bundled 
products along side individual products.  A NMNL formulation is used to estimate 
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market shares for all products from within the different product categories where bundles 
are treated as an additional nest along side the individual products.  In this formulation, as 
a product design becomes more attractive it increases the utility of the corresponding nest.  
That nest or category increases in inclusive utility which increases the overall market 
share of the nest at the expense of other nests or categories.  Using this approach the 
manufacturer is thus able to measure to the cross category effect and therefore able to 
optimize designs for profit across multiple categories.   
Demand estimation is just a portion of the overall multi-category product 
optimization framework.  Additionally, this approach considers that a design dependency 
exists between the products.  A design dependency means that products from different 
categories must share design variables.  In the example provided, the tools must share the 
same voltage level and battery pack.  The approach used in this research thrust treats 
these design dependencies as common or shared design variables in the MOGA.  That is 
the voltage and the battery capacity of the individual products and the bundle must be the 
same.  The selection of shared variables in the multi-category framework then becomes 
extremely important as they impact the desirability of all individual products as well as 
the bundle.   
Similar to Research Thrust 2, this research thrust considers that retailers will set 
profit maximizing retail prices after a manufacturer offers a design.  Instead of assuming 
that wholesale prices shift to a Nash equilibrium as well this research thrust assumes that 
manufacturers have imperfect information, may not act rationally (maximize profit), or 
may have different objectives (market share for example).  The uncertainty in 
manufacturer responses is treated similar to machine tolerances or environmental 
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uncertainty in formulating a robust optimization of the multi-category design framework.  
We assume intervals of uncertainty for these multi-disciplinary sources of uncertainty 
and show that all can be managed at one time using a deterministic robust optimization 
approach.   
A case study is developed for two power tools that operate off of the same battery 
pack and optimized under the pricing framework of a monopolist retailer.  A multi-
objective optimization is performed for profit and market share which are shown to be 
competing objectives.  Additionally, a robust optimization considering uncertainty in 
competitor response at the wholesale level, manufacturing tolerances and cost is 
performed.  The nominal optimum solutions dominate the robust solutions as is to be 
expected considering the additional constraint imposed (profit and market share must 
vary by less than 10%).  Most importantly, one can observe that the optimal design 
characteristics change depending upon the focal manufacturer’s objectives and tolerance 
for uncertainty in the objective functions.  Robust designs are significantly different than 
nominally optimal designs.   For example, robust designs exhibit much higher voltages 
and lower wholesale prices.  Finally, the retailer reacts favorably to the bundled products 
by pricing them in a way that it attracts significant market share in competing against the 
individual products.  Ultimately, this effort has provided a much more rich and realistic 
framework for manufacturers to simultaneously design products and product bundles for 
multiple categories consistent with actual industrial practice.    
6.2 MAIN CONTRIBUTIONS 
 Several new product design optimization approaches have been developed in this 
dissertation that specifically tailored for the emerging clout of channel controlling 
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retailers.  Each of the research thrusts provides a step forward in terms of discipline 
integration with engineering design relative to the extant approaches.   
 In research thrust one several contributions are made that make the rest of the 
dissertation possible: 
• A design acceptance criterion is established based upon the profitability of 
the retailer’s assortment.  This criterion mimics the reality of the retailer 
decision making process and is modeled in a chance constrained 
formulation that allows the manufacturer to gauge the probability of 
acceptance for any candidate design.  This improvement allows 
manufacturers to simultaneously quantify profit and risk for a design 
decision. 
• Slotting allowances are incorporated in an engineering design framework.  
This extends the engineering design approach to include a very realistic 
marketing consideration.  Additionally, the approach mimics reality by 
having the manufacturer pay a deterministic quantity to offset the 
uncertainty in the retailer’s profit. It is shown how a designer can use 
slotting allowances for any given design to achieve a probability of 
acceptance.  This may be a good alternative to changing the design to 
improve acceptability since it is possible to achieve higher profits for a 
given level of acceptability by offering a slotting allowance as compared 
to changing the optimal design. 
• Cost and market share are modeled and optimized simultaneously with 
respect to engineering design.  Costs are predicted with financial analysis 
 158
and multi-variable regression while market share predicted through a 
discrete choice analysis that includes latent consumer segments. 
• An optimization approach is presented to allow a manufacturer to trade 
profitability versus the probability of retailer acceptance.  The approach 
uses the uncertainty in a conjoint estimate to develop a chance constraint 
that bounds the feasible region for engineering design.   The objectives are 
traded against one another using the constraint epsilon approach.     
 Research Thrust 2 builds on the work of Research Thrust 1 with the primary focus 
on manufacturer and retailer strategies: 
• The primary contribution of this research thrust was to integrate the 
pricing structure in retail channels in the design process.  Prior approaches 
assumed that both manufacturer competitors and retailers were passive 
upon the entry of a new product. 
• Several pricing structures are developed that allow the manufacturer to 
more accurately gauge the positioning of a design within the marketplace.  
These structures are the most common in channel environments and all 
assume that an oligopoly of manufacturers provides products at a price to: 
a monopolist retailer, identical duopolistic retailers, differentiated 
duopolistic retailers, and duopolistic retailers with exclusive contracts.  
• Proof of a vertical Nash equilibrium is provided for multi-product retailers 
supplied by single product manufacturers.   
• In this research thrust, profit of both the focal manufacturer and retailers is 
optimized simultaneously.  This provides the manufacturer with a new 
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way to gauge retail acceptability of a candidate design.  A risk-averse 
manufacturer can forego profit for the retailers sake to improve 
acceptability by choosing a design along the Pareto frontier. 
• The approach allows us to quantify the value of providing an exclusive 
contract to a retailer which it turns out is substantial.   
• Under each of the pricing structures a variety of optimal designs are 
demonstrated which provides credence to the belief that the channel 
environment should be taken into account by designers. 
In Research Thrust 3 the overall approach is extended to consider multiple 
product categories (including bundles) along with uncertainty in competitive response: 
• The extant engineering design literature has not considered demand 
modeling for multiple product categories which is the foundation of this 
thrust.  Multiple product category demand is estimated using a NMNL 
formulation.  This provides the means to evaluate any candidate design’s 
affect on the in-category assortment as well as the related category 
assortments since some degree of substitutability exists across categories. 
• Product bundles are increasingly pervasive in retail markets and the new 
approach offered in this thrust allows retailers and manufacturers to 
evaluate the attractiveness of product bundles to end consumers as well as 
the impact of the bundle on the individual product’s profitability.   
• The design of product bundles is formulated for simultaneous evaluation 
next to the manufacturer’s individual products.  The approach allows 
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manufacturers to create products that are both optimal when sold as a 
bundle and optimal when sold as individual products. 
• Due to the fact that game theory cannot predict all strategic actions an 
alternative design framework is developed to consider the actions of 
competitors.  Uncertainty in strategic actions is very large at the 
manufacturer level where production costs, varying objectives, and 
multiple strategic dimensions (price, quality, color weight for example) 
make it impossible to conclusively prove equilibrium in strategy amongst 
competing manufacturers.  To overcome this, an established robust 
optimization technique is used to optimize multiple categories and bundles 
under uncertain intervals of model parameters in multiple disciplines.  The 
approach is implemented for uncertainty in competitor strategies, focal 
manufacturer production costs and engineering design tolerances 
providing a mechanism to account for the wide berth of uncertainties in 
product design for retail channels. 
6.3 FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS  
The multidisciplinary nature of this dissertation provides many avenues to further 
research.  Given that, the extensions and improvements with the greatest promise will be 
the focus of this section. 
6.3.1 IMPROVEMENTS IN THE RETAILER ACCEPTANCE CRITERION 
The chance constrained retailer acceptance criterion presented in Research Thrust 
1 can be extended in many ways.  First, the case of many channel retailers that must all 
be satisfied with multiple chance constraints can be investigated.  One could require that 
 161
a subset of retailers be satisfied with use of binary variables to select retailers as channel 
partners.  Thus the manufacturer could avoid developing products that satisfy retailers 
that are less appealing to a profitable customer segment than other retailers.  
Additionally, the formulation could be extended to include acceptance criterion for 
multiple products offered at one time or the option for the retailer to select n of N 
products in the lineup.  
Simplifications allowed us to exclude the affect of time but future work under this 
framework could include changing consumer demand profiles through the use of the net 
present value and other emerging models including the use of an option theory (Hull, 
2006).  Changing consumer demand profiles or utilities might be approximated using a 
time series of conjoint data and linear regression or standard forecasting techniques.  As 
an example, consider the case where customer preferences are changing rapidly in the 
automotive sector to prefer more fuel efficient cars or novel designs such as crossover 
vehicles.  One could measure the affect of econometric data (e.g., current gasoline price) 
on these changing utilities and couple these observations with an econometric forecast 
(e.g., gasoline price forecast) to predict the changes in future customer segment utilities.  
Clearly these, changing preferences would affect the solution, especially when a 
relatively low discount rate is applied to future cash flows, and is an area open for 
research.  
6.3.2 IMPROVEMENTS IN STRATEGIC INTERACTIONS 
 In the future it would be useful to extend the strategic actions of the 
methodologies developed in Research Thrust 2 to take into account competitor strategies 
in other attributes (amperage, weight etc.) as we have only considering reactions in the 
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short term which is limited to price.  This would be a very difficult task as noted in the 
motivation for robust optimization in research Thrust 3.   To do this it would be necessary 
to prove profit quasi-concavity in all competitor design variables.   
 Second, it would also be useful to consider that the manufacturer may have 
multiple products within channel segment.  With slight modifications, the proof in 
Appendix B can be extended to a multi-product manufacturer in a differentiated retail 
monopoly, duopoly, or oligopoly.    Under such a formulation the manufacturer could 
attempt to optimize a line of products competing within the same product category.  Such 
an extension could also be used to optimize individual products competing with bundles 
in multiple product categories.  A proof of existence of a vertical Nash equilibrium for 
the NMNL formulation would be useful for this extension.   
 Finally, our strategic interactions have not considered the possibility of the retailer 
offering an “in-house” brand.  In-house brands can be outsourced to external 
manufacturers or developed by a division owned by the retailer.  In either case, the 
retailer has strategic control over the product attributes beyond the pricing considering in 
this dissertation.  More importantly, the retailer’s profit function will change to include 
the wholesale margin when the product is produced within the corporation.  This fact 
may change the solution to pricing equilibrium, as well as access to shelf space (see e.g., 
Amrouche and Zaccour, 2007) and adds additional strategy variables for the retailer 
making the problem more complex.   
6.3.3 PRODUCT LINE FORMULATION 
 A product line refers to two or more products offered by a firm within a product 
category.  Product lines and more specifically product families have recently received 
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attention in the engineering design literature (see e.g., Simpson, 1998) as manufacturers 
attempt to manage costs through commonality of design.  Product families share common 
features or components and offer the greatest opportunity for extensions of the present 
work in retail channels.  Commonality of design for the product family or line can 
produce economies of scope or scale which of course contributes to profits for a 
manufacturer.  A flexible core design or designs for can increase agility in adapting to 
changing customer needs which would be a competitive advantage in retaining value 
through optionality (Jiao et al., 2006).   
 Given these attributes and the prevalence of product families in retail channels an 
extension to that end would be an appropriate application of the methodologies developed 
in this dissertation.  First and foremost it would be important to understand the retailer’s 
acceptance criterion in light of the entire product line or family.  The retailer pricing and 
assortment selection decision has been theoretically modeled (Villas-Boas, 1998) for 
simple demand models where the retailer has discretion to select any portion of the 
product line to maximize profits for the assortment.  Actual industry input is difficult to 
come by but it would be very useful to know whether or not retailers accept or reject 
entire product lines or fractions thereof.  Absent this information it should still be 
possible to extend the present formulation to include several aspects relevant to product 
lines.    
 First the manufacturer can take into account the retailer acceptance criterion 
(Research Thrust 1) and pricing for his/her product line as it spans across multiple 
product categories (including bundles) using the nested logit formulation demonstrated in 
Research Thrust 3.  This extended formulation could be used in concert with an improved 
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cost model that considers design commonality to optimize profits across the entire 
product line.  Such a formulation should be able to capture design trends in improving 
retailer acceptance for the product line as well as profitability for a product line.  
 Additionally, the extent to which design integration between products contributes 
to product line success might be modeled as in the bundling approach presented in 
Chapter 5.  For example, a manufacturer that offers a highly integrated or dependent 
product line that customers value might find greater success.  An example might be how 
a power tool line that operates off of a common inexpensive battery and a proprietary 
quick change chuck system (portion of the tool that holds bits) might experience greater 
acceptance for the entire product line due to design integration.  The end customers 
perceive value in the optional use of common parts for subsequent tool purchases for 
emerging requirements. 
 More obviously, the product line can be optimized to best fit the existing 
assortment and underserved customers which are of primary importance to the retailer.  
Villas-Boas (1998) suggests that manufacturers should increase product line diversity to 
mirror the targeting strategy of retailer.  This would be accomplished again through the 
nested logit formulation with customer segments who are presently more or less served 






This is a regression of product attributes to predict cost of an Angle Grinder cited in 
Section 3.5.2. 
SUMMARY OUTPUT  
       
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.886063     
R Square 0.785107     
Adjusted R Square0.759826     
Standard Error 9.405603     
Observations 20     
  
ANOVA       
  df SS MS F Sig F  
Regression 2 5494.5 2747 31.055 2.1E-06  
Residual 17 1503.9 88.5   
Total 19 6998.4       
  
  Coeff. Std Err t Stat P-valueLow 95% Up 95% 
Intercept -29.2941 9.3861 -3.12 0.0062 -49.097 -9.49117
Amps (A) 3.616034 0.6987 5.18 8E-05 2.14188 5.09019
P/W (watts/lbf) 0.186567 0.0416 4.48 0.0003 0.09873 0.2744











APPENDIX B - PROOFS 
B.1 PREPARATORY MATERIAL 
LEMMA 1 
 If f is quasiconcave, then any strict local maximum is a strict global solution 
(Wolfe P., 1970) 
Proof of Lemma 1 by Contradiction (WolfStetter, 2000) 
Assume that the contrary is true, i.e., a strict local maximum x* is not a global maximum 
for a quasiconcave function f.  For x* to not be a global maximum there must exist some 
point y where ( ) ( )*xfyf ≥  (see  Figure    B1). 









Figure    B1:   Lemma 1 
 
 All points X’ in the local neighborhood of x* must lie below f(x*) by the definition 
of a strict local maximum yet if the function is quasiconcave all points between x* and y 
must be greater than f(x*) (the minimum of the two).   A contradiction exists and  f(y) 
cannot lie above f(x*) for f to be quasiconcave.  Thus all points of a quasiconcave 
function must lie below f(x*).  A strict local maximum x* of a quasiconcave function is 
therefore a global maximum.    
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B.2 THEOREM 1 – RETAILERS’ MULTIPRODUCT NASH EQUILIBRIUM 
A Nash equilibrium in prices exists for a retailer carrying an assortment of n products in a 
category of N products carried by all retailers. 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
A retailer with n products seeks to maximize the sum of the n profits subject to similar 
profit maximizing responses from other retailers.  For a Nash price equilibrium to exist 
the profit function must then be quasiconcave in the prices Pn.  For a unique price 
equilibrium to exist the profit function must be strictly quasiconcave in prices.  The 
general structure of the proof will be to first show that the profit function is quasiconcave 
and then to show that the stationary point(s) are strict local maximum  (Lemma 1).   
Nomenclature for Proof: 
mi Market Share of Product i in the focal retailer’s assortment 
mj Market Share of Products j=1,2,..n in the focal retailer’s assortment  
Utot Represent eU where U represents the total utility of all products at other retailers 
and the no choice option. 
Wi Wholesale price of Product i 
Wj Wholesale price of Products  j=1,2,..n 
Pi Retail price of Product i 
Pj Retail price of Products j=1,2,..n  
Ui Utility of non-price attributes Product i 
Uj Utility of non-price attributes of Product j 
µ Scaling factor for price utility 









































































































The profit for the focal retailer is then the sum of the two products 







π    (B2.2) 





























     (B2.5) 
Using the above simplifications the first derivative of π with respect to price of product i 
is: 





















π   (B2.6) 





















π    (B2.7) 












jjjiii WPmWPm µ    (B2.8) 












jjjiiiii WPmWPWPm µ     (B2.9) 











µ    (B2.10)          
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Thus the retailer’s margin (Pi-Wi) on product i can be determined in terms of all other 
products and the customer price scaling factor µ. 
 Now we look to see if by symmetry the absolute margin or markup is the same for 
any other product in the focal retailer’s assortment n.  We change the product index to 
any arbitrary value γ in the assortment where γ≠i  to see if all products in n must have the 
same absolute margin at stationary points:  
Replacing i with the arbitrary product γ in Eq. B2.1- B2.10 shows that the absolute 
markup on γ is also a function of all products in the retailers assortment (Eq. B2.10).   
Thus the absolute markup is equivalent and all products in n have equal markups at 
stationary points for the focal retailer: 
( ) ( )γγ WPWP ii −=−                 (B2.11) 
 This result allows us to introduce the markup variable θ=Pi - Wi  as a substitute for 
the multiple price variables Pi which we’ve shown is valid for all products at stationary 
points for the retailer of interest (Eq. B2.6).   This new variable transforms the 
optimization to a single variable optimization.  The constant markup assumption although 
not pervasive in the modeling literature is not without precedent (Sudhir, 2001).  Our 
application of the single variable transformation is important because the more obvious 
approach of analyzing quasi-concavity for multiple variables with a bordered Hessian 
fails to guarantee quasi-concavity.   
 Additionally, for this assumption to be valid we only need to assume that profit is 
maximized at a stationary point as the set of constant markup solutions represents all 
stationary points.  We know that profit function does not increase asymptotically at prices 
equal to infinity (market share goes to zero at the limit) or at prices at their lowest level 
 170
(wholesale prices) and thus the maximum must at least be at a stationary point satisfying 
the first order condition.  This does not prove quasi-concavity for the entire profit 
function though using the first derivatives and the second derivatives to create the 
bordered Hessian (sufficient condition) can show that the profit function is at least quasi-
concave for large regions of price.  
 Instead, we use the result of constant markups at stationary points to transform the 
original problem and prove that the entire function is quasi-concave.  The new profit 




















































1    (2.12) 





















































    (2.13) 
The profit function simplifies to: 
Nkr θπ =      (B2.14) 







∂          (B2.15) 









π 2     (B2.16) 
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µθ         (B2.20) 
 Interestingly, this result shows that as the retailer becomes nearly a monopolist (or 
dominates k) the margin will go up which seems to agree with overall economic 
interpretation of monopoly pricing and greater consolidation of power.  Recall that the 















π kNkr     (B2.21) 
Clearly if θ (markup) is increased from the solution to the first order condition Eq. 
(B2.20)  then the slope is always negative (or profit is decreasing) because k-1 is always 
negative as the sum of market shares cannot exceed one (see Eq. B2.21).  If θ (markup) 
which is non-negative is decreased then the slope is always increasing from zero and is 
thus positive (Eq. B2.21).  Thus the profit function is at least quasi-concave in the non-
negative markup variable. 
 Quasiconcavity proves that a Nash equilibrium exists but does not prove that a 
unique Nash equilibrium exists.  It is necessary to prove that the function is strictly 
quasiconcave.             










π 2     (B2.22) 











































































































































































































































































2 )(    (B2.32) 
Evaluating the second derivative Eq. B2.32 at the solution to the first order condition (Eq. 
B2.21) shows that the profit function is negative definite at all stationary points and thus 
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unique Nash equilibrium exists (Lemma 1).  This solution takes nearly the same form as 
the single product per retailer equilibrium developed by Anderson, De Palma, and Thisse 
(1992).     
 The constant margin result of this proof can easily be shown numerically without 
enforcing the constant margin.  For a wide range of utility inputs and wholesale prices we 
were able to reach first order solutions where the margin on the products within the 
retailers assortment was identical even though each price was considered a design 
variable in the numerical optimization of first derivatives.  One cautionary note, is that it 
is possible for prices to diverge toward infinity as the first order conditions numerically 
satisfied when k falls extremely low due to high prices.  This difficulty is easy to 
overcome though by constraining prices to less than some large unreasonable value (e.g., 
$10000 for an angle grinder) 
B.3 THEOREM 2 – MANUFACTURER’S SINGLE PRODUCT NASH 
EQUILIBRIUM 
A Nash equilibrium in wholesale prices exists for a manufacturer selling products 




A manufacturer with 2 retailers seeks to maximize the sum of the profits from the 2 
retailers subject to similar responses from other manufacturers.  For a Nash price 
equilibrium to exist the profit function must then be quasiconcave in the prices Wri.  For a 
unique price equilibrium to exist the profit function must be strictly quasiconcave in 
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prices.  The general structure of the proof will be to first show that the profit function is 
quasiconcave and then to show that the stationary point(s) are strict local maximum  
(Lemma 1).  We assume that the retail margins θi are known from Theorem 1.   
Nomenclature: 
mri Market Share of Product i at retailer r 
Пi Manufacturer Profit 
Wri Wholesale price of Product i at retailer r 
Uri Utility of non-price attributes Product i at retailer r 
 



























































































































The profit for the focal retailer is then the sum of the two products 
( ) ( )NCWmNCWm iiiiiii −+−=Π 2211     (B3.2) 






























∂       (B3.5) 
Using the above simplifications the first derivative of πr with respect to price of product i 
is: 
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)(   (B3.7) 
( ) ( ) 0)1( 2211 =−++−− iiiiii CWmCWm µ    (B3.8) 
( ) ( ) ( ) 022111 =−++−−− iiiiiiii CWmCWCWm µ    (B3.9) 
( ) ( ) ( )iiiiiiii CWCWmCWm −=−++− 12211 µ           (B3.10) 
Thus the manufacturer’s margin (W1i-Ci) at retailer 1 on product i can be determined in 
terms of the characteristics of both retailers (see m1i and m2i) and the price scaling factor 
µ. 
Taking the 1st derivative with respect to the wholesale price for retailer 2 yields the same 
result: 
( ) ( ) ( )iiiiiiii CWCWmCWm −=−++− 22211 µ    (B3.11) 
The left sides of Eq. B3.10 and Eq. B3.11 are equivalent and thus the markup of all 
products in are equal at all stationary points for the focal manufacturer: 
( ) ( )iiii CWCW −=− 21              (B3.12) 
 This result allows us to introduce a wholesale markup variable ωi=Wri - Ci  as a 
substitute for the multiple wholesale price variables Wri which we’ve shown is valid for 
all products at stationary points for the manufacturer of interest (Eq. B3.12) .   This new 
variable transforms the optimization to a single variable optimization similar to Theorem 
1.  We assume that the manufacturer’s profit will be maximized at a stationary point and 
proceed with the now transformed single variable optimization.  This constant markup for 
the manufacturer means that given identical production costs and transaction costs the 
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wholesale price charged to each of the retailers will be the same.  If a retailer is more 
costly to work with (delays payments, many customer returns etc.) the assumption that Ci 
is not constant for all retailers can be changed to include the disparity in retailer 
performance. 




































































  (B3.13) 





































































   (B3.14) 
The profit function simplifies to: 
Nki ω=Π       (B3.15) 
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µω       (B3.21) 
 Like Theorem 1,  this result shows that as the manufacturer becomes nearly a 
monopolist (or dominates k)  the margin will go up.  Recall that the first derivative of 















kNki     (B3.22) 
Clearly if ω (markup) is increased from the solution to the first order condition Eq. 
(B3.21)  then the slope is always negative (or profit is decreasing) because k-1 is always 
negative as the sum of market shares cannot exceed one (see Eq. B3.22).  If ω (markup) 
which is non-negative is decreased then the slope is always increasing from zero and is 
thus positive (Eq. B3.22).  Thus the profit function is at least quasi-concave in the non-
negative markup variable. 
 Quasiconcavity proves that a Nash equilibrium exists but does not prove that a 
unique Nash equilibrium exists.  It is necessary to prove that the function is strictly quasi-
concave.  Because k and П take the same form as Theorem 1 the rest of the proof is 






APPENDIX C:  COMPUTATIONAL ISSUES 
 The computation of the strategic cases as posed requires a tri-level optimization as 
shown in Figure 4.4.1.   Initially, the engineering module selects designs to populate the 
first generation of a Multi Objective Genetic Algorithm (Deb, 2001).  Each design is sent 
to the wholesale pricing level where prices are selected using Matlab’s gradient based 
constrained optimizer fmincon.  At the third level retail prices are set using fmincon.    
 For the monopoly case each objective function call (profit maximization) at the 
retail level requires just one retailer profit calculation (RPC).  Matlab’s fmincon proceeds 
iteratively (RI=retailer iterations) to find the global maximum profit with respect to retail 
price through a typical gradient based optimization.  Thus the time to find retail prices 
given a wholesale price is of the order (RI×RPC).  Retail prices can only be selected after 
each of the wholesale prices is  known for the n manufacturers.  It is assumed that 
manufacturers are operating as a small oligopoly with perfect information.  As such we 
find wholesale prices by minimizing the sum of the square of profit derivatives for all 
manufacturers (Eq. 4.5).  This requires a baseline function call of wholesale profits 
(Wholesale Profit Calculation) and a finite difference calculation for each manufacturer 
meaning that wholesale profits must be computed n+1 times for all iterations of the 
constrained minimization.  Assuming the constrained minimization takes a number of 
iterations (WI=Wholesale iterations) the computational complexity at the wholesale level 
will be dependent upon the number of manufacturers and will thus be (n+1) ×WI×WPC.   
 The WPC time is almost entirely dependent upon the retail price calculation.  This 
is because the retail prices can take 30 to 40 seconds to converge for a monopoly but 
once known the market shares are trivial in comparison.  Thus, the time complexity of 
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WPC is of the order: RI×RPC.   The time complexity for the monopoly wholesale price 
equilibrium for each design is of the order  (n+1) ×WI× RI×RPC.  Given a generation of 
size N each generation in the genetic algorithm requires approximately:   
Genmonopoly=N (n+1) ×WI× RI×RPC 
 The time complexity of the duopoly is similar except that additional function calls 
are required to find the Nash equilibrium at the retail level.  Each retailer r must set prices 
on the n products that are best responses to their competitor’s prices.  Much like the 
wholesale level we solve for retail prices by minimizing the sum of the squares of the 
first derivatives (Eq. 4.2).  The computation of the first derivatives is performed with 
finite differences and therefore requires a baseline profit function call and n additional 
function calls for each retailer r.  Thus, the time complexity at the retail level now 
becomes (1+r×n)RPC.  In our case we investigate 4 manufacturers and two retailers so 
the retail level iterations take approximately 8 times longer than the monopoly case.  The 
duopoly generations require a time approximation of: Genduopoly=N (n+1) ×WI× 
RI×(1+r×n)RPC.    
 Empirically, these approximations are born out by the evidence that each 
wholesale price for a given design required approximately 30 seconds for the monopoly 
case and 4 minutes for the duopoly case.   
 While the wholesale and retail profit functions are strictly quasi-concave it is 
numerically necessary to use constrained minimization because the slope of the 
multinomial logit (MNL) profit function approaches zero as prices approach infinity (See 




















Figure    C1:   MNL Profit Function 
 If one examines point A in Figure    C1 it is clear that a gradient based optimizer 
searching for stationary points (Eq. 4.2 and Eq. 4.5) is equally likely to find the 
maximum and the minimum of the MNL profit function if left unconstrained.   As such, 
we require the Nash equilibrium solutions for both the retail (Duopoly) and wholesale 
levels to satisfy the following constraints: (1) Hessian must be negative definite; (2) Price 
must be less than $X.  ($2 for the example above).  If characteristics of the MNL function 
are relatively stable across all designs considered it is possible to limit the required 
constraints to just constraint 2.  For example, if the designer knows that the transition 
from a negative definite Hessian to a positive definite Hessian (approximately point A) is 
always greater than $X then constraint 2 can be used alone to eliminate the computational 
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